Considering the Options: The Purpose and Authority of Practical Deliberation. by Forrester, Alexa A.
Considering the Options: 










A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Philosophy) 









Professor Elizabeth S. Anderson, Chair 
Associate Professor Sarah Buss 
Associate Professor Gregg D. Crane 
Professor Stephen L. Darwall, Yale University 
 












To Dwight and Nita, 











I would like to thank the members of my committee:  Liz Anderson, for the 
example you set, for all the time and energy you have invested in this project, and for the 
important resources you have provided intellectually and personally, including your 
apparently never-ending reserve of insight and calm.  Sarah Buss, for the fact that you, 
joining this endeavor so late in the game, have somehow managed to provide a 
disproportional amount of priceless help.  Stephen Darwall, for sticking with me from 
afar, and for being right about so many things.  Scott Shapiro, for your general guidance, 
and for an incredibly helpful phone call at a pivotal moment in the development of my 
ideas.  Gregg Crane, for deftly walking the line between philosophy and literature.  I 
would also like to thank a number of other philosophers who have played a role in 
shaping my thoughts on this project: David Velleman, Rich Thomason, Eric Lormand, 
Daniel Stoljar, Peter Railton, Victor Caston, and Allan Gibbard.  And, of course, I am 
grateful for the general support of others along the way, especially Louis Loeb, Ken 
Walton, and Herman Cappelen. 
I would like to thank all of my fellow graduate students, and in particular David 
Dick, Tim Sundell, Josh Brown, Ivan Mayerhofer, and Eleni Manis.  You know why I 
love you and what I owe you.  I would also like to thank the many encouraging friends 
who have rooted for me along the way: Chris Cromwell, Heather Stickeler (Ikemire!), 
Liz Warburton, Derek Mong, Annie Fisher, Geoff and Kate and Iris Maturen, Vicki 
 iv 
Timpe, Erin Donnelly, Anne Schafer, Andrea Landis, and Alice Baker—I carry you all 
around with me every day.  I would also like to thank the many amazing poets and 
writers who have, over the years, blessed me with beautifully-crafted breaks from 
philosophical texts.  
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities, who, during a moment of grad-school fatigue, reminded me why I love the 
academy.  Michèle Leaman, I am especially grateful for your support as I literally grew 
into motherhood, and for your on-going friendship. 
And then, of course, I would like to thank my family. Mom and Dad, for planting 
and nurturing the seed.  To Jon, Bryan, Ginny and Cliff, Lani and Tommy, Sarah, Sandra, 
Gigi, Garth and Kendra, Andrea and Alison, Ann and Dave, and Charles, and to my 
extended family, Beth and Monte, Jean and Norm, Cindy and Mike, Frank and Laura, 
Barbara and Tom, and Melody, and all your above-average children and grandchildren, 
for ensuring that I always feel loved.  Thanks to Teak and Cypress, my cats, for putting 
up with the multiple cross-country moves that were required to make this possible.  To 
Cameron, thank you for your joyful disposition and patience.  And, finally, to Chris, 











Dedication ........................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ iii 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter One. Why Deliberate? ............................................................................................1 
Chapter Two. The Search for Rational Deliberation .........................................................31 
Chapter Three. Normative Authority and Deliberation .....................................................62 
Chapter Four. The Vindication of Values..........................................................................92 











This dissertation is about practical deliberation: why we do it and what is at stake 
when we do.  Contemporary ethicists tend to take one of two possible positions regarding 
the purpose of practical deliberation.  Either deliberation is purely instrumental, serving 
heterogeneous ends fixed by motivational dispositions over which an agent has no 
rational control, or deliberation serves one particular meta-end—such as the systematic 
justification of desires or the inclination toward self-understanding—the possession of 
which is a precondition on rational agency.  I argue that neither of these options yields an 
adequate understanding of motivational psychology, and offer instead a third option that 
takes deliberation to be a process of open-ended problem-solving aimed at overcoming 
actual instances of motivational uncertainty.  I call this position the prospectivist account 
of deliberation. 
Chapter One argues that prospectivism is a distinct theoretical option, reducible to 
neither instrumentalism nor a meta-end account of deliberation.  Chapter Two defends 
the position that prospective deliberation meets the two constraints on practical reason: it 
is both practical and rational.  Chapter Three argues that normative theory should not 
proceed without an awareness of the reflective conditions that give rise to the question of 
what to do.  I call this the guidance-first approach to normativity.  I answer Nomy 
Arpaly’s explicit challenge to the guidance-first approach, and I use prospectivism to 
modify and correct existing accounts of the conditions that give rise to deliberation, 
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specifically, those offered by Thomas Nagel and Christine Korsgaard.  Chapter Four 
defends an evidential theory of normative justification: a given value’s capacity to guide 
unproblematic activity serves as evidence for, i.e. justification of, that value.  Chapter 
Five argues that prospectivist deliberation suffices to explain the data that is usually cited 
in favor of free will, in part by providing an account of how prospectivist deliberation can 
be used to justify claims of moral responsibility.  Since prospectivist deliberation is also 












1.1  The Desiderata 
 In order to support theories of agency and practical reason, our best account of 
motivational psychology must allow us to do the following. 
(a) Ground the distinction between the total set of an agent’s physical behavior and 
the subclass of her behavior that is motivated behavior (i.e., goal-oriented 
behavior).   
 
(b) Explain the trigger for, and aim of, deliberation.  This includes accounting for 
both means-end deliberation and deliberation of ends (reflection during which we 
consider potential ends themselves and attempt to determine whether to adopt 
those ends). 
 
(c) Ground the distinction between motivated behavior and the even smaller subclass 
of deliberate behavior. 
 
These desiderata are interrelated.  We should expect that how we account for any one will 
influence how we account for the others. 
  
1.2  Standard Belief-Desire Psychology 
The position that belief and desire are distinct mental states, and that the former is 
governed by reason, while the latter is not, is often attributed to Hume and called 
‘Humean.’  I wish to sidestep interpretive issues here, so I will focus on the position 
itself, which I will call “standard belief-desire psychology.”  The basic idea is that 
motivated behavior is caused (and distinguished) by two isolated components—a 
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volitional component and a cognitive component.  The former fixes the ends at which an 
agent aims, and the latter fixes the means to those ends.     
Belief-desire psychology can easily ground the distinction between mere behavior 
and motivated behavior.  Any behavior guided by appropriately related belief-desire pairs 
counts as motivated behavior.   Any behavior not guided by beliefs and desires does not.  
But the belief-desire model encounters difficulties when explaining the trigger for, and 
aim of deliberation, and grounding the distinction between all motivated behavior and a 
smaller subclass of consciously-guided deliberate behavior. 
 One initial problem is that, if passion alone is responsible for fixing ends, then it 
seems we are faced with a dilemma.  First, we might believe passion is determinate—that 
whenever there is a case of conflict between desires, the intrinsic properties of the desires 
is what settles the issue.1  The problem with this is that it would make the familiar 
phenomenon of practical deliberation about goals inexplicable.  If an agent’s desires are 
on their own equipped to resolve any potential conflict with other desires, then an agent 
would never have cause to deliberate about whether she should do one thing or another.  
And if she did so deliberate, such deliberation would be causally inefficacious.  Her 
passions would dictate what she was going to do, unresponsive to her judgment of 
whether she should do it.  This hypothesis contradicts our common experience of 
instances in which we try to decide between two competing goals by reflective 
deliberation, instances in which our decisions seem, at least in most cases, to make the 
difference in what we do.  Of course, our experience may be deceptive.  Perhaps it simply 
                                                        
1 One popular candidate property to play this role is brute hydraulic strength of a desire, but some 
other property could serve the role instead.  The important point is that, whatever property serves 
the role, it must be intrinsic to the competing desires, and capable of settling the competition on 
its own, i.e., without arbitration or moderation. 
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seems like we engage in causally efficacious deliberation of ends, but in fact we never 
do.  This is a conclusion, I believe, we should accept only if and when we have ruled out 
all competing theories of motivation that would vindicate our deliberative experience. 
The second prong of the dilemma is to admit that while passion is the only thing 
that can fix one’s ends, sometimes it fails to do so.  And in these cases, we become 
unsure of what we will do.  But this cannot be right either.  For, although it preserves our 
intuition that we can sometimes be uncertain about what to aim for, it gives us no power 
to overcome this uncertainty.  In other words, it does not help explain the trigger or aim 
of deliberation, only the cause of uncertainty.  Furthermore, if this were an accurate 
account of motivation, we would expect to encounter much more often than we actually 
do cases in which agents have become motivationally stuck.  All around, our fellow 
citizens would be simply standing still because their passions were in conflict, were not 
themselves capable of resolving the conflict, and nothing else was.   
Of these two options, the first is more tenable.  Therefore, a regular companion of 
belief-desire psychology is hydraulicism: the claim that the stronger desire (in the 
hydraulic, rather than phenomenological sense of strength) always wins, and that in 
almost all cases of conflict one desire is stronger than the other.2 
Hydraulic belief-desire psychology can straightforwardly explain the distinction 
between motivated and mere behavior.  To have a goal is to have an end that is backed by 
a desire stronger than any competing desires and enabled by appropriate means-end 
beliefs.  Motivated behavior is all behavior guided by belief-desire pairs; mere behavior 
                                                        
2 Again, hydraulicism is only one option for how passions might be causally determinate.  I will 
not explore other possibilities here, except to say that any theory that proposes that desires are 
always capable of working things out on their own will be subject to the same criticisms I level 
against hydraulicism. 
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is any behavior not guided by belief-desire pairs.  But what resources, if any, does 
hydraulic belief-desire psychology have to account for the phenomenon of deliberation, 
particularly deliberation of ends, and the difference between the broad class of motivated 
behavior and deliberate action?   
One approach to explaining desiderata (b) and (c) within the standard belief-
desire framework is to posit a meta-end that 1) triggers deliberation, 2) is not itself in 
question during deliberation, 3) provides standards whereby other ends are organized, 
and 4) enforces the conclusions of deliberation.  The literature offers many candidate 
meta-ends, for example: the aim of doing what is best all things considered (Davidson3); 
the aim of maximizing utility (rational choice theory); the aim of acquiring self-
understanding (Velleman4); the aim of doing what is justified (Smith5); and the need to 
act only in accordance with reasons for acting (Korsgaard, on one interpretation6).  
Granted, these meta-ends are not always offered specifically in response to the above 
desiderata, nor as meta-ends as such.  However, I believe it is the dialectical 
responsibility of those who posit these deliberative aims to explain how else they can be 
interpreted, if not as meta-ends.7 
During deliberation, a meta-end has authority not because of its strength, but 
because of its status.  As the end whereby other ends are organized, i.e., the end that 
                                                        
3 Davidson, Donald. 1980/2001.  See, in particular, “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” (21-
42) 
4 Velleman, J. David. 2000. 
5 Smith, Michael. 1994. 
6 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. 
7 Another option for explaining deliberation of ends is to posit two distinct sources of motivated 
behavior, one that is entirely accounted for by hydraulic belief-desire psychology, and another, 
which operates entirely independent from the influence of desire and which generates intentions  
and choices. This approach is taken by R. Jay Wallace (2006).  I believe this position is unstable, 
fluctuating between either positing a hydraulically backed meta-end or endorsing an untenable 
metaphysics. 
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deliberation serves, it is not itself in question.  Of course, in order for a meta-end to 
trigger deliberation in the first place, and to enforce deliberation’s conclusions, it must be 
backed by a volitional mechanism that is stronger than any of the various heterogeneous 
desires that would otherwise move the agent.  By attributing to all deliberators a meta-
end backed by a such a mechanism, we can account for the existence of agents who 
deliberate regularly about what their goals should be, while still maintaining the spirit of 
belief-desire psychology.  
Turning to desideratum (c), we must ask how a meta-end might help explain the 
difference between motivated behavior and deliberate behavior.  To illustrate the 
difference, consider the following example from Velleman. 
…a child accidentally brushes a glass off of the table, and your hand shoots out to 
catch it.  Everything happens so fast that you see your hand catching the glass 
before you fully realize that the glass is falling…[This] is an instance of behavior 
directed at a goal, but it isn’t a full-blooded exercise of your agency…the 
reflexive extension of your hand is aimed at something—namely, preventing the 
glass from smashing on the floor.  Despite being goal directed, however, this 
behavior still lacks some element that’s necessary to full-blooded action.  So what 
makes for action is not simply being goal directed.8 
 
How can belief-desire psychology make up the difference?  Again, meta-end accounts 
can be deployed here.  The requisite distinction between automatic goal-oriented 
behavior and deliberate goal-oriented behavior can be grounded in an agency-bestowing 
meta-end.  For example, Velleman takes any action guided by the aim of self-
understanding to be full-blooded action.9  
In what follows, I hope to show that the three desiderata can be better explained 
without positing a meta-end.  The explanation will be better in the sense that it is more 
                                                        
8 Velleman, J. David. 2000. (189-190) 
9 Velleman, 2000. (See in particular 193-199) 
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parsimonious and also because it preserves some room for a genuine sense in which we, 
rather than passions or inclinations that we happen to have, control our fates. 
 
1.3  A Prospectivist Account of Motivated behavior 
1.3.1  Deweyan starting points 
John Dewey offers an understanding of the cause and purpose of practical 
deliberation that differs significantly from the meta-end view.  He begins with the 
observation that humans are naturally active beings.  Second, he observes that human 
activity10 is guided primarily by habit and impulse.  In other words, most of what we do 
is done not because we decide to do it, but rather because we have developed a habit of 
doing it, or are moved by some subconscious impulse to do it.  This does not mean that 
there is no explanation for such activity, just that the explanation does not involve an 
appeal to conscious desires and aversions, nor to the process of deliberation.  Which 
brings us to the third salient feature of Dewey’s theory:  It is only when a conflict among 
habits, impulses, and/or the environment interrupts our natural activity that deliberation 
begins.  That is, deliberation is a means to restoring activity that, until a particular point 
of conflict, was proceeding smoothly.  The fourth important point follows naturally: the 
constitutive aim of deliberation is the overcoming of conflict and the subsequent 
restoration of natural activity. 
Dewey believes that humans engage in “original, unlearned activity.”11  His name 
for the forces that spur this activity is impulse.  Infants emerge from the womb crying, 
clenching their fists, kicking their legs, etc.   It seems unnecessary to posit any directive 
                                                        
10 This term is meant to be neutral, encompassing both mere behavior and action. 
11 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (92) 
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mental states to these infants.  We do not believe their crying is the result of a decision to 
cry, or even a consciously-entertained desire to do so.  
Dewey emphasizes that, to a greater extent than most other creatures, humans are 
born dependent on elder members of the species.  This fact interests him because, as a 
consequence, an agent’s survival and prosperity requires her ability to immediately begin 
harmonizing her impulses with both the physical and the complex social environment 
into which she is born.  Dewey writes, “Even if by some miracle original activity could 
continue without assistance from the organized skill and art of adults, it would not 
amount to anything.  It would be mere sound and fury.”12  Thus, harmonizing our 
impulses with our social and physical environments is not only necessary for survival; it 
is the source of the meaning of our activity. 
I find it provocative to consider the notion that all meaning, including linguistic 
meaning, might arise from the activity of harmonizing our native impulses with 
environmental stimuli by way of habit formation.  But for now I will stick with a more 
modest and less controversial interpretation of Dewey: after so much hapless flailing, an 
infant begins to notice that every time she places her legs at a certain angle, they connect 
with the floor and her whole body moves.13  The act of placing her legs at a certain angle 
while kicking, in virtue of its association with her subsequent movement, thus takes on 
significance, or comes to mean something to her.  In this sense, agents naturally expect 
like effects from like causes.  In the highly socialized, linguistic environments in which 
most human children are raised, the muttering of a certain sound can come to mean the 
appearance of a comforting blanket; a certain expression on the face of a parent can come 
                                                        
12 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (90) 
13 I do not mean to suggest by this that the infant is yet aware of her legs as her legs.  Rather, 
simply that she is aware of predictable patterns of felt activity and felt response. 
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to mean impending unpleasantries; the tone of a certain buzzer can come to mean that 
someone is at the door.  Meanings of this sort are inextricably tied to an agent’s learned 
expectations and her preference for certain courses of events over others. 
The process of harmonizing our natural impulses for movement and expression 
with our environment leads to the formation of habits—habitual behavior that allows for 
the regular release of impulse in a manner that responds to both social and natural 
environmental pressures.  For example, once an agent learns that sucking on a pacifier is 
an efficient way to release a particular impulse (as opposed to sucking her thumb, which 
invites troubling environmental factors like disapproval from her elders), she develops 
the habit of sucking on her pacifier.  In this way, we develop habits through which our 
impulses are channeled.   
For Dewey, there is nothing more to an agent’s will than the total collection of the 
habits that move her to act.  He writes, “All habits are demands for certain kinds of 
activity; and they constitute the self.  In any intelligible sense of the word will they are 
will.”14  It is important to acknowledge that Dewey’s definition of will diverges 
significantly from the definition that prevails in most philosophical discussions, the 
definition upon which will is embodied in deliberate action, in action on the conclusion 
of a piece of conscious practical reasoning.  It may seem puzzling that Dewey chooses to 
include under the canopy of  “will” operations that happen unconsciously or behind our 
backs.  But I hope it will become clear as I proceed that for Dewey, almost everything we 
do is determined in one way or another by habit, including reflective, intelligent conduct.  
Taking this into consideration, we can see that Dewey’s equivalence of an agent’s will 
                                                        
14 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (25) Emphasis his. 
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with her habits and impulses constitutes a definition that is broader but not contradictory 
to the one normally invoked by philosophers. 
Dewey believes that very little of our activity is the result of pure, unshaped-by-
habit impulses.  In the following passage, his discussion of the persistence of certain 
societal customs helps clarify his sense of the relationship between impulse and habit. 
War and the existing economic regime…are crucial cases of the relation existing 
between original impulse and acquired habit. They are so fraught with evil 
consequences that any one who is disposed can heap up criticisms without end.  
Nevertheless they persist.  This persistence constitutes the case for the 
conservative who argues that such institutions are rooted in an unalterable human 
nature.  A truer psychology locates the difficulty elsewhere.  It shows that the 
trouble lies in the inertness of established habit.  No matter how accidental and 
irrational the circumstances of its origin, no matter how different the conditions 
which now exist to those under which the habit was formed, the latter persists 
until the environment obstinately rejects it.  Habits once formed perpetuate 
themselves, by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities [i.e. 
impulses].  They stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select, concentrate and 
organize the latter into their own likeness.  They create out of a formless void of 
impulses a world made in their own image.  Man is a creature of habit, not of 
reason nor yet of instinct.15 
 
For reasons illustrated in this passage, Dewey criticizes the projects of psychologists who 
attempt to classify our “original impulses” into rigid categories such as the impulse for 
sex or the impulse for war.  Impulses, he believes, are non-specific, and they secure their 
release in accordance with whatever means are available to them.  For this reason, 
individual habit and societal custom persist because they provide a ready outlet for a 
particular impulse, but not because the impulse itself demands that particular outlet.  The 
concluding sentence of the above passage supports a claim I made earlier.  Dewey 
believes that a large portion of human activity results from the impulses humans have and 
the habits through which those impulses are regularly released.  That is, a large portion of 
                                                        
15 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (125) 
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human activity is what contemporary philosophers would call mere behavior, as opposed 
to deliberate behavior or action. 
For Dewey, the need for deliberation arises only when an agent’s natural activity 
is arrested—when habits and impulses are incapable of moving the agent either because 
they have come into conflict with each other or with the environment.  When this 
happens, the agent becomes temporarily paralyzed and deliberation serves as the means 
for overcoming this paralysis.  For this reason, it is proper to say that resolving the 
impasse among habits, impulses, and the environment is the constitutive aim of 
deliberation.  During deliberation an agent is quite literally being propelled in two or 
more directions at once, or in one environmentally unavailable direction.  The end of 
deliberation is the cessation of this tension, the return to a state in which the agent is 
being propelled in one and only one (available) direction. 
The question remaining is how an agent deliberates.  What process does an agent 
use to overcome the impasse she is confronting?  According to Dewey, to overcome this 
temporary paralysis, she must actively seek a resolution by imagining a variety of 
possible actions and their respective consequences in search of one imagined option that 
will, in virtue of its representational content, restore overt action.  Dewey writes: 
“…deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible 
lines of action,”16 and,  “All deliberation is a search for a way to act…[its] office is to 
facilitate stimulation,”17 and finally, “[Deliberation] consists in selecting some foreseen 
consequence to serve as stimulus to present action.”18  
                                                        
16 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (190) 
17 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (193) Emphasis his. 
18 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (261) 
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The process of deliberation terminates in choice, the event of “hitting in 
imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt 
action.”19  In other words, choice occurs when the agent imagines an available course of 
action that satisfies the demands of her will.20  This particular imagined course of action 
resolves the temporary paralysis of conflict, and allows overt action to proceed.  On this 
account, choice is envisioned as a type of discovery, the terminus of a specific search—
the search for a unified path forward.  Dewey writes, “There is seen to be but one issue 
involved in all reflection upon conduct: The rectifying of present troubles, the 
harmonizing of present incompatibilities by projecting a course of action which gathers 
into itself the meaning of them all.”21 
 Dewey’s understanding of motivation and deliberation have been mostly 
overlooked or dismissed by contemporary ethicists, I believe, to the detriment of the 
field.  One of my primary aims in the coming pages is to resuscitate key points from his 
work in the context of a new theory of motivation and deliberation, and to demonstrate 
the power and intuitive appeal of such a theory.   In the process, I will diverge 
considerably from Dewey’s terminology and some of his theoretical commitments, but 
the motivational psychology I develop below is much indebted to those aspects of his 
theory highlighted above.  
 
1.3.2  A new way to think about motivated behavior 
To develop these ideas in greater detail, I propose we begin by setting aside the 
idea that causally efficacious belief-desire pairs guide all motivated behavior and 
                                                        
19 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (192) 
20 Again, for Dewey, will is equivalent to the total collection of an agent’s habits and impulses. 
21 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (210) 
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replacing it with a single mental state—expectation—that causes and guides motivated 
behavior.  I do not deny that both beliefs and desires play a role in fixing the content of 
expectations, but illuminating how this happens is key to understanding our motivational 
selves. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will define expectation as the future-oriented 
epistemic state (whatever it is) that enables surprise.  For example, imagine an agent 
walking down a hallway in the middle of the night and tripping on a box she had left 
there the previous evening.  As this agent walks, she does not represent the presence of 
this box to herself, and instead is guided by the expectation that she will, as she normally 
does, walk safely down the hallway.  Thus, she is surprised to find resistance against her 
foot as it collides with the box, surprised to find herself suddenly thrown off balance, etc.  
Now, to say that, prior to the collision, she believed there was no box in the hallway, or 
that she believed the hallway to be entirely clear, would be strained, since she had not 
reflected on either of these propositions, and if she had, she probably would have 
changed her expectations.  Nevertheless, she was expecting the hallway to be clear, and 
hence expecting herself to walk safely ahead, and, I propose, this expectation was guiding 
her behavior.   
Why think that expectations cause behavior?  Consider first our simplest 
expectations, those that, like perception, are generated automatically in response to the 
environment.  The psychologist Daniel Gilbert calls this phenomenon, in which an 
agent’s mind regularly and automatically generates expectations of what’s ahead, 
nexting.22  Gilbert cites an experiment in which monkeys watch a ball drop into a chute.  
The monkeys automatically lower their eyes to the bottom of the chute in anticipation of 
                                                        
22 Gilbert, Daniel. 2006. (7-8)  
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the ball’s reemergence.  Gilbert writes: “When some experimental trickery causes the ball 
to emerge from a different chute than the one in which it was deposited, the monkeys 
display surprise, presumably because their brains were nexting.”23 
 But if nexting can cause small behavioral impacts like the redirecting of one’s 
gaze, as in the case of the monkeys, then there is no principled reason that it could not 
cause impacts in larger muscle groups as well.  In fact, this seems like a good explanation 
for what happens when, say, a cat moves its whole body in anticipation of the future 
location of a particular mouse.  Or consider this: Imagine you are waiting at the bottom of 
a slide to catch a toddler.  Suppose one section of the slide is covered, so that, 
momentarily, the child disappears from view.  Without any conscious effort, your brain 
will, before she reappears, generate the expectation that she will reappear, including a 
rough expectation of the velocity and direction she will be traveling.  This expectation 
will guide not only where you look, but also how you position your body. 
But notice also how this last scenario is more sophisticated than the monkey case.  
The representational content of your automatic prediction of the child’s trajectory is not 
working alone to guide your behavior.  There is another structure of representational 
content, namely the image of yourself catching the toddler that influences your behavior.  
We can demonstrate this counterfactually.  Replace the toddler in the example with a 
snarling terrier.  Although your expectations of the terrier’s trajectory might be roughly 
the same as in the case of the toddler, the effect of that expectation on the position of 
your body will be quite different. 
So there is yet another representational structure influencing your behavior, an 
activated (or practically engaged) representation of catching the child in the near future.  
                                                        
23 Gilbert, Daniel. 2006. (8) 
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Which is to say, the temporally-indexed contents of your expectations are shaped not 
only by current perception and background beliefs, but also by the content of some 
activated representation of the future, which I will call a goal.24   
Even very sophisticated goals can be automatically and unconsciously generated. 
In his article, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,” psychologist John Bargh 
summarizes a variety of studies which demonstrate that nearly all behavior—from the 
simplest movement of one’s eyes, to much more sophisticated, goal-oriented behavior 
like aiming to keep a child safe—can be governed by goals activated without an agent’s 
awareness, and without a conscious act of will.25  In one example, subjects could be made 
to adopt unknowingly the goal of excelling on a test simply by being exposed to the word 
“success” in the course of an earlier unrelated task.  Bargh concludes that, even if a small 
percentage of goals are activated by what he calls “acts of will,”26 most human behavior 
is governed by automatically activated goals.  For now, the important claim is that these 
activated goals, however they become activated, shape our expectations of what is ahead, 
including our expectations of what behavior we will engage in and what will result from 




24 I am using this term in the way it has been employed in psychological literature on this topic.  
As I will soon discuss, it is broadly defined to include both automatic, unconsciously activated 
goals and more deliberately adopted goals. 
25 Bargh, J. A., and Chartrand, T. L. 1999. 
26 Bargh characterizes behaviors governed by acts of will in a variety of ways: as processes that 
we choose and intend to engage in; processes of which we are aware; processes that require effort 
and attention; and processes that we can control.  From a philosophical perspective, if this list is 
meant to distinguish “automatic” from “willful” behavior, it is far too messy.  Each of these 
descriptions specifies a slightly different set of conditions, leaving unresolved the question of 
which conditions are essential to, and which are merely symptoms or indicators of, acts of will. 
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1.3.3  Prospects, prospections, and the prospective set 
Suppose we think of this in the following terms.  Call any representation p whose 
content may become expected a prospect.  Prospects come embedded in larger 
representational structures, strings of temporally-indexed expectations that represent the 
activity leading up to, resulting from, and including a particular goal, φ.  Call each of 
these larger structures a prospection-aimed-at-φ, Pφ.  This concept is meant to capture 
consciously adopted long-term plans, as well as more short-term and sometimes 
automatic expectations. 
The contents of prospections are extremely rich, dynamically evolving, and they 
can draw on any concepts in an agent’s conceptual arsenal.  An agent can, for example, 
expect to buy a motor home, to participate in democracy, to overcome her fear of flying, 
or to eat a grape.  Prospective content is in large part determined automatically in 
response to an agent’s perceived environment and to the specific contents of her goals as 
she is representing them.  Prospective content may also, if necessary, be determined via 
deliberation, but I will return to this point later.   
At the foundation of prospective moral psychology is the claim that all motivated 
behavior is caused by prospections.  Let me say a bit more about this causal claim.  First, 
it is only an agent’s expectations of what will happen in the immediate future, rather than 
the entire contents of her prospection, that actually trigger the motor responses that now 
cause overt behavior.  And yet the agent’s representations of the temporally immediate 
future are influenced by representations of what will happen in more temporally distant 
moments.  So the activated goals in prospection play a crucial, if indirect, causal role in 
guiding current behavior. 
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Second, prospections come in varying degrees of specificity.  The expectation that 
I will make myself a cup of coffee does not include a representation of the specific 
movements I will make with the muscles in each of my fingers.  This is important 
because it turns out that the behavior caused by a given prospect in prospection is a lot 
more intricate than is explicitly represented.  Skilled behavior, I maintain, is just this: 
representations at a general level causing very intricate behavior that satisfies the general 
representation. 
Third, we are not simple creatures.  Often, our behavior is guided by many 
prospections at once.  We can thus speak of an agent’s entire set of prospections, or her 
prospective set.27  And, to return to desideratum (a), we can define motivated behavior as 
the class of all behavior guided by the content of an agent’s prospective set. 
 
1.3.4  The inaccuracy of hydraulicism 
By positing that the contents of an agent’s prospective set, including the goals 
therein, often evolve dynamically and without reflection, prospectivism accommodates 
Bargh’s empirical discoveries, and our personal experience, both which suggest that 
much of our goal-oriented behavior is automatic, in the sense that it is triggered without 
conscious reflection or awareness.  This brings us to the task of explaining (b)—what 
causes us to deliberate and what is the aim of our deliberations? 
Prospectivism offers the following account: allowing that an agent’s prospective 
set can evolve automatically and without disruption, there are frequent cases in which an 
                                                        
27 Determining the content of an agent’s prospective set at any moment is at least as difficult as 
the notoriously difficult task of determining what an agent perceives at any given moment. 
Nevertheless, we can easily evaluate certain claims about content.  I.e., I am perceiving a 
computer screen. I am expecting my keystrokes to cause words to appear on the computer screen.  
Etc. 
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agent’s prospective set becomes unsettled, i.e., when some change in the agent or her 
environment automatically activates new prospective content that cannot be seamlessly 
incorporated into her current prospective set.  When prospection is thus interrupted, an 
agent literally does not know what to expect from herself, and because of this, 1) she is 
not prompted by her expectations to do anything28, and 2) her future behavior seems 
indeterminate to her.   
Importantly, this can and does happen on its own.  Interruption of prospection is 
all that is needed to trigger deliberation, and we find ourselves needing to deliberate 
precisely because automaticity fails us, because our heterogeneous motivations and 
beliefs as they are at a given moment do not add up to settled prospection.  In such cases 
of disruption, in order to restore motivated behavior, we need to decide what to do.  
Practical deliberation is the process employed to overcome such impasses, and choice is 
the conclusion of that process.  Thus, on the prospectivist account, agents deliberate 
regularly not because a particular meta-end requires it, but rather because agents are 
equipped with an automatic deliberative response in the face of prospective uncertainty. 
But this raises a number of further questions.  How does prospection become 
unsettled in the first place?  Is the aim of settling one’s prospective set itself a meta-end?  
What is required to resettle prospective content?  What deliberative processes are 





28 At least not with respect to the particular prospections involved in the interruption.  Prospection 
can be partially interrupted.  
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1.3.5  Three causes of unsettled prospection 
All cases of unsettled prospections, I maintain, are caused by one or more of three 
possible problems with prospective content: the perceived presence of a gap, the 
perceived presence of contradictory content, or the motivational insufficiency of content.   
 Gaps: A gap in prospection occurs when an agent is unable to generate content 
that she can expect to get her from her present position to some activated goal.  For 
example, suppose an agent is aiming to reach a certain campsite by nightfall.  To a certain 
degree of specificity, she expects a future in which she continues hiking on the trail and 
arrives at the campsite before sunset, and this representation is guiding her conduct.  Now 
suppose she comes upon a raging creek that, because of flash flooding, has washed out 
the footbridge.  This causes a gap in her prospection:  she can no longer expect herself to 
continue on the trail, and there is no other course of activity she can imagine herself 
engaging in that she can expect will deposit her at the campsite by nightfall.  Thus, the 
timeslots in prospection between the representation of the present and the representation 
of her pre-dusk arrival at the campsite are rendered devoid of expectable content.  I will 
call gap-free prospections means-end contiguous. 
  Gaps can be caused and perpetuated by lack of means, lack of skill, or 
lack of imagination.  It may be, in the case above, that there is no human that 
could ford the river in those conditions.  In such a case, the agent’s inability to 
generate a settled prospection stems from an accurate representation of her lack of 
means.  Similarly, it might be that the hiker could ford the river with appropriate 
training, but that she rightly gauges she lacks such training.  In this case, the 
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hiker’s accurate understanding of her lack of river-fording skill causes the gap.29  
Or, finally, it might be that the hiker could ford the river by simply trekking 
upstream, where the river is preceded by two smaller, fordable creeks.  In this 
case, the hiker has the required means and skills needed to reach the campsite by 
nightfall, but simply fails to realize this.  Here, her failure to imagine something 
that is in fact possible perpetuates her impasse.   
Importantly, there is room for uncertainty and experimentation in the face 
of a problem.  She can, for instance, adopt an interim goal of stepping into the 
river to test its strength before determining whether she can expect to ford across.  
And there is also room for hopes and ideals—outcomes an agent aims for but 
doesn’t actually expect—to influence prospection.  Consider an individual rushing 
to catch a bus.  She may not expect to make the bus (i.e., she will be disappointed 
but not surprised if she sees the bus pulling away as she arrives at the stop), but 
she does expect to get to the bus stop quickly. The prospection aimed at getting to 
the bus stop quickly will involve running, crossing streets without waiting for a 
walk signal, etc., until she reaches the bus stop.  Her activated goal is shaped by 
her hope that the bus will be there when she arrives, but the object of her hope is 
not itself expected. 
Contradictory content: Just as it is impossible to consciously and 
simultaneously endorse p and not-p, it is impossible to consciously and simultaneously 
expect p and not-p.  Of course, we can sometimes fail to notice contradictions in our 
expectations.  I can on Monday adopt a plan to meet with Dave on Wednesday night, and 
                                                        
29 Lack of skill can be seen as a subset of lack of means, but one that is useful to distinguish when 
it comes to diagnosing our problems and planning long-term preventative measures. 
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on Tuesday agree to meet with Ivan on Wednesday night.  In the intervening time, I may 
fail to think about the two contradictory events simultaneously.30  More likely than not, 
however, sometime prior to the planned meetings I will realize that I am expecting two 
contradictory things, and this realized contradiction will unsettle the contents of my 
prospective set.  When this happens, in order to resettle my prospective set, I must either 
surrender (i.e., deactivate) one of the goals, or find some way to reconcile the two.31  
Unfortunately, these processes can be very difficult, especially when we are strongly 
attached to certain outcomes. 
Motivational insufficiency: Imagine you are rushing to leave your house when 
your housemate pulls a fresh sheet of piping hot cookies from the oven and invites you to 
have one.  Your mouth starts watering.  Your mind generates an image: head to the 
kitchen, reach out, grab a cookie, lift it to your mouth, etc.  This whole chain pops into 
your head automatically.  However, your knowledge of the cookies’ temperature 
generates the expectation of pain at the end of such a sequence.  And so, in spite of your 
possession of an epistemically viable prospection, your motivational system balks.  You 
                                                        
30 My failure to recognize the conflict can be due to the influence of what Rich Thomason has 
called “topic.” Our representations are often circumscribed by topic to help us plan more 
effectively, but as Thomason notes, distortions due to topic are “one price we pay for such 
circumscription.” (See, Thomason, Richmond.  “The Context Sensitivity of Belief and Desire” in 
Reasoning About Actions and Plans. Georgeff, Michael P.  and Lansky, Amy, ed. 1987) 
31 There is actually a third option:  I can willingly ignore the contradiction, putting it out of my 
mind, especially if it occurs in some temporally-distant time slot.  This will allow motivated 
behavior to continue in spite of the contradiction.  However, as the moment of contradiction 
grows closer and closer, it will get harder and harder to do this, for if the contradiction occurs in 
the most immediate timeslots of prospection, it will disable current behavior:  I literally won’t 
know what to expect from myself, and I won’t be able to do anything until I resolve the conflict.  
As Bratman has argued, humans are planners by nature. We tend to work out the kinks in 
prospective content before the time for execution is upon us. However, there may be individuals 
who chronically wait to decide.  They foresee future incompatibilities and pernicious gaps but 
ignore them until they are literally forced to reconcile them. 
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consider waiting for them to cool, but your motivational system also balks at being late 
leaving the house. 
This example highlights the fact that epistemic viability is not the only constraint 
on the expectability of content.  Excitement and aversion are the fuel of all motivated 
behavior; they are the springs of action.  If our expectations of the future did not 
physically excite or avert us, they would not cause motivated behavior at all. And this 
yields the third possible source of prospective interruption: motivational insufficiency.32  
It is worth noting that empirical research suggests that neurological systems of 
reward and punishment are distinct.33   My strong aversion to the representation of being 
burned is not matched by a strong excitement at the thought of not being burned.   Nor 
must my strong excitement at the thought of eating a cookie be matched with a strong 
aversion to representations of not eating a cookie.  We need not try to reduce aversion to 
desire, nor reduce interruption due to motivational impotence to interruption due to 
incompatibility of content.  Faced with the likely prospect of getting hurt if I grab a 
cookie off the cookie sheet, we need not suppose that the cause of my hesitation is due to 
the fact that getting hurt conflicts with an active goal of not getting hurt.  It is possible 
and advantageous to keep the conditions for epistemic viability separate from the 
conditions for motivational viability. 
                                                        
32 This may seem trivial, but the condition is actually informative.  First, it is only one of three 
possible sources of interruption, so a prospection that is extremely exciting can fail to cause 
behavior if it is lacks means-end consistency or compatibility.  And prospections that are both 
means-end consistent and compatible can fail to guide behavior if they are not exciting enough 
(including the case in which they are positively averting). Second, being sufficiently exciting is a 
matter of whether the content represented in prospection generates a certain threshold-level of 
excitation, and a given prospection can cross this threshold in a number of different ways. 
33 Timothy Schroeder offers a helpful summary of the neuroscientific research on punishment and 
rewards in his book Three Faces of Desire. 2004. (49-57) 
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The motivational impacts of various representations are determined in part by 
nature, but also a great deal by nurture, particularly by the cultural environments in which 
we acquire our concepts.  Consider, for example, how much the cultural context in which 
one acquires the concept ‘abortion’ affects the motivational responses one has to 
prospections involving that concept.  Because these motivational impacts are physical 
impacts, they are, in principle, measurable.  But I leave the task of discovering how to 
measure them to the empirical psychologists.   
To summarize, in order to be incorporated into settled prospection all potential 
prospective content must simultaneously satisfy three constraints, two of which are 
epistemic, and one of which is motivational.  In this limited sense, prospectivism mimics 
belief-desire psychology.  But it replaces belief-desire psychology’s bifurcation with the 
notion of a single mental state—a prospection—the entire represented content of which 
must be both epistemically and motivationally viable in order to guide activity.  The 
novel claims of a prospective moral psychology are a) any automatically-activated 
content that, as represented, satisfies these three constraints, is incorporated seamlessly 
into settled prospection, influencing, but not interrupting, an agent’s motivated behavior; 
and b) in the case that some automatically-activated prospective content fails to satisfy 
these three constraints, an agent’s prospective set becomes unsettled, and practical 
deliberation is triggered. 
 
1.3.6  The aim of deliberation 
 Prospectivism maintains that agents are compelled to deliberate about what to do 
because deliberation is how they actively bridge the gap between a state of suspended 
motivation and a settled prospective set.  This offers a clear contrast with the meta-end 
 23 
accounts discussed above.  Consider the descriptions of deliberation found in the 
following passages: 
From Christine Korsgaard: 
The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such.  It 
needs a reason.  Otherwise, as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go 
forward…[O]ur reflective nature gives us a choice about what to do.34 
 
From R. Jay Wallace: 
In deliberation, we try to determine what to do by reflecting on the question of 
what there is reason for us to do…The power of choice has its natural home 
in…the deliberative question of what we ought to do.35 
 
From J. David Velleman: 
One possibility [for a motive that would bestow rational agency] would be to 
posit a higher-order desire, on the part of every agent, to be actuated by those of 
his lower-order motives which constitute the best reasons for him to act.  This 
desire would move a person to survey and evaluate his motives as reasons for 
acting, and it would then add its motivational force to whichever combination of 
motives impressed him as rationally superior.36 
 
From Michael Smith: 
Suppose Anne very much wants to dance a jig.  Recognizing her desire to dance a 
jig, she asks herself whether this desire is worth having and acting upon.  In other 
words, she deliberates…When we deliberate, and decide what we have a rational 
justification for doing, that very fact sometimes makes a difference to what we 
do.37 
 
All of these writers depict agents who are, first, determinately motivated by belief and 
desire, but who then, in an act expressive of their rational nature, survey their desires (or 
the options suggested by their desires) and ask, “I want to do x, but should I?”   
But deliberation almost never happens this way.38  Not only are our desires as 
such rarely in the foreground of deliberation, but also, most of the time we deliberate, we 
                                                        
34 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996.  (92-93, 96) 
35 Wallace, R. Jay. 2006.  (151, 153) 
36 Velleman, David. 2000. (14) 
37 Smith, Michael. 1994. (153, 132) 
38 Nomy Arpaly makes a similar point. Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. (24) 
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simply are not motivated, consciously or otherwise, by some latent love of or need for 
reasons.  We are motivated, rather, by the very things that have caused conflict in our 
prospective set, and we struggle to move forward in the face of the conflict.  A 
prospective moral psychology captures this fact.  On a prospective foundation, the 
constitutive aim of deliberation is nothing more substantive than deciding what to do. 
This is the minimal aim all practical deliberators have in common.  
 
1.3.7  Is ‘deciding what to do’ a meta-end? 
Christine Korsgaard writes,  
Human beings are condemned to choice and action.  Maybe you think you can 
avoid it, by resolutely standing still, refusing to act, refusing to move.  But it’s no 
use, for that will be something you have chosen to do, and then you will have 
acted after all…The necessity of choosing and acting is not causal, logical, or 
rational necessity.  It is our plight: the simple inexorable fact of the human 
condition.39   
 
I take Korsgaard to be making the following point here.  Once you have donned the 
practical point of view, there is no way to proceed with motivated behavior without first 
making a choice (ignoring, for the moment, cases of shifts in circumstance).  
Prospectivism accommodates this point.  To see how, consider the following example. 
Suppose you must decide by tomorrow between two competing job offers, one in 
Boston and one in San Francisco.  After spending a great deal of time weighing the pros 
and cons of each, you have yet to settle the contents of your prospective set.  Under such 
circumstances you might be tempted to throw up your hands and say, “Forget it! I simply 
cannot decide!”  The problem with this is that once you have donned the practical point 
of view, once the contents of your prospective set have become unsettled, the option of 
                                                        
39 Korsgaard, Christine. 2009. (2) Her emphasis. 
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not engaging in practical deliberation is just that—an option.  And thus it must itself be 
perceived as means-end contiguous and non-contradictory, and it must be motivationally 
sufficient.   But notice, the fact that you are strongly excited by the prospect of accepting 
the Boston job works against the prospect of making no decision as much as it works 
against the prospect of accepting the job in San Francisco.   
This is how a conflict in motives can itself motivate deliberation.  The goals that 
cause the problem continue to make their demands until you, the deliberator, figure out 
some way to manage them.  And, from the deliberative prospective any hypothetical 
prospective content, including the option of suspending deliberation without making a 
decision, or the option of deciding what to do by flipping a coin, is sensitive to the 
motivational and epistemic constraints that govern all prospective content. 
This is why, as Korsgaard correctly observes, you cannot avoid choice and action.  
Because if you are ever in a situation in which you are seriously considering not making 
any choice, it is too late.  The responsibility for your future behavior already thereby lies 
in your hands (or rather, in your deliberative processes, which I discuss more below) and, 
short of spontaneous suspension of your mental faculties or abduction, nothing is going to 
relieve you of that responsibility.  But, importantly, prospectivism accommodates this 
necessity of choice without committing us to any particular ends, meta- or otherwise. 
This brings us to why, on the prospective account, the constitutive aim of 
deliberation—deciding what to do—cannot be elevated to the status of a meta-end.  For, 
it does not trigger deliberation, it does not enforce deliberation’s conclusions, and it does 
not provide standards for deliberative success beyond finding some motivationally and 
epistemically viable option. 
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1.3.8  The process of deliberation 
So the story goes: as an agent deliberates, she is searching for an option 1) that 
represents a course of activity that appears to be free from gaps, 2) whose represented 
course of activity does not appear to contradict the content of any other prospection 
currently guiding her behavior, and 3) whose represented course of activity is sufficiently 
stimulating.   
It is important to clarify here, however, that this deliberative “search” does not 
involve merely a canvassing of pre-fabricated options.  Rather, the agent must actively 
manufacture her options in imagination40 by recombining, redescribing, specifying, and 
innovating the content of various options until she finds one that works.  Recombination 
involves splicing together content from competing lines of action into a single option.  
Redescription involves reclassifying the activities involved in an option by attending to 
them in more detail, or in the light of other contextually relevant features (e.g., 
redescribing being on time to a meeting as being respectful to one’s colleagues).  
Specification involves making a general plan more specific.  And innovation involves 
inventing new concepts or using old concepts in new ways. 
Deliberation then, is a matter of problem-solving.  It is a matter of using these 
four tools—recombination, redescription, specification, and innovation—in order to craft 
an option free from any unsettling prospective content.  Importantly, when an agent finds 
an option that works, no additional act of “will” is needed to settle her prospective set.  
Because she has manufactured an option that passes all bars for incorporation, it will be 
                                                        
40 Imagination is the faculty with which we entertain non-actual states of affairs. 
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activated, and she will straight away return to motivated behavior, with the content of the 
successful option simply becoming the content of an activated prospection.   
Also importantly, a deliberator can apply the processes of recombination, 
redescription, specification, and innovation to any prospection in her prospective set, not 
just the one that originally caused the motivational problem.  Faced with the raging river, 
for instance, the hiker might not only deliberate about how to get to the campground, and 
whether to get to the campground, but also whether it is important to keep her shoes dry, 
whether it is cowardly to turn back, and whether she should abandon her ambition to be a 
professional wilderness guide.  In other words, no particular goal in prospection is 
beyond the reach of imagination’s revisionary processes.  And, within the constraints of 
an agent’s motivational dispositions, deliberation can involve the revision of goals as 
much as it involves the revision of means to those goals. 
 
1.4  Deliberation and Deliberate Behavior 
 Because deliberation requires an agent to consciously attend to her options, she is 
typically aware, when deliberation concludes, of what she expects herself to do.  After 
deliberating long and hard about whether to join her friends on a road trip, say, an agent 
is aware of, and has accepted via deliberation, a plan to forgo the road trip in order to 
finish painting the exterior of her house.  Thus, she deliberately paints her house and 
deliberately declines the road trip offer. 
 However, we often consciously attend to and accept prospective content without 
deliberation.  Imagine an agent who is being approached on the street by someone 
handing out fliers.  She might, with no deliberation at all, form a plan to decline the 
advertiser’s offer by saying, “No, thank you.”  Suppose that such exchanges always make 
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her feel a bit uncomfortable, so as the advertiser approaches, she is attending to the 
expected event in her imagination, dreading it in a small way.  It seems here that the mere 
fact that she is attending to, and in the light of such attention accepting the goal of 
declining the flyer, is sufficient to qualify the behavior as deliberate.  Thus, I propose as a 
definition of deliberate behavior any behavior that is guided by goals that 1) have been 
attended to by the agent, and that 2) have, in the light of that attention, remained 
practically engaged.  Thus, we should expect all behavior that follows from deliberation 
to be deliberate, but other motivated behavior may be as well. 
 
1.5  The Belief-Desire Dilemma 
 The account I have developed here suggests that we abandon the idea that 
motivated behavior is caused by a pair of mental states—belief and desire—and accept 
instead that they are caused by a single mental state, prospection.  But, given my proposal 
that prospective content is governed by both epistemic and motivational constraints, we 
might wonder just how far we have diverged from the traditional belief-desire picture, 
particularly when it comes to accounting for deliberative phenomena and action. 
 To make this point clear, let us consider the way that belief-desire psychology 
factors into a persistent puzzle within ethics.  The puzzle can be put as follows:  The 
outcomes of practical deliberation must be either beliefs or desires.  If they are desires, 
we can easily explain the motivating force of our practical judgments, but we must 
abandon the idea that practical judgments are the products of rational processes and 
subject to rational criticism.  If, on the other hand, our practical judgments are beliefs, we 
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can preserve the idea that they are the products of rational processes and subject to 
rational criticism, but we surrender our ability to explain their causal efficacy.41    
 We might hope that abandoning the belief-desire psychology upon which this 
puzzle rests would help us resolve it in a clear way.  But it does not, at least, not yet.  For, 
it is possible to rephrase the problem in terms of epistemic and motivational constraints 
rather than beliefs and desires.  Do the conclusions of practical deliberation place 
epistemic or motivational constraints on prospective content?  For example, if I judge that 
the right thing for me to do in a given situation is to send my child to private school, is 
this judgment effective in shaping the content of my prospective set because it constitutes 
a belief that I should send my child to private school (i.e., a belief that I should possess 
φprivate-school as an activated goal), or because it actually activates that goal, or at least, 
makes me motivationally inclined to reject any plan that does not include φprivate-school? 
 And here the dilemma repeats itself.  As Pamela Hieronomy has argued, deciding 
it would be good to intend to φ is not the same as deciding to φ, just as deciding it would 
be good to believe p is not the same as deciding to believe p.42  Hence, if our practical 
judgments are simply beliefs about which prospects we should and should not have as 
activated goals, it remains to be explained how they could play a causal role in actually 
activating or deactivating those goals.  Further, given the cases of akrasia we face in our 
daily lives it seems that we have evidence suggesting the opposite.  Our judgments about 
                                                        
41 The belief-desire dilemma is related to the puzzle articulated by Michael Smith as “the moral 
problem.”  However, unlike the moral problem, the belief-desire dilemma does not emerge from 
any pretheoretic intuitions about whether an agent is, ceteris paribus, moved by her practical 
judgments, nor whether those judgments are judgments about “matters of fact.”  Rather the only 
pretheoretic intuitions we need are the following.  Sometimes practical judgments move an agent 
to action, and in many, if not all of those cases, we believe those very judgments are subject to 
rational criticism. 
42 Hieronymi, Pamela. 2005. 
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which goals ought to be activated do not alone have the power to activate those goals.  
On the other hand, if our practical judgments just are activated goals, it is unclear in what 
sense these conclusions are the appropriate subjects of rational criticism.  Further, it 
raises the question of why we form normative beliefs about which goals ought to be 
activated at all. 
 The following chapter is a response to this reformulated version of the belief-
desire dilemma. I will show that the prospectivist account of motivation can provide the 
basis for an escape from this dilemma.  Thus, although replacing belief-desire psychology 
with the prospective account of motivation does not alone resolve the puzzle, it provides 











The Search for Rational Deliberation 
 
 
To frame the investigation at the heart of this chapter, I open with a passage from 
Jay Wallace: 
Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, 
the question of what one is to do…Our capacity for deliberative self-
determination raises…questions about how deliberation can succeed in being 
practical in its issue.  What do we need to assume — both about agents and about 
the processes of reasoning they engage in — to make sense of the fact that 
deliberative reflection can directly give rise to action?  Can we do justice to this 
dimension of practical reason while preserving the idea that practical deliberation 
is genuinely a form of reasoning? 43 
 
This quote asks two questions of practical reason:  First, in what sense is practical reason 
causally efficacious and, second, in what sense is it reasoning as opposed to just mental 
activity.  In this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that a prospectivist motivational 
psychology successfully answers both these questions. 
 
2.1  The Practicality of Practical Deliberation 
 If we take “action” in the above quote to be equivalent to “deliberate behavior” as 
defined in Chapter One, then prospectivism sufficiently addresses the first question 
above.  Here is a summary of how it does so.  In order to make sense of the fact that 
deliberative reflection is practical in its issue, we need to assume only the following 
about deliberating agents:  First, motivated behavior is directly guided by prospections—
                                                        
43 Wallace, R. Jay. 2008. (1) 
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chains of goal-shaped expectations.  Second, as long as each prospection in an agent’s 
prospective set meets the three activation conditions—means-end contiguity, non-
contradiction, and motivational sufficency—motivated behavior proceeds.  Third, when 
motivated activity is interrupted because of a prospective failure—a scenario in which 
one (or more) of the prospections in an agent’s prospective set fails to meet these 
conditions—an agent deliberates, using her faculty of imagination, to generate new, 
failure-free prospective content via recombination, redescription, specification, and 
innovation.  When this process is complete, when she has successfully generated a 
failure-free prospective set, motivated activity is restored. 
 
2.2  Defining “Action” 
 There is one caveat I want to mention in response to Wallace’s use of the phrase 
‘directly give rise to action.’  Again, if we take action to be equivalent to deliberate 
behavior then this phrase is unproblematic for my account.  But some philosophers 
believe that action is a more substantive concept, that it picks out an even narrower class 
of human activity.  If this is the case, then although I have answered the question of how 
deliberative processes are practical in their issue, I have not yet explained how they could 
give rise to action, in the substantive sense of the word.  So here, I want to offer briefly 
an account of what I think the correct understanding of action is. 
 I believe setting action equivalent to deliberate behavior is appropriate because it 
situates it properly between one conception of action that is too broad—Hume’s—and 
one conception that is too narrow.  Criticizing Hume, Korsgaard writes, “Hume’s view 
depends upon an inadequate conception of action.  For Hume, an action is essentially 
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nothing more than a movement caused by a judgment or idea.”44  I agree with Korsgaard 
that Hume’s view is obviously too broad.  If Hume is right, then any motivated behavior, 
even the automatic, counts as action.  But habitual and impulsive behaviors are among 
the prime candidates we want to exclude from the class of action, at least if we want, as 
most action theorists do, to exclude the majority of non-human animal activity from the 
class of action.  This makes Hume’s conception untenable.  
 However, some who want to maintain that practical reason plays a key role in 
distinguishing action from lesser forms of motivated activity overcompensate for the 
breadth of Hume’s position, delivering a conception of action that is too narrow.  I will 
use Velleman as the example of such overcompensation. 
 For Velleman, all action is aimed at and guided by one goal: self-understanding.  
One’s actions contribute to one’s self-understanding so long as they make sense of an 
agent’s motivations within the agent’s particular environment.  For example, my decision 
not to gamble my last $100, even in the face of great odds for winning a very large pay-
off, makes sense given how crucial that $100 dollars is to my survival, and how I value 
survival much more than being rich.45  When we deliberate, Velleman believes, it is 
because we are uncertain which course of action will make sense given our goals and our 
environment, and we are trying to settle this question for ourselves.   Of course, 
sometimes an agent may think she knows the answer to this question without 
deliberating, and in those cases, her action can be guided by the aim of self-understanding 
                                                        
44 Korsgaard, Christine. 2009. (64)  
45 Velleman, David. 2000. This example is adapted from one Velleman uses in a critique of 
decision theory.  His point is that the formal rationality prescribed by decision theory can 
sometimes be at odds with “rationality on the substantive dimension,” (167) which includes 
viewing options in terms of concepts like “good enough,” and that we should not forsake that 
latter for the former. (144-169) 
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without involving reflective deliberation.  But whenever an agent’s uncertainty about her 
own motives or her environment call into question her self-understanding, she must 
deliberate.  Since the conclusion of her deliberation will be an action-guiding intention to 
do what makes the most sense, where deliberation has filled in the particular content of 
“what makes the most sense,” action will regularly follow from deliberation. 
 Let me begin by noting that it is possible to create a Vellemanean deliberator from 
a prospective deliberator by adding to the prospective deliberator’s motivational set a 
powerful, perhaps unconscious, desire to do whatever will make most sense of oneself.  If 
there are in fact agents out there who are so motivated, and Velleman himself may be one 
such agent, then Velleman’s account of deliberation is an accurate descriptive account of 
at least those deliberators.  I do not claim, therefore, that deliberation as envisioned by 
Velleman is psychologically impossible.  Rather, my claim is that his account is not 
general.  It does not pick out the features common to all deliberators, but rather, the 
features common to some subset of deliberators with certain substantive inclinations.   
 On the prospectivist picture, self-understanding is useful to solving the problems 
one faces during deliberation.  Thus, it might look as if all deliberators care ultimately 
about self-understanding.  But, if self-understanding is a means to solving one’s 
problems, then one does not need to care about it in itself in order to engage in the mental 
activities that bring it about, nor does it have any final authority or oversight with respect 
to the ordering of one’s affairs.  We should not assume that self-understanding is the 
meta-end of deliberation any more than we assume that being transported is the meta-end 
of driving, though of course, an agent might have an strong inclination to be transported.  
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Velleman’s account of action is therefore too narrow because it ties action to a 
regulating goal only some agents possess.  Remember Korsgaard’s claim,  “Human 
beings are condemned to choice and action…It is our plight: the simple inexorable fact of 
the human condition.”46   To make good on this claim, we must understand action 
broadly enough so that it follows from all complete deliberation, not just deliberation 
guided by an optional or idiosyncratic end.  In contrast to Velleman’s picture, 
prospectivism claims that we are all bound to run into prospective uncertainty at one 
point or another, regardless of whether we share any substantive aims.  Thus, agency is 
tied to something we have in common with other humans, but this something is not a 
particular aim, a particular regulatory inclination, or even a particular problem, but rather 
the capacity to have and solve problems itself. 
The question then becomes whether the processes that yield deliberate behavior 
(which I will henceforth use interchangeably with ‘action’) can be considered rational in 
any sense.  As a starting point, I will examine two contemporary proposals on this 
question, one made by Candace Vogler and one by Bernard Williams.  I will respond to 
the shortcomings in these views by offering my own account, and then I will contrast this 
account to a number of additional proposals. 
 
2.3 The Rationality in Practical Deliberation 
2.3.1  Vogler’s instrumentalism 
One popular view of practical reason is instrumentalism, the view that 
deliberation employs reason insofar as it involves the ability to grasp one’s goals and 
reason about the means to those goals.  One contemporary proponent of this view is 
                                                        
46 Korsgaard, Christine. 2009. (2) Emphasis hers. 
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Candace Vogler, who has attempted to defend what she takes to be the key insight of 
instrumentalism, the proposition which, she believes, allows instrumentalism to maintain 
its status as the ‘standard view.’  
The proposition is this: practical reason is calculative, i.e., concerned with 
matching means to determinate ends.  Further, calculative reason can tell the entire story 
of practical reason.47  If this is the case, we should be able to formulate deliberative 
standards in calculative terms.  In fact, Vogler insists that deliberation, even normative-
flavored deliberation of ends, falls within her calculative conception of practical reason.48  
She argues for this as follows:  Deliberation is constitutively aimed at something, namely, 
deciding what to do.  If deliberation is constitutively aimed at something, it therefore has 
a calculative form, a form exposed with a ‘useful-style’ explanation:  I deliberate about 
ends in order to decide what to do.  And, finally, if deliberation has a calculative form, 
then it is not importantly different from motivated activity in general.49  Which is to say, 
deliberation is more or less rational with respect to how well it delivers on its aim. 
But here Vogler misses an important fact.  Constitutive aims do not necessarily 
explain nor motivate the behavior which they are used to distinguish.  To illustrate this 
point, imagine asking someone why she is playing chess, and having her respond, “I am 
playing chess in order to capture my opponent’s king.”  In doing so, she has not actually 
answered your question.  Rather, she has merely confirmed that she is indeed playing 
chess.  To explain why she is playing chess, i.e., why she is sitting there trying to capture 
                                                        
47 Vogler, Candace. 2002. (6, 149) 
48 She writes: “Although moral psychology is very important to work on ethics, calculative views 
of practical reason need not turn on any specific moral psychological commitments…the claim 
that practical reason is primarily calculative cannot be defeated by recourse to claims about 
practical reasoning [or] claims about moral psychology.” Vogler, Candance. 2002. (24) 
49 Ibid. (168-170) 
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her opponent’s king, she would have to offer some further end, an end potentially fixed 
by any one of the threefold goods Vogler takes practical reason to track (e.g., I am 
playing chess because it is pleasant, and/or useful for x, and/or befitting). 
We can make the same point about the constitutive aim of deliberation.  The 
claim that I am deliberating about my options in order to decide what to do is 
uninformative.  We must appeal to some further end to explain why we are deliberating.  
However, in the case of deliberation of ends there is no fixed end to which an agent can 
appeal to explain her behavior.  Rather, there are numerous conflicting ends, and the 
conflict among them explains the fact that she is deliberating.  The ends that cause the 
problem continue to make their demands until she, the deliberator, manages to 
reconfigure them.  
Importantly, this is not a point about whether an agent is consciously aware of the 
fact that she is trying to decide what to do.  Rather, it is a point about whether that aim, 
consciously or otherwise, does any explanatory or motivational work.  Prospectivism 
says no.50  On its own, the aim of making a decision offers neither a source of motivation 
nor standards for success beyond what the practical problem that prompts deliberation 
already provides on its own.  So, although we can point to what all deliberators have in 
common with a general teleological description—namely, “they aim at deciding what to 
do”—a proper portrayal of deliberative processes does not see them serving settled ends, 
meta or otherwise, but rather modifying prospective content in order to lead problematic 
ends toward reconciliation.   
                                                        
50 This is not to claim that it is impossible for such an aim to do such work, just that the aim does 
not generally do this work. 
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Vogler seeks to defend the core insight of instrumentalism, which is, she insists, 
neutral with respect to moral psychology.  But if prospectivism is true, the practical 
reason she offers has nothing to say regarding what makes one choice better than another.  
For, in the face of unsettled prospective content, calculative reason (at least not as she has 
portrayed it) says nothing regarding how best to reorganize the ends in question.  Of 
course, after we have made a decision, we will be able to explain the resulting activity 
calculatively in light of the ends that ended up mattering.  To return to the example from 
§1.3.7, we can say after I accept the Boston job that I did so at least in part because I 
value living where there is a robust public transportation system, and that living 
somewhere with such a transportation system is a conscious end of mine.  But the value 
of the ends that might eventually factor into useful-style explanations are themselves in 
question during deliberation.  This is what is special about the “much-touted”51 practical 
point of view.  Deliberation is in a class of its own; it cannot properly be considered just 
another motivated behavior.   
So, against Vogler’s attempt to defend the key instrumentalist insight, I seek to 
defend a key anti-instrumentalist insight, albeit without its standard Kantian framing.  
The insight is this.  Deliberative processes do not serve antecedent ends; rather, they 
modify them.  Accordingly, if there are any deliberative standards at all, these standards 
must be grounded somewhere besides antecedent ends.   
But then, of course, we must wonder:  Is there any principled way to make a 
decision, and, if so, where do the principles get their authority?  If there are no principled 
ways to make a decision, it is difficult to see how deliberation could be considered a 
rational process at all.  If all we are doing when we deliberate is randomly surfing options 
                                                        
51 Ibid. (6) 
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in our imagination until we hit upon an option that satisfies the three prospective 
constraints, this seems like a decidedly arational process. 
 
2.3.2  Williams and rational motivational change 
In his article “Internal and External Reasons” Bernard Williams offers a response 
to the questions posed by Wallace above.  Williams maintains that deliberative processes 
can impact the contents of an agent’s subjective motivational set, S, because the mere 
entertainment of various propositions, in the service of generating a viable option, have 
motivational impacts on an agent.  This accords nicely with the prospectivist picture of 
practical deliberation, which involves using imagination to redescribe, recombine, and 
specify the contents of various options until one meets all three activation conditions.  In 
other words, in order to be successful, deliberation not only can, but must, produce a 
change in an agent’s subjective motivational set; it must transition an agent from having 
an S currently unequipped to guide behavior to having an S that actually does guide 
behavior.  Williams is right when he writes: “We should not…think of the contents of S, 
as statically given.”52 
 Importantly, however, Williams wants to make an additional, more ambitious 
point about rational practical deliberation.  He wants to maintain that at least some of the 
processes employed in deliberation count as rational processes or practical reasoning.  
Consider the following passage: 
(W1) …indeed the mere discovery that some course of action is the causal means 
to an end is not in itself a piece of practical reasoning.  A clear example of 
practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one has reason to φ 
because φ-ing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant, etc. 
way of satisfying some element in S, and this of course is controlled by 
                                                        
52 Williams, Bernard. 1979/2001. (81) 
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other elements in S, if not necessarily in a very clear and determinate 
way.53 
 
Although Williams seems confident that the former process is not an instance of 
reasoning and that the latter is, it is hard to know what Williams takes to distinguish these 
two cases.  And since this is precisely the question I am interested in, I would hope for 
him to provide grounds for his distinction.  Later, he writes, 
(W2) There is an essential indeterminacy in what can be counted a rational 
deliberative process.  Practical reasoning is a heuristic process, and an 
imaginative one, and there are no fixed boundaries on the continuum from 
rational thought to inspiration and conversion.54 
 
Assuming he is right about the vagueness of the boundaries between rational and non-
rational processes, this indeterminacy does not get him off the hook in terms of 
explaining why in the paradigm cases one process (the mere discovery of a means to an 
end) is not a rational process and why another (the concluding that one has a reason to φ 
because φ-ing is the most economical means to an end) is a rational process.   
Perhaps vagueness lies in between, but what I hope to get from Williams is an 
account of the difference between what he has called a “clear case” of rational 
deliberative processes and those deliberative processes he thinks are clearly not rational.  
But in providing any such account, he must clarify what it is to be a rational process in a 
way that makes it clear that rational processes can have motivational impacts.  For, if it 
turns out that only the non-rational deliberative processes are the ones capable of 
delivering the motivational changes required for successful deliberation, then Williams 
would be left with the conclusion that rational processes have no practical import, a 
conclusion he is eager to reject.   
                                                        
53 Ibid. (80) 
54 Ibid. (86) 
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Because he doesn’t provide an account of the distinction between rational and 
non-rational processes explicitly, we must extract it from his text.  Consider the following 
two passages in which he muses on the different ways an agent can deliberate.  
(W3) …there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as: thinking how 
the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering; 
where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, 
considering which one attaches most weight to…; or, again, finding 
constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an 
entertaining evening granted that one wants entertainment.55 
 
(W4) [An agent] may think he has reason to promote some development because 
he has not exercised his imagination enough about what it would be like if 
it came about.  In his unaided deliberative reason, or encouraged by the 
persuasions of others, he may come to have some more concrete sense of 
what would be involved, and lose his desire for it, just as, positively, the 
imagination can create new possibilities and new desires.56 
 
 The point that Williams ends on in W4—that imagination can create new 
possibilities and new desires, and destroy old possibilities and old desires—is entailed by 
prospectivism, and is also what gives credibility to Williams’ assertion that the contents 
of one’s subjective motivational set are never statically given, and can be altered via 
imagination-driven deliberation.  But this doesn’t yet say anything to the question of 
whether the processes by which imagination creates and destroys desires are rational or 
non-rational, nor does it say how reason is involved one way or another. 
 One possibility is that rational practical deliberation involves not just the creation 
and destruction of possibilities and desires, but also a process consisting of an agent’s 
judging what he himself has reason to do.  This suggestion is supported by passages W1 
and W4.  In both passages, an agent’s assessment of his reasons for action seems to be a 
natural sub-process of deliberation.  In W4, for instance, Williams portrays a deliberative 
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situation in which an agent’s judgment regarding what he has reason to do hinges on 
whether his imagination has yet to destroy a certain desire. But we might wonder, how 
could this be so?  Here is one set of circumstances under which this could be so:  
(a) The truth of internal reasons statements hinges on facts about what an agent 
desires. 
 
(b) A deliberating agent knows that the truth of internal reasons statements hinges 
on facts about what he desires. 
 
(c) A deliberating agent is attempting to make a true judgment regarding which 
internal reasons he has. 
 
(d) When an agent’s coming “to have a more concrete sense of what would be 
involved” in some φ, causes him to “lose his desire” to φ, he also thereby 
changes his judgment about having a reason to φ. 
 
This schema might work as a generalization of some instances of deliberation. Imagine a 
case in which an agent thinks he has reason to cheat on an exam, but on reflection he 
realizes that doing so would violate principles he respects and wants to endorse.  He also 
reflects on the consequences of not cheating and realizes that even the worst-case 
scenario—failing the exam—is not all that bad.  Having a more concrete understanding 
of his options thus completely kills the desire he once had to cheat, and, in virtue of this 
fact, allows him to correctly judge that he has no (internal) reason to cheat.   
However, even if this offers an accurate description of how people sometimes 
deliberate, and even though it involves an agent’s reflection upon what he has reason to 
do, it is flawed as an example of a rational process of deliberation for two reasons. 
First, in a point made by Michael Smith, it is not the case that in all instances in 
which imagination alters our desires we are inclined to say that the resulting desires have 
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been rationally produced.57  For instance, if an agent is scheduled for surgery to remove 
his gangrenous foot, he might allow himself to dwell in imagination on the pain of the 
surgery and the difficulties of life as an amputee.  If these imaginative dwellings evoke 
strong aversions, they might thereby shift the contents of his prospective set so that he 
decides not to show up for surgery.  But it seems to run contrary to intuition to claim that 
such a decision has been rationally arrived at, even if the agent concluded in response to 
his changing desires that he had a strong reason to avoid surgery.  And notice, the 
problem here is not that he misimagined anything.  Surgery is painful, and life as an 
amputee is hard.  It seems appropriate that dwelling on such an imagined future evokes 
aversion.  It is only if the aversion evoked is enough to sway the agent to avoid surgery, 
that his decision seems irrational.  This raises the question of whether any motivational 
impacts that are prompted by imaginative specification, redescription, or recombination 
count as rational changes. 
Second, if changes in an agent’s motivational set are what make the causal 
difference in deliberation, as prospectivism entails, and an agent’s judgments of what he 
has reason to do simply respond to changes in the motivational set as they occur, but do 
not actually cause any changes themselves, then even if such reason judgments are part of 
deliberation, they are causally inert.  They do not actually help an agent determine what 
he is to do, even if they help an agent decide what he has reason to do. 
 Taken together, these objections make me suspect that Williams’ must have 
something else in mind.  We cannot make the imaginative processes at work in effective 
deliberation rational simply by laying atop these processes an agent’s (causally 
                                                        
57 Smith, Michael. 1994.  (156-158) 
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inefficacious) process of judging what he has reason to do.  So what else could Williams 
have in mind?  Evidence may be found in this passage: 
(W5) I take it that, insofar as there are determinately recognizable needs, there 
can be an agent who lacks any interest in getting what he indeed needs…If 
an agent really is uninterested in pursuing what he needs; and this is not the 
product of a false belief; and he could not reach any such motive from 
motives he has by the kinds of deliberative processes we have discussed; 
then I think we do have to say that in the internal sense he indeed has no 
reason to pursue these things.58 
 
Implied in this passage is that an agent has an internal reason to φ if an agent can arrive at 
a state of being motivated to φ by employing the kinds of deliberative processes 
described in W1, W3, and W4 to get from previous motivational states to the state of 
being motivated by φ.  So we might think that Williams is suggesting that these processes 
that change desires are at the same time rational processes because in changing desires, 
they simultaneously generate reasons.   
 But this gets us nowhere.  If Williams is suggesting that all of the deliberative 
processes discussed in his text yield reasons (thus making them rational processes), then 
he is subject to the objection illustrated by the surgery example above—sometimes the 
imaginative processes involved in deliberation yield changes in motivation that seem to 
explicitly contradict what even an agent himself might judge he has reason to do.  Or, as 
Smith puts it in a similar objection, “I see no way in which the effects of compulsions, 
addictions, emotional disturbances, and the like could be precluded by [Williams’ 
account of rational deliberation].”59 
 If Williams believes that only some of the desire-changing processes he has 
discussed yield reasons (thus making them rational deliberative processes) and some do 
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not, then he still has not provided the criteria we would need for distinguishing between 
the rational and non-rational processes. 
 
2.4  Diagnostic Reason 
2.4.1  Diagnosing a prospective problem 
 I suggest the following understanding of practical reason.  Reason is involved in 
practical deliberation insofar as it helps an agent locate, diagnose, and articulate the 
causes of a given prospective uncertainty, so that her deliberative search for a resolution 
becomes progressively less random and more intelligent.  I will call this diagnostic 
reason.  When employed during practical deliberation, diagnostic reason is practical in 
two senses: the problem it aims to diagnose is a practical problem, and the solution it 
helps deliver is action itself. 
There are three primary benefits to viewing the role of reason in this way.  First, it 
will help explain why sometimes reason appears to deliver deliberative conclusions, but 
sometimes it does not.   For, sometimes a proper diagnosis of a problem is all that is 
needed to answer the question of what is to be done.  This is the case when one already 
has a trusted method for resolving the problem on hand, so that once one realizes that she 
is facing that problem, she can easily identify and enact the solution.  Once I realize that 
my car is pulling to the left because of a flat tire, I know exactly how to prevent my car 
from pulling to the left.  But if I realize that my car is pulling to the left because of 
alignment issues, which I can recognize but do not understand in depth, I do not yet know 
how to make my car stop pulling left.   
Second, it can explain why in some cases of practical deliberation, the choices we 
settle on are provisional.  For, if our diagnostic reason locates a problem we do not 
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understand well enough to solve, we have no choice but to experiment, to adopt an 
attitude of, “I’ll try this and see what happens.”  But even in these cases, if our diagnostic 
reason has served us well, our experimentation is not entirely random.  I will not try to fix 
my alignment problem by releasing rodents into the undercarriage of my car, or by 
removing the windshield, or by driving the car into a brick wall.  Diagnostic reason can 
get me as far as knowing which experiments might work, or at least which experiments 
might yield useful feedback. 
Third, diagnostic reason can account for the fact that practical rationality is honed 
over time, and that it is more reliable as a deliberative tool in situations that are familiar.  
In diagnosing a problem with a car, for example, someone who has seen and solved many 
problems with such cars will likely be more effective in solving the problem with the car. 
In response to this third point, some might argue that it is not the capacity for 
reason that is getting honed in these situations, but rather one’s store of background 
knowledge.  But, at least when it comes to diagnostic reason, the capacity to engage in a 
fruitful diagnosis of a given problem does not involve “accessing” background 
knowledge via reasoning processes, processes that then check such background 
knowledge for relevant information.  If that were the case, an agent would need to check 
her entire store of background knowledge every time she encountered a problem.  Our 
minds are more efficient than this.  The lessons of experience are built right in; our 
capacity for diagnostic reason is constituted by our ability to recognize problems as 
familiar types, and to see in new problems relevant analogies to other problems we have 
encountered.  
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Empirical psychologists have studied this phenomenon.  Michelene Chi, a 
psychologist at the University of Pittsburgh, writes, “It is well known by now that the 
quality of problem representation influences the ease with which a problem can be 
solved.”60  In one study, Chi and her fellow researches documented differences in how 
physics experts and physics novices categorized the problems in a given problem set.  
The novices categorized problems according to “surface features” such as into groups of 
problems about “rotational things” or “blocks on inclined planes.”  In contrast, experts 
were able to quickly group the problems in accordance with the major physics principle 
that would allow for their solution—for example, into groups of problems that “can be 
solved with Newton’s second law” and “can be solved with the Law of Conservation of 
Energy”—even though the surface features of the problems were very different.61  The 
researchers concluded that the initial identification of a problem schema “restricts search 
for a particular solution to a small range of possible operations.”62 
Of course, the examples from Chi’s study deal with fixed-end reasoning.  In these 
cases, there is a particular, unchallenged goal—finding the answer to the physics 
problem—and diagnostic reason helps the physicists figure out which method to apply to 
achieve this goal.   But much practical deliberation, I have argued, involves cases in 
which our goals themselves are in question because of a particular conflict.  In such 
cases, diagnostic reason is employed to help us locate and clearly understand which ends 
and means need to be changed, how much they need to be changed in order to resolve the 
problem, which ends and means can be changed, and what other problems may arise 
when such changes are implemented.  By giving us a clearer understanding of the 
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problems we face, our diagnostic reason assists our imagination in its search for 
acceptable prospective content.   Diagnostic reason allows us to rule out instantaneously 
whole classes of options, and it helps us locate those features of the remaining options 
that point us toward prospective revision that will work. 
Understood this way, then, diagnostic reason does not itself activate or deactivate 
prospective content.  Its conclusions are not propositions of the form “it is right to do x,” 
but rather intelligent search parameters along the lines of “look here for a potential path 
forward” and “doing a will lead to b, and b will be hard to live with.”  Diagnostic reason 
guides us toward content that will, in virtue of meeting the three activation conditions for 
prospection, activate itself.   An apt analogy for deliberation, then, is someone who is 
actively trying to pick a lock using various tools.  Diagnostic reason will help the agent 
understand the shape, size, and pressure that needs to be applied in order to open the lock, 
but the “key” will be complete when and because it opens the door.  Similarly, an agent’s 
choice is made when and because a particular imagined option suffices to meet the 
activation conditions.   
Importantly, if this successful option has been forged in the light of a 
sophisticated and accurate understanding of the agent’s problem, then reason has played a 
significant role in delivering practical choice.  When deliberation involves such processes 
it is rightfully called rational.  The inherent motivating properties of the successful 
prospective content discovered through this process will make the choice effective, and 
guide an agent’s actions, but the content itself is shaped heavily by an agent’s 
understanding of her problem, an understanding that is subject to rational criticism.  
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Soon, I will address the precise ways in which problem schemas are subject to rational 
criticism. 
 
2.4.2  Not reason enough 
 The picture of reason I have offered here cannot be reduced to simple means-end 
reasoning.  For, reason here does not simply serve an agent’s activated goals and plans.  
Rather, it assists deliberating agents as they creatively manufacture new goals and plans, 
and thereby new motivations.  Still, some may see this as a decidedly Humean picture.  
Reason, it seems, provides no motivational force.  Its causal efficacy, rather, lies in its 
ability to assist an agent in identifying and authoring options that harness the force of 
motivational and epistemic dispositions over which she has no direct control.  
 This is quite a departure from the more full-blooded Kantian versions of practical 
reason that writers like Korsgaard, Wallace, and Velleman seek to defend.  On such 
pictures, reason is much more than a tool for diagnosing our motivational problems.  It is 
an independent spring of action.  It delivers both a definitive verdict on what should be 
done, and also (in normal functioning adult agents) the causal power to make that verdict 
a reality. 
 These theorists might accuse me of defining reason in a manner that begs 
Wallace’s first question, the question of how practical reason can be causally efficacious.  
In my original answer to that question, I claimed that practical deliberation is effective 
because it is, by definition, the process that restores motivated activity when motivated 
activity has been interrupted.  But deliberation is not itself a rational process, but rather 
an imaginative process influenced by diagnostic reason.  Hence, I have not shown that 
practical reason is itself effective, but rather that practical reason is part of an effective 
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deliberative process.  We might worry that this is quite like claiming that some sugary 
cereal is part of a complete breakfast, when all of the “completeness” is being achieved 
by the other nutrient-rich components of the meal. 
In response, I first want to highlight the fact that diagnostic reason is neither 
strictly theoretical nor practical.  It is a capacity to develop problem schemas in the face 
of uncertainty, schemas that then direct a search toward new, unproblematic content.  
This capacity can be applied either to descriptive uncertainty (uncertainty about the facts) 
or normative uncertainty (uncertainty about what to do).  Of course, insofar as problem 
schemas are representations of problems, they are themselves descriptive, and as such, 
they can be more or less accurate.  This might spur the intuition that the work of 
diagnostic reason, like means-end reasoning, is theoretical work that just happens to 
have, because of the context in which it is employed, practical consequences. 
However, it is important to remember that even though problem schemas can be 
more or less accurate, the primary aim of these schemas during deliberation is not 
accuracy, but usefulness.  Returning to the case of the physics problems above, the 
novices who grouped the problems according to surface features did not have inaccurate 
representations of the problems, they just had less useful representations of the problems.  
Most philosophers have, rightly I believe, rejected the pragmatic notion that theoretical 
reason, and the descriptive beliefs it yields, aims at usefulness as opposed to accuracy. 
Hence, if diagnostic reason aims to deliver useful problem schemas, it is not itself an 
instance of purely theoretical reason. 
But then we may wonder, is diagnostic reason’s involvement in deliberation 
sufficient to make the conclusions of deliberation susceptible to rational criticism?  I 
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believe it is.  Insofar as an agent’s diagnostic reason yields an understanding of the 
problem she is facing, and insofar as this understanding restricts the options she considers 
during deliberation and thereby restricts her eventual behavior, we can conclude that her 
understanding of the situation seriously influences her actions.  This understanding is 
subject to rational criticism—it can be criticized both on grounds of inaccuracy and on 
grounds that some more useful understanding was overlooked—and, derivatively, any 
actions under its guidance are also subject to rational criticism.  Another way of putting 
the point is this: when we criticize an agent’s actions as irrational we are in fact aiming 
our criticism at what we believe to be an agent’s faulty understanding of her situation. 
  
2.4.4  The objects of normative uncertainty 
 Diagnostic reasoning can be deployed in practical deliberation for two 
conceptually distinct tasks: fixed-end reasoning and open-ended reasoning.  Fixed-end 
reasoning, i.e., means-end reasoning, is characterized by an agent’s endorsement (or, 
perhaps, more minimally, acceptance) of all activated goals in prospection.  Because 
circumstances do not create a demand for the revision of goals, diagnostic reason is set 
only the task of specifying the means to activated goals.  Open-ended reasoning, 
however, is required when two or more activated goals are in conflict, or when one 
activated goal is not realizable given environmental circumstances. 
The problems that call for open-ended reasoning are marked by the need to adjust 
one’s goals, and solving these problems inherently involves questioning the import of 
preserving certain goals as is, versus revising or abandoning them.  Thus, when we are 
struggling to decide, in the face of conflict, which goals to endorse and continue to invest 
resources in, normative theory becomes relevant as a problem-solving tool. 
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Remember, on the prospectivist picture, the true objects of practical uncertainty, 
i.e., the what in what we are uncertain about when deliberating, is our prospective set.  In 
short, we are uncertain regarding what to expect from ourselves and from the 
environment with which we are interacting.  But because conflicts among goals and the 
environment can cause open-ended problems, prospective uncertainty gives rise to 
normative uncertainty, in the following way. 
 Suppose you have internalized two norms: do not eat animal products and be a 
gracious house guest.  These norms have been conditioned as immediate evaluative 
rejections of certain prospective contents.  Now, when your host offers you for breakfast 
a plate of eggs and bacon and a glass of milk, your norm against consuming animal 
products rejects this future and causes you to search for a replacement.  But the nearest 
replacement, declining the food, also is rejected, by a different norm.  Part of diagnostic 
reason’s job when conflicting norms cause problems for prospective content is to ask 
about the possibility and consequences of flouting either norm.   
A shorthand way to describe this is as a process of evaluating the import of the 
norms in question.  Further, as Dewey would remind us, in almost any case of 
prospective conflict, as we delve further into the diagnostic work, looking for possible 
ways we might revise our goals, we eventually are forced to ask questions of import.   
Recall the hiker from §1.3.  Faced with the raging river, she might not only ask how to 
get to her campsite by nightfall, but also whether it is important to get to her campsite by 
nightfall, whether it is important to keep her shoes dry, whether giving up and turning 
back is cowardly, and whether it is important to avoid being cowardly.  The line between 
fixed-end reasoning and open-ended reasoning is hazy.  
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Assessments of import will involve attending to the phenomenology and content 
of one’s occurrent desires, attending to the expected consequences of abandoning or 
preserving particular goals, and considering how given goals and values function to 
harness, effectively and reliably, motivation in unproblematic ways.  Thus, a 
sophisticated understanding of the problems we face in deliberation will involve theories 
about which of our goals and norms are important and why.  In other words, a 
sophisticated understanding of our problems will involve normative theory. 
  
2.5  Locating Diagnostic Reason 
 The way we understand our problems influences how robust and satisfactory our 
solutions to those problems will be.  To make this point clear we can consider the tragic 
case of Mary Griffith, who, upon learning her son Bobby was gay, convinced him to pray 
to God to be cured and to turn to church activities for solace and guidance.  Bobby 
heeded her advice, and the pressure from his community, but these actions only led him 
to loathe himself more, until he eventually committed suicide.  Mary has since left her 
church and become an active advocate for gay and lesbian youth.63 
 Both Bobby and Mary misunderstood the contours of their respective problems.  
Some of this misunderstanding involved mistaken means-end beliefs.  For instance, Mary 
thought that her son could change his sexual orientation through prayer.  But they also 
had inadequate understandings of whether and why it was important to “cure” Bobby’s 
gayness.  They drastically overestimated how hard it would be to live a life of open 
embracement of Bobby’s sexuality and drastically underestimated how hard it would be 
for Bobby to live the life recommended by his family and church.  Mary put too much 
                                                        
63 Aarons, Leroy. 1995. 
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stock in the importance of how her family would be perceived, and not enough in the 
psychological health of her child.  Further, the whole community failed to take note of 
the contradictory evidence bearing on their beliefs about the afterlife consequences 
Bobby would face if he did not repent. 
 The following lesson can be gleaned from the above example.  Diagnostic reason 
plays a central role in guiding agents’ behavior.  Therefore it is legitimately practical 
reason.  It will be informative now to contrast this conception of practical reason—as the 
capacity to accurately and effectively diagnose one’s prospective problems—with other 
conceptions of practical reason on offer.  
 
2.5.1  Velleman’s self-understanding 
 Velleman’s approach to solving the belief-desire dilemma introduced at the end of 
Chapter One is to posit the existence of a strong, mostly subconscious inclination toward 
self-understanding.  This grounds a solution to the belief-desire dilemma in the following 
way.  Faced with a variety of options about what she might do, an agent forms a belief 
about which of the options would make the most sense of herself given her motivations 
and the environment, and then her inclination toward self-understanding adds its 
motivational force to that option.64  The result is an intention, a mental state that has the 
same direction of fit as belief—it aims to accurately represent the future—but the same 
direction of guidance as desire—it guides an agent’s actions so as to make itself true.  
                                                        
64 Velleman, J. David. 2000. (22, 24, 141) In these passages, Velleman writes of the aim of self-
understanding “adding its motivational force” to first-order desires in order to tip the balance in 
its favor.  This makes it seem that Velleman takes the aim of self-understanding to interact 
hydraulically with first-order desires.  He moves away from this position in more recent work, 
clarifying that the aim of self-understanding governs first-order desires, but does not compete 
with them. (cf. Velleman, J. David. 2008.) 
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Intentions are a special kind of belief.  They are self-fulfilling predictions.  In short, we 
fix the contents of our belief regarding what we will do by deciding what will make the 
most sense, and then we do what we believe we will do because we could not make sense 
of ourselves otherwise.  
Contrast this picture with prospectivism, which takes doing what we believe we 
will do as basic to all motivated behavior, insofar as our settled prospections are self-
fulfilling expectations.  On this picture, intentions are viewed as a subset of settled 
prospections, all of which are causally efficacious.  Thus, we do not need to posit any 
particular agency-bestowing inclination to explain the possibility of self-fulfilling 
expectations.  Such expectations are a possibility independent from any particular aim or 
inclination. 
 Once Velleman posits that having an inclination toward self-understanding is 
what enables a certain subclass of beliefs (with their mind-to-world direction of fit) to 
acquire the same direction of guidance as desires, then self-understanding is also 
available to stand in as the motivating and organizing force (i.e., meta-end) behind 
practical reflection.  But since prospectivism does not need to posit a given aim to explain 
the efficacy of expectations—it takes such efficacy as basic—nor to explain the advent of 
deliberation—it posits prospective uncertainty here instead—then injecting self-
understanding as the rationality-bestowing property of deliberation is gratuitous. 
Self-understanding is, of course, a critical component of diagnostic reasoning as I 
envision it.  For, the fuller and more robust an agent’s understanding of herself is, the 
more accurate and empowering her understanding of her problem will be.  Thus, most 
deliberating agents are in fact working to increase their self-understanding.  However, the 
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regular pursuit of reflective self-understanding is compatible with either possibility: that 
self-understanding is a necessary means to practical problem-solving or that self-
understanding is the organizing goal of practical deliberation. 
 In his more recent work, Velleman encourages us to read his claim that self-
understanding is the aim of reflection cautiously.  He writes, “[L]ike method actors, we 
never stop relying on our first-order impulses to fund our activities; we merely shape 
those activities into the most understandable enactment of our impulses, all 
considered.”65  He wants to ensure that we not interpret the aim of self-understanding as 
competing with other aims, but rather seizing upon their malleability to shape those aims 
in understandable ways.  The problem for Velleman is that he cannot explain why an 
agent would bother shaping activities into an understandable enactment of her impulses, 
without positing the existence of a tendency toward self-understanding.  Here he pounds 
the table.  We all have this tendency, and having this tendency just is what makes us 
rational.   
 The prospectivist agrees with the first half of Velleman’s claim—we never stop 
relying on our first-order impulses to fund our activities—but disagrees with the second 
half.  In contrast, the prospectivist maintains that we shape our activities only when and 
because the impulses are incapable of doing so on their own.  In the process of 
refashioning our ends, self-understanding helps us get things back on track.  But this 
process does not necessarily aim for, nor result in, the most understandable enactment of 
our impulses.   
                                                        
65 Velleman, J. David. 2008. (432-433) 
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Velleman writes, “the drive toward self-understanding [exerts] a fairly minor, 
modulating role in our practical affairs.”66  The prospectivist theory does not need to 
posit a drive toward self-understanding at all.  It explains why we are disposed to 
modulate our impulses in light of our self-understanding by taking self-understanding to 
play a crucial role in problem-solving and problem-preventing.  It trades the claim that 
we are all regulated by an inclination toward self-understanding with the claim that we all 
have problems and the reflective capacities to help ourselves tackle those problems. 
 
2.5.2  Smith’s systematic justification 
Michael Smith envisions practical reason as the process that allows us to form an 
evaluative belief “about what would be desired if we were fully rational.”67  The ideal of 
full rationality, for Smith, involves being such that all of our desires are systematically 
justifiable.  Thus, deliberation is rational insofar as it delivers judgment on which desires 
are parts of an agent’s systematically justifiable set of desires and which are not.  He 
writes, “…though the imagination can indeed produce new and destroy old desires via 
vivid presentations of the facts, its operations are not guaranteed to produce and destroy 
desires that would themselves be sanctioned in an attempt at systematic justification,”68 
and “…by far the most important way in which we create new and destroy old underived 
desires when we deliberate is by trying to find out whether our desires are systematically 
justifiable.”69   Thus, for Smith, practical reason is a reflective process with a fixed and 
causally efficacious meta-end: systematic justification of one’s desires. 
                                                        
66 Velleman, J. David. 2008. (433) 
67 Smith, Micheal. 1994. (160) 
68 Smith, Micheal. 1994. (161) 
69 Smith, Micheal. 1994. (158) Emphasis his. 
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My response to Smith is similar to my response to Velleman.  The aim of 
systematic justification of one’s active goals is helpful as a means to overcoming the 
problems diagnostic reason is employed to solve, which is why it seems that deliberation 
often involves trying to identify systematizing relations between disparate goals.  But 
such systemization is not the end of practical reason.  Practical reason aims to find only 
enough systemization as is required to solve the problem.  When it comes to systematic 
justification, diagnostic reason satisfices.   
Which is to say, we do not need to appeal to the ideal of complete systematic 
justification to account for the fact that the imaginative processes in deliberation are 
rational processes.  If the goal of diagnostic reason is only to locate and understand the 
forces (both internal and external) that have led to uncertainty so that an agent’s search 
for a resolution is more effective, this will be enough to make it a rational process.  This 
allows us to treat the ideal of complete systematic justification of desires as an optional 
ideal for rational deliberators.70  And if the ideal is optional, so are any of the specific 
imperatives it issues.71 
                                                        
70 I would like to register here my skepticism that 1) complete systematization of desires is 
possible, 2) even if it is possible, it is desirable, and 3) even if it is possible and desirable, it can 
be meaningfully executed in absence of particular prospective problem.  
71 I must admit here that my argumentation on this topic is hindered by my lack of clarity 
regarding Smith’s understanding of systematically justified desires.  At one point (158-161) he 
alludes to a Rawlsian process of reflective equilibrium to explain how systematic justification 
might be achieved.  In general, I find reflective equilibrium to be an attractive method of 
conceptual analysis and theory-modification.  But I am not sure what role Smith envisions 
reflective equilibrium playing in the face of prospective and normative uncertainty, i.e., in the 
face a given practical choice.  He writes, “…we might find that our specific value judgments 
would be more satisfyingly justified and explained by seeing them as all falling under a more 
general principle...[and this] may itself cause us to have a new, underived desire for that more 
general thing.” (160)  Here the concepts of ‘justified’ and ‘explained,’ appear to go hand-in-hand.  
But, consider that an agent could be in the following position: she could realize that two of her 
value judgments could be unified under a single egostic principle and so adopting that principle 
would make her set of profiles more explicable but perhaps no more justifiable than it previously 
was.  What would the ideal of systematic justification recommend with regard to adopting a more 
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2.5.3  Millgram’s practical induction 
Diagnostic reasoning, as I have been describing it, is a conscious, reflective, 
deliberative process that functions only in the face of an agent’s actual uncertainty 
regarding what she will do.  However, in order to do its job properly, diagnostic 
reasoning must be supported by continuous and automatic belief- and value-updating 
processes which may also fall under the umbrella of rational processes.   
Prospectivism accepts that adjustments in ones beliefs, values, and goals can 
happen without conscious attention so long as those adjustments do not cause a 
prospective problem for an agent.  Hearing a noise outside, I form the belief that someone 
is mowing the lawn without consciously attending to that belief.  However, if the noise 
grows louder and louder and my house starts shaking, then I will be uncertain about the 
cause of the sound, and will need to do some conscious diagnostic work. 
Elijah Millgram has argued that just as we form beliefs through processes of 
theoretical induction, so too do we form values and goals through what he calls “practical 
induction.”72  This conception of practical reason dovetails nicely with mine.  Practical 
induction can be viewed as a background process critical to the proper functioning of 
diagnostic reasoning.   
                                                        
general egoistic desire in this case?  Indeed, Smith suggests later that a particular egoistic 
principle—namely, the principle that one should gain wealth no matter what the cost to others—is 
indefensible because “fully rational creatures would want no such thing” (195).  But of course we 
cannot make that judgment unless we assume that we have access to what fully rational creatures 
want.  Smith writes that the “only court of appeal there is for claims about what we have 
normative reason to do” is “[people’s] stock of wisdom about such matters against which each 
person’s opinions should be tested” (195-196).  This makes the systematization of desires an 
inherently public activity.  But going public does not resolve the fundamental question if the 
public is not itself comprised of rational individuals.  Whether we are trying to systematize only 
our own desires or the desires of everyone, we face the same question: does explanation via 
systematization really amount to justification?  
72 Millgram, Elijah. 1997. (43-51) 
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When an agent asks herself during conscious deliberation whether adopting a 
particular course of action will solve her prospective problem, she will need to consult a 
variety of values she has built up through past episodes of unconscious practical 
induction, values that now bear on her choice.  Consider, for example, an agent 
attempting to decide whether to go back to school for a higher degree.  Perhaps she has 
learned over time, for example, that a certain amount of disposable income makes her life 
much less stressful.  Or, through a series of frustrating experiences, she has come to care 
more than she thought she would about prestige and social status.  Or, her previous 
experiences in school have taught her that she tends to become frustrated and impatient in 
the classroom, preferring instead “real-world” situations.  These are values and 
preferences she has built up through practical induction prior to a moment of reflection 
that now become relevant to her resolving a particular uncertainty.  
She may also draw upon consciously directed episodes of practical induction 
during deliberation to form new values.  For example, she may direct herself to attend to 
the experiences of all those she knows with higher degrees.  Having never considered 
these disparate lives (say, of her father, of her high school friend, of her doctor) in 
conjunction, she now takes them as a collection of evidence that bears on the question of 
whether she should attain a higher degree.   
To be clear, I see induction—both theoretical and practical—as supportive of 
diagnostic reason, but not constituting diagnostic reason.  In order to home in on a useful 
problem schema, and to assist in the construction of a resolution to a particular 
deliberative uncertainty, an agent will need to make inferences.  Practical induction will 
be incredibly useful in this regard. 
 61 
 
2.5.4  Richardson’s specificationism 
 Henry Richardson’s conception of deliberation also dovetails nicely with the 
prospectivist account of motivation.  Richardson has effectively defended the idea that 
we can, and regularly do deliberate about our ends, and has argued persuasively against 
maximization accounts of practical reason.73  To account for how processes of deliberate 
revisions of ends are subject to rational pressures, he introduces the notion of 
specification.74 
Despite our shared perspectives on the plight and needs of deliberating agents, it 
is worth noting the difference in emphasis between our two projects.  Richardson is 
interested in laying out the conditions under which a given revision of ends, i.e., a given 
move from E to E* could count as a rational revision.  Then, by demonstrating that such 
revisions can apply not only to particular ends, but to ultimate ends as well, he shows that 
rational revision of ultimate ends is possible.  The rationality of a given specification is, if 
I read Richardson correctly, determined by the relationship between the content of a 
given antecedent end and the resulting revision to that end.75   
In contrast, my interest here lies not in the possibility of a rational relationship in 
content between one end and its revision, but rather in the nature of the mental capacities 
that can deliver revisions to ends in the first place.  There may very well be a tight 
connection between these two projects, but I will not explore it here. 
                                                        
73 Richardson, Henry. 1997. (See, in particular, 89-158) 
74 He uses this term more broadly then just the making general plans more specific.  It also 
involves, for instance, getting specific about under exactly which circumstances a given end will 
be adequately satisfied, and so forth. 









Normative Authority and Deliberation 
 
 
 Humans need guidance, and they need it because they are reflective beings of a 
particular type.  A handful of contemporary philosophers have emphasized that normative 
inquiry, including ethical inquiry, should not proceed without an awareness of the 
reflective conditions that give rise to the need for guidance.  Call this the guidance-first 
approach to normative theory.  I endorse such an approach, and in this chapter, I hope to 
defend it in two steps.  First, I will explore and argue against Nomy Arpaly’s explicit 
rejection of guidance-first approaches to normative inquiry.  Second, I will suggest a 
prospectivist rendering of the type of guidance needed by practical deliberators.  This will 
stand as a corrective against the flawed accounts of deliberation at the heart of other 
guidance-first approaches and will thereby make the approach more compelling. 
 
3.1  A Guidance-First Approach 
In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard frames normative inquiry as follows, 
When you want to know what a philosopher’s theory of normativity is, you must 
place yourself in the position of an agent on whom morality is making a difficult 
claim.  You then ask the philosopher: must I really do this?  Why must I do it?  
And his answer is his answer to the normative question.”76   
 
Korsgaard then articulates three criteria that any answer to the normative question must 
meet.  First, the answer must actually convince the sincere deliberator that she is bound in 
                                                        
76 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. (16) Emphasis hers. 
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the particular sense in question, or as Korsgaard puts it, the answer needed “is really the 
first-person answer, the one that satisfies us when we ourselves ask the question.”77  In a 
related point, the answer must be “transparent.”  Finding out why I think I must do 
something must not thereby convince me that I do not need to do it.  Third and finally, 
Korsgaard argues, the answer to the normative question must appeal “in a deep way” to 
our sense of our identity.  She argues that since morality sometimes demands hard things 
of us, including in some situations the sacrificing of our own lives, the answer to the 
normative question must show that sometimes “doing the wrong thing is as bad as or 
worse than death,”78 and since a loss of identity is often just as bad or worse than death, 
she believes that the answer to the moral question must issue from a sense of who we are. 
By demanding that normative philosophy must speak directly to the sincere 
practical deliberator, Korsgaard has implicitly staked out a meta-philosophical position—
a position regarding the aim of philosophical inquiry itself.  She believes that, at root, all 
genuinely normative inquiry arises from, and answers to, sincere deliberators.  I am 
inclined to agree with Korsgaard on this point.  But it is puzzling that Korsgaard restricts 
her framing of the inquiry to an agent struggling with morality’s claims rather than an 
agent struggling with the authority of prospective content generally speaking.79  Consider 
the fact that moral norms are not the only norms that require difficult sacrifices.  Fashion 
can require us to wear uncomfortable and potentially dangerous shoes.  Social mores can 
require us to tolerate nearly intolerable people.  Prudence can require us to sit at our 
computers on a lovely afternoon.  Given this, we could pose a question very similar to 
Korsgaard’s question using any of these sets of norms as a starting point:  Place yourself 
                                                        
77 Ibid. (17) 
78 Ibid. (17) 
79 Bernard Williams briefly notes this objection in his reply to Korsgaard. 1996. (210) 
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in the position of an agent on whom a particular norm or set of norms (fashion, etiquette, 
prudence, aesthetics, law, parenthood, morality, etc.) is making a difficult claim.  Then 
ask the philosopher:  What must I do now?  And why must I do it?  His answer is the 
answer to the normative question. 
Below, I will defend the meta-philosophical claim that normative inquiry cannot 
be cleaved from the needs of genuine deliberators, i.e., that normative inquiry must 
answer to the agent asking the normative question.  Further, I will defend the position 
that normative ethics must center on a distinctive, collaborative project that understands 
a) the dynamic role norms play in guiding motivated behavior and b) the sources of 
legitimate challenge to normative authority.  I will call the general position that 
normative claims and theories must answer to deliberating agents the guidance-first 
approach to normativity. 
 
3.2  Arpaly’s Rationality 
Nomy Arpaly has explicitly rejected the idea that normative inquiry must cater to 
deliberating agents.  In Unprincipled Virtue, she argues that agents can be rational 
without deliberating and irrational even when they deliberate and act in accordance with 
what they judge to be the most reasonable option.  Because deliberators are fallible in this 
way, Arpaly does not believe that a given account of rationality should be constrained by 
the requirement that it have the power to convince genuine deliberators of its authority.  
And yet, at the same time, she believes that such an account, once in hand, will have 
authority over deliberating agents whether they recognize the authority or not.  That is, 
 65 
these agents will be committing mistakes if they fail to meet the criteria for rationality.80  
She writes: 
There are at least two ways to think of theories of rationality.  One way is to see 
the ideal theory of rationality as providing us with a manual of sorts: follow these 
instructions, and you will always make rational decisions or you will, at least, 
know whether or not you are acting rationally at the moment.  Another way is to 
see theorizing about rationality as aiming, not at providing us with a manual, but 
at providing us with a third-person theory—a theory that tells us when people act 
rationally and when they do not, so that given full information about a person’s 
circumstances, beliefs, and motives, one would be able to tell how rational or 
irrational said person would be in performing an action.  These two tasks…are 
more different than they may look, and conceptual blunders may ensue if one 
does not always know which of them one pursues.81 
 
Because I seek to defend a guidance-first approach to normative inquiry, and because 
Arpaly’s conception of a manual for rational behavior seems reminiscent of such an 
approach, I believe something relevant can be learned from exploring Arpaly’s treatment 
of this distinction.  Arpaly explicitly aims to contribute to the latter project, and she 
expresses doubt that there is any fruitful relationship between the two projects.  This 
doubt takes different forms.  Sometimes it seems she is merely dismissing the possibility 
that accounts of rationality can be used as manuals to rational behavior.  Other times it 
appears that she is questioning whether a satisfactory manual to rational behavior is 
possible at all, and thereby implicitly suggesting that the pursuit of one will be fruitless. 
Here I will ask the following questions:  Are these two tasks as different as 
Arpaly claims they are?  Does she give sufficient reason to conclude that a third person 
account of rationality cannot be translated into useful first-person guidance?  Does she 
                                                        
80 Arpaly, Nomy. 2006. (86-108) She argues this by analogy to belief.  She claims that one who 
concludes not-Q from (P and PQ) will not only be failing to follow a descriptive pattern of 
reasoning, but also will be doing something she ought not do, that is, making a mistake.  Further, 
Arpaly argues, it will be a mistake whether the agent had the capacity to do otherwise or not.   
81 Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. (33) 
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offer a convincing argument that manual-style theories are altogether impossible?  And, 
finally, does she offer any argument for the importance of prioritizing the quest for an 
account of rationality over the quest for guidance? 
 
3.2.1  Rationality manuals versus accounts of rationality 
In the passage above, Arpaly implies that people confuse the task of developing a 
rationality manual and the task of articulating an account of rationality simply because 
the distinction between the two is hard to notice, and is often overlooked.  However, I 
think that urge to yoke these two pursuits together is not simply a matter of overlooking a 
salient difference.  There is a straightforward argument to be made for the conclusion that 
possessing an account of rationality thereby provides adequate guidance for being 
rational. 
P1) Possessing account R allows judge J the capacity, given full information, to 
determine whether any agent A is acting rationally or irrationally, as well as 
what A would need to do differently to act more rationally or perfectly 
rational in the given circumstances. 
 
P2) Judge J is an agent. 
 
C) Therefore, possessing account R will allow Judge J the capacity, given full 
information, to determine whether J is acting rationally or irrationally, as 
well as what J would need to do differently to act more rationally or perfectly 
rational in the given circumstances. 
 
This argument demonstrates that, for the individual who is both a judge and an agent, 
having a third-person account of rationality is in fact equivalent to having a first-person 
manual for rational behavior.  But there are at least three possible challenges to this 
argument, some of which Arpaly raises herself.  I will take them in turn. 
 The first I will call the “know-how” response.  This objection can be motivated by 
an analogy.  Suppose that a botanist has a complete account of sequoias.  Given full 
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information about any specimen, she can use the account to determine whether the 
specimen is a sequoia.  Which is to say, for any specimen, she can know that it is or is not 
a sequoia.  But, of course, she herself does not know how to become a sequoia.  Nothing 
in the account of sequoias can tell her how to grow the appropriate limbs, how to turn her 
skin into bark, etc.  And therefore, the objector may say, though the account is a perfectly 
sufficient third-person account of sequoias, it is nevertheless insufficient as a sequoia-
realization manual.  The bite of this objection comes in recognizing that, in the 
conclusion of the argument above, although Judge J may be possessed of clear judgment 
about exactly what changes she would need to make to become rational, the theory that 
allows her to make this judgment does not thereby empower her to make the necessary 
changes.   
But this objection relies on unrealistic standards for instruction manuals.  We do 
not expect instruction manuals to make us omnipotent.  We expect them to tell us exactly 
what is required to realize a certain goal, and how we can use our actual physical 
capacities (perhaps with some practice) to bring this goal about.  But it is not the fault of 
an instruction manual that it cannot give us new causal powers.  We would not say that a 
blueprint for a house is instructionally insufficient because we do not have the wood or 
manpower to complete the project.  Of course, in order to be effective in guiding 
behavior, every instruction manual must be combined with the goal of attaining what the 
instructions promise, and the capacity to do the things required to meet that goal.  In the 
case of the botanist, it is not her instructional manual that is insufficient.  Rather, she 
lacks the other two elements.  She is not aiming to be a sequoia, and even if she were, it 
is anatomically impossible for her. 
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This leads to a second possible objection.  It is true that we cannot hold our 
instruction manuals responsible when their efficiency is undermined by an agent’s lack of 
relevant motivation or skills.  However, we do realize that instructional manuals need to 
be intelligible to those whose behavior they are designed to guide.  Consider the notation 
on a sheet of music that has been given to someone with both the goal of playing the 
melody it prescribes and also the skills to play the melody.  Of course, the script might be 
unintelligible to her.  She might lack the capacity to read music altogether, having learned 
to play completely by ear.  Or perhaps the music is transcribed in some idiosyncratic and 
rare notation that only a handful of musicians worldwide understand.  It seems clear that 
this is a shortcoming of the musical instructions qua instructions.  Which is to say, while 
we do not take the sheet of music to be insufficient if it does not endow the musician with 
the desire and skills to play the song, we do take it to insufficient qua instruction manual 
if it is written in a manner unintelligible to the musician. 
This highlights the fact that all instruction manuals must be audience-specific.  
The instructions therein must be communicated in a medium that the audience can grasp 
and translate into an understanding of what they need to do.  And this leads to the second 
objection to the above argument, which I will call the “advice” response.  As Arpaly 
suggests, in the case of rational guidance, it may be impossible to formulate a given 
instruction in a way that the agent can grasp and make use of.  Consider the following 
passage: 
‘Never pay attention to anything I say’ is incoherent advice, but it may still be 
true that a rational agent would never listen to anything I say…‘Never act out of a 
conviction that is the result of self-deception’…is not very useful advice; neither 
is ‘Never act out of an unconscious wish that has nothing to do with the task at 
hand.’ Still, it may be true of the rational agent that she would never act out of 
such motives—that she would not simply try to avoid doing so, but in fact would 
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never act out of them…‘Act against your best judgment’ is also an absurd piece of 
advice…Acting against one’s best judgment is not something that one can, as a 
result of deliberation, resolve to do; one just changes one’s best judgment as to 
what to do.82 
 
The implication seems to be that, once we have a third-person account of rationality in 
hand, it may be incredibly difficult or impossible to convert this account into an 
intelligible set of instructions for how to be rational.   
There are two reasons this response fails.  First, while it may be that certain 
formulations of the account of rationality would be unintelligible as advice in the relevant 
sense, we cannot conclude from this that all formulations will be so unintelligible.  
Consider, for example, Liam.  Liam is a compulsive liar who hopes to communicate this 
fact about himself to the world.  Is it possible for Liam to communicate to us that 
everything he says is a lie?  If he could make just one exception, he could of course say, 
“Everything I say, except for this statement, is a lie.”  But suppose for the sake of 
argument that Liam could never bring himself to make an exception.  It might in this case 
be impossible for him to communicate to us that he never tells the truth.  But of course, 
the fact itself can still be communicated.  A non-liar, a sign hung around Liam’s neck, the 
regular discrepancy between Liam’s claims and our own observations—any of these 
could alert us of the fact which Liam himself cannot communicate. 
Arpaly imagines the instruction manual must come in the form of general rules 
written directly from the third-person account.  But why, we may wonder, would the 
advice need to be framed in this particular way?  If, given a complete account of 
rationality, I know that the rational thing for you to do is spend the afternoon studying, 
even though you have decided in accordance with your best judgment to go to the park, 
                                                        
82 Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. (34-35) 
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why must I communicate this to you by saying, incoherently, “Do the opposite of what 
you decide to do.”?  Why can I not advise instead, “Stay home.  Study.  Do not go to the 
park.”?83  Even if some ways of translating a third person account of rationality into 
instructions fail to yield an intelligible manual, this does not mean all such attempts are 
similarly doomed. 
But there is an additional reason the advice response fails as an objection.  Since, 
we are imagining, the person who is in possession of an account of rationality is herself 
the agent in need of guidance, communication becomes moot.   If I know in advance that 
Liam is incapable of telling the truth, any blunders that ensue when he tries to 
communicate this point to me are irrelevant.  Similarly, if I have a complete account of 
rationality, I will not need to translate the account into communicable advice in order to 
use it as a guide.  It will show me directly what the rational thing is for me to do, and I 
will do that. 
 Finally, in response to this defense, it could be argued that, in interpreting the 
above passage as having to do with forms of communication and advice, we somehow 
miss the deeper point, which has not to do with communication between the individual 
who possesses the account of rationality and the individual who needs a manual for 
rational guidance.  Rather, what is lurking here is a problem of access.  There is, this 
response maintains, something about being in a scenario in which you need guidance that 
guarantees you cannot use a third person account of rationality as the source of that 
guidance.  I will call this the “access” response.  Arpaly writes, 
 
                                                        
83 In fact, I believe there is a good reason that the latter advice might not be an effective guide to 
your behavior.  But this has nothing to do with whether it is intelligible, but rather whether you 
trust me as an authority on what is rational, a point I will return to at great length later. 
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It might even be possible that just as the right account of delusion must imply that 
one cannot tell if one is deluded or not, the right account of rationality must imply 
that, at least in some situations, one is a very bad judge of one’s own rationality.84  
 
In response to this suggestion, we might wonder first whether it is true that the right 
account of delusion must imply that one cannot tell if one is deluded.  But granting that it 
is, then in order to preserve the analogy the first premise in the original argument must be 
revised to say: 
P1) Possessing account R allows judge J the capacity, given full information, to 
tell whether any agent A except herself, is acting rationally or irrationally, 
and to what degree, and what A would need to do differently to act more 
rationally or perfectly rationally.  
 
Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the right account of delusion is the one that 
equates being deluded with having false beliefs.  From a third-person perspective, given 
full information, this would allow us to say of any given agent whether or not that agent 
is deluded.  For instance, suppose one year ago we knew 1) Bernie Madoff believed his 
scheme was never going to be exposed, and 2) Bernie Madoff’s scheme was going to be 
exposed, we would rightly conclude that Madoff was deluded.  One of the things we go 
looking for when trying to discern whether a given believer is deluded is a discrepancy 
between his beliefs and reality.85  Given that we can use this account of delusion to 
diagnose others, can we not thereby use this account of delusion to diagnose ourselves?  
There is reason to think we cannot.   
First, while it is often easy for a judge to detect the discrepancy between another’s 
beliefs and reality, we might think it is rarely easy, perhaps impossible, for a judge to 
spot discrepancies between her own beliefs and reality.  Of course, in the previous 
                                                        
84 Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. (34) 
85 A complete account of delusion involves more than just—false beliefs, for instance, a persistent 
unwillingness to revise beliefs in light of contrary evidence. 
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chapter I discussed how checking for error is a regular component of human mental 
activity.  If I am going to the store and I believe I am out of milk, I might check the 
refrigerator to be sure my belief is correct.  In this case, I can use direct perception of a 
state of affairs to check the accuracy of my beliefs about that state of affairs, and, often 
revise my beliefs in light of this perceptual evidence.  Surely this is a case in which I 
have spotted a discrepancy between my beliefs and reality. 
But I gather that the objection runs deeper than this.  The objection is grounded, I 
suppose, in the realization that all the double-checking we can do must be done from our 
first-person perspective.  And some types of evidence of error that are very difficult or 
impossible to see from this perspective are nevertheless easily seen from an external 
perspective.  Hence, we can use our account of delusion to judge others, but not 
ourselves. 
But realize here that the reason we cannot translate our account of delusion into a 
delusion-avoidance manual is not because of some insufficiency in the account of 
delusion, but rather with our lack of full information.  The response gets its force from 
our intuition that it is much more difficult, impossible even, to possess the information 
about ourselves that we need to apply the account of delusion to ourselves than it is to 
possess the information about others that we need to apply the account of delusion to 
them.  If we were capable of attaining full information about ourselves, one of the things 
we would learn is whether our beliefs are false, and hence, whether we are delusional.   
Later in her discussion, Arpaly writes, “I take it as an advantage of my view [of 
rationality] that it correctly predicts a world in which people often have to ask others to 
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judge their own rationality, ‘Am I crazy?’ they ask.”86  Let Ann be an agent, and Judy be 
an observer, and let’s suppose Ann asks Judy, “Am I deluded here?”  It seems to me that 
in order to ask this question, Ann presumes that Judy more or less shares her third-person 
account of delusion, but Ann suspects that Judy has information that she herself does not 
have, information that can be more easily, or perhaps exclusively, gleaned from an 
external perspective.  If this is the case, then what stands between the third-person 
account of delusion and a perfectly adequate first-person delusion-detecting instruction 
manual is nothing.  Rather, Ann’s lack of full information is creating the gap. 
All of this discussion leads to the following insights.  A complete third-person 
account of rationality is not alone sufficient to guide us in rational behavior.  For, in 
addition to such an account, what is needed is the following three things: the active goal 
of being rational, the skill to do the things that lead to the fulfillment of this goal, and 
access to the full information regarding whether one is doing the things that lead to the 
fulfillment of this goal.  But notice, none of this suggests that we need a different account 
of rationality to serve as an instructional manual.  Rather, the third-person account must 
be accompanied by certain motivational and skill-related conditions in order to serve as 
an instruction manual. 
Hence, Arpaly’s original suggestion that there are two independent lines of 
inquiry regarding rationality—one that tries to provide an instruction manual and one that 
tries to provide a third-person account—is undermined.  Of course, the person who seeks 
to be rational may have problems that the person who seeks merely to judge whether 
others are rational does not have.  She may face limitations on her own skill set and 
motivational capacity.  She may also face persistent worries about the reliability of the 
                                                        
86 Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. (61) 
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information she uses to judge whether she is being rational at any given time.  But these 
difficulties do not arise because her account of rationality is insufficient as a guide.  They 
arise because the world conspires against her using the guide to change herself. 
Returning to the original dialectic, we must wonder how these insights bear on the 
defense of guidance-first approaches to normativity.  In demonstrating that Arpaly’s 
distinction between accounts of rationality and instruction manuals for rational behavior 
is indefensible, perhaps I have proved too much.  For, it appears the best we can do if we 
want an instruction manual for being rational is to locate a complete third-person account 
of rationality, and then work hard to make sure we have the skills and knowledge needed 
to apply the account to ourselves. 
In other words, the conclusion from the above discussion seems to be that, to the 
extent we are interested not only in distinguishing rational from irrational behavior but 
also in being rational ourselves, we thereby simply give ourselves extra non-ethical 
work—namely, the epistemological work of making sure we have full relevant 
information and the practical work of developing whatever skills it takes to be rational.  It 
is reasonable to think that this extra work is not within the purview of ethics.  Which is a 
way of arguing that only the first, non-guidance task—the task of providing a third-
person account of rationality—should be the concern of ethicists and those worried about 
practical rationality.   
Has our defense of guidance-first ethical inquiry failed?  In realizing that the two 
tasks that Arpaly takes to be distinct are in fact not distinct, have we thereby 
inadvertently made her dismissal of guidance-first approaches all the more inevitable? 
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In the next section, I will argue that we have not.  For, if we take the lessons of 
prospectivism into consideration, if we remind ourselves that deliberators have no 
indubitable ends, not even the end of being rational, we begin to understand why the 
ethicist must do more than provide mere third-person accounts of the concepts—morality, 
rationality, bravery, patriotism, kindness, etc.—that guide our behavior by serving as 
ideals.  Even further, we begin to understand why any accounts of ethical concepts that 
are formulated without concern for an agent’s guidance cease to be binding concepts for 
that agent at all. 
 
3.2.2  Begging the question 
Conceptual analysis is the bread and butter of philosophy.  We philosophers 
analyze concepts better than anyone else, and we cannot seem to help ourselves.  Our 
friends ask us, “Do you like the way the Obama administration is handling the financial 
crisis?” and our first response is, “Well, it depends on what you mean by ‘like’…”  It is 
no surprise then, that we cannot resist the urge to analyze some of the most prominent 
action-guiding concepts in our conceptual arsenals—good, moral, rational, right, 
valuable, important, etc.  We want for each of these a list of criteria that will help us 
distinguish for any given agent, including ourselves, whether that agent’s actions fall into 
the relevant category.   
But, when we are deliberating sincerely about what to do, often the question we 
seek to answer is not primarily a question of conceptual analysis, nor a question of 
applying concepts to determine which actions would fall into which categories, though 
there is certainly some of this going on.  Rather, the primary question is which categories 
our actions ought to fall into.   
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In the case of descriptive concepts, like ‘walking’ or ‘jumping’, our concepts 
themselves do not purport to answer this question, any more than our concept of 
‘unicorn’ purports to answer the descriptive question of how many unicorns exist.  
Rather, it is our desires, our norms, our value judgments, and the commands of others, 
which, employing these concepts, purport to answer the ought question.  When we accept 
the authority of these sources of prospective content, we accept as binding the normative 
answers they give regarding what is to be done.  In these cases it is easy to spot the 
difference between the following questions: 
1) Analysis and application question: What is required for me to be walking? 
 
2) Authority question: Is walking now required of me? 
 
Things get trickier, however, when the concepts we are analyzing are normatively loaded 
concepts like moral, rational, right, brave, etc.  These concepts, helpful for allowing an 
individual to keep track of what is to be done and what is not to be done, wear their claim 
to authority on their sleeves.  Korsgaard writes, 
Every moral theory defines its concepts in a way that allows us to say something 
negative about people who [challenge or ignore claims involving those 
concepts]—say, that they are amoral or bad.  But an agent who doubts whether he 
must really do what morality says also doubts whether it’s so bad to be morally 
bad...87 
 
The problem with the concept of morality is that it blurs the distinction between the 
analysis and application question and the authority question.  Because an analysis of 
‘moral’ involves, as a defining criterion ‘required’, it blurs the difference between the 
questions: 
1) Analysis and application question: What is required for me to be moral? 
 
2) Authority question: Is being moral now required of me? 
                                                        
87 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. (16) 
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The guidance-first approach to normative inquiry can be understood as an antidote to this 
kind of confusion.  It insists that these two questions are distinct and need to be treated as 
distinct, and that authority questions are the primary questions at stake in general ethical 
inquiry. 
The above discussion of Arpaly’s distinction between accounts and manuals 
allows us to see that those things that are required to turn an account of rationality into an 
effective ‘rational behavior instructional manual’ are not the type of things that ethicists 
can, or should try to, provide.  But it does not thereby follow that ethicists cannot or 
should not try to answer authority questions.  For these questions are never of the form, 
“What is required to achieve goal g?”  Rather, the general form of the question is:  Given 
that I cannot take all of my antecedent prospective content as authoritative, which 
prospective content, and which sources of prospective content, should I take to be 
authoritative?  
Korsgaard writes that the “tendency to conflate the normative question with other 
questions often results in the normative question being blocked or ignored.”88  Indeed, it 
seems Arpaly has done just this.  Particularly, working with what she believes to be an 
intuitive analysis of rational, she then argues that any action that does not fall into the 
category is not merely not-rational, but it is in addition, mistaken.89  By successfully 
establishing that the guidance needs of the sincere deliberator are irrelevant to the 
question “what is rational?” when that question is treated as a descriptive analysis and 
application question, she takes herself to have established that the needs of the sincere 
                                                        
88 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. (43) 
89 See fn. 80. 
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deliberator are also irrelevant to the related authority question.  But the latter does not 
follow from the former. 
 
3.3  Misunderstood Deliberators 
3.3.1  Detecting rationality 
 When asked directly why she believes deliberation is important, Arpaly writes, 
Our higher faculties, it seems, are a wonderful asset when it comes to dealing with 
new information and unfamiliar data…the ability to deliberate and reflect helps 
make us, as humans, be rational much more often, about many more things, in 
many more contexts.”90   
 
In particular, she believes, deliberation helps us be more rational by endowing us with the 
following advantageous capacities: the ability to reconsider our intuitions in unfamiliar 
scenarios, where our intuitions are often unreliable; the ability to double-check our gut 
instincts when we have become aware that our gut instincts on a particular matter often 
lead us astray; and the ability to focus our concentration on competing considerations 
regarding any weighty matter.91 
Arpaly acknowledges a lurking tension here, admitting,  
Some of the [advantages of deliberation] on my list might make one wonder if I 
am not taking back some of what I said before.  How do these work if deliberation 
does not have the kind of authority that some action theorists invest in it…?”92   
 
She responds by writing,  
 
But this is like saying that it makes no sense to install Norton Utilities on my 
computer’s hard drive simply because Norton Utilities is a fallible computer 
program that occasionally erases a good file.  All in all, deliberation increases our 
chances of being rational.  Occasionally, however, it only stands in the way of 
reasonableness.93 
                                                        
90 Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. (64-65)  Emphasis hers. 
91 Ibid. (63-64) 
92 Ibid. 2003. (65) 
93 Ibid. 2003. (65) 
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How is this analogy supposed to defuse the charge that deliberation does have genuine 
authority?  The software picture is this:  There is a fact about which files are bad for 
one’s computer.  Agents run Norton Utilities software because, wanting to avoid these 
files, they aim to discover which of the files on their computer are bad.  When the 
software locates these files, it destroys them.  Users trust the software’s authority because 
they believe that, more often than not, it destroys the bad files.  The analogous 
deliberative picture is this:  There is a fact about what it is rational to do in any given 
circumstance.  Agents deliberate because, wanting—consciously or unconsciously—to 
act rationally, they aim to discover which of all the actions available to them is the 
rational action.   When they locate the rational option, they act in accordance with that 
option.  Agents trust deliberation’s authority because they believe that more often than 
not, it delivers the rational action. 
Against this backdrop, Arpaly’s point is simple and quite compelling:  Our 
deliberative rationality-detecting systems, just like our utilities software, are fallible.  In 
addition, sometimes our instincts will lead us to do the rational thing even if we do not 
deliberate, just as sometimes our computers will remain in good working function if we 
do not run Norton software.  We are warranted in trusting deliberation’s conclusions, 
Arpaly believes, because far more often than not, they deliver accurate answers to the 
analysis and application question, “What is rational?” 
This may be a satisfactory answer to action theorists who believe the constitutive 
aim of deliberation is deciding which course of action is rational.  These theorists may 




detecting capacity in the way that the authority of Norton software is dependent on its 
virus-detecting capacity.  But, as I have argued at length, the constitutive aim of 
deliberation is not rationality.   
There is another reason that philosophers, including myself, might “invest 
deliberation with authority” that Arpaly overlooks.  Deliberation, I maintain, does not 
have authority because it yields some privileged access to facts about what is the rational, 
good, or right thing to do, facts that the deliberator would otherwise lack.  Rather, 
deliberation has authority because, when someone is genuinely deliberating, her 
deliberative processes are the only things she can take as authoritative, if she is to take 
anything as authoritative at all.  Another analogy might help make this distinction clear. 
When survivors of a shipwreck climb aboard the only remnants of the 
wreckage—a tattered, leaking lifeboat—they do not trust it to carry them to safety 
because they believe it possesses the qualities that, generally, allow it to serve that 
function.  Rather, they trust it because it is their only option.  It is likely, in fact, that they 
have grounds for doubting the capacity of the lifeboat to deliver them to safety, and yet 
trust it with the task anyway.  Similarly, deliberators may doubt, in light of Arpaly’s 
discussion (and, it is worth mentioning, a heap of empirical evidence from moral 
psychology that supports the conclusion that conscious reflective deliberation often 
makes us worse rather than better off94) that their deliberations will steer them toward 
well being, or any other generally desirable state.  But trust their deliberative processes 
they must. 
Consider now the judges who are equipped with a full grasp of all relevant 
concepts and full information about the world, and who are watching these deliberators 
                                                        
94 See, for example, Lehrer, Jonah. 2009.  And, Gladwell, Malcolm. 2005. 
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from the third-person perspective.  Whatever these deliberators do, the judges will be 
able to discern exactly which categories they and their actions fall into.  The judges will, 
because of their privileged perspective, accurately judge whether the deliberators have 
done something kind, beautiful, rational, moral, good, funny, charming, useful for 
society, etc.  And they will also know whether the deliberators have been deceived in 
believing that they have done any of these things.  If the deliberators are so deceived, 
they are surely mistaken in that sense.   
But it is not a mistake for these deliberators to trust their deliberative processes.  
They have no choice in the matter.  Short of waiting for some outside force to make up 
their minds for them, deliberation is their only hope for determining what is to be done. 
The question thus becomes, exactly what are deliberators trusting their deliberative 
process to do during deliberation? 
 
3.3.2  Awareness of our mental states 
 One seemingly unique talent humans possess is the ability to be aware of, and 
attend to, our own mental states as such.  This talent is the foundation of reflective self-
awareness, and it is taken to be crucial to our capacities for reasoning and deliberation.  
Beyond this, however, some philosophers have suggested that the awareness of our 
mental states creates a problem for us that no other animal has, a problem that reflective 
deliberation is then employed to solve.  The following two passages, from Korsgaard and 
Nagel, respectively, attempt to articulate exactly what problem is caused by our ability to 




[T]he human mind is self-conscious in the sense that it is essentially reflective…A 
lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and 
its desires are its will.  It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious 
of them.  That is, they are not the objects of its attention.  But we human animals 
turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves, on to our own 
mental activities, and we are conscious of them.  That is why we can think about 
them.  And this sets us a problem no other animal has.  It is the problem of the 
normative…I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act.  But I back 
up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance.  Now that 
impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem.  Shall I act?  Is this 
desire really a reason to act?  The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and 
desire, not just as such.  It needs a reason.95 
 
The capacity for self-consciousness changes the nature of the being who is 
making the choices—whether they are decisions to act or decisions to believe—
by introducing irrevocably the distinction between appearance and reality, 
between how things seem from our personal point of view and how they really 
are—and facing us with the need and perhaps providing us with the capacity to 
arrive at an answer that seems right not just from our individual point of view but 
from the reflective standpoint that takes this view as its object.96 
 
To return to the question at hand, these theorists believe that, during deliberation, 
deliberators trust their deliberative processes to resolve the problem (or, alternatively, 
meet the need) that arises as a result of our reflective capacity.  The question I want to 
ask here is whether the problems confronting the individuals described by Korsgaard and 
Nagel are the same as the problems that confront the prospective deliberator.  I will 
conclude that deliberators rarely, if ever, face the problems described by Korsgaard and 
Nagel, but that it is easy to mistakenly think they face such problems because the above 
problems are similar to the problems that are in fact regularly faced by prospective 
deliberators.  Further, to the extent that any individuals actually do face the above 
problems, there is nothing we can do, as philosophers, to help them. 
 
3.3.3  Aiming for certainty 
                                                        
95 Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. (93) Emphasis hers. 
96 Nagel, Thomas. 1996. (202) 
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If prospectivism is true, we can immediately spot a flaw in Nagel’s understanding 
of the reflective agent’s need.  For, it is not self-consciousness that introduces the 
distinction between appearance and reality.  The mere recognition that we have a belief is 
not itself enough to challenge the belief’s accuracy.   Rather, it is evidence of error that 
first makes us aware of the possible discrepancy between what we believe and how things 
actually are.  It is, for example, the moment we realize how many houses there are in the 
world, that we begin to question whether any man, no matter how many flying reindeer 
he has at his disposal, could possibly visit all the houses in one night.  And then we might 
wonder:  Does Santa have the power to stop time?  Does he deliver presents to other 
countries on different days?  Does he delegate some of his work to our parents?  Etc.  It is 
not first the capacity to be aware of beliefs as such that introduces a problem to be solved.  
Rather, awareness of incompatibility among beliefs introduces uncertainty that cannot be 
resolved until we modify our belief set. 
In the practical realm, not only are our beliefs called into question, but also our 
goals, our desires, and the norms that we use—consciously or unconsciously—to govern 
prospective content.  For the sake of discussion, I will say that when a belief is in doubt 
its accuracy is in question; and when a norm is in doubt its authority is in question.  
Using this terminology, we can say that during regular, non-reflective activity, we take 
our beliefs to be accurate guides to how the world is, our prospections to be accurate 
guides to how the world will be, and the norms and desires that shape the content of those 
plans to be authoritative guides to how the future should be.   
Allow me to make an important note about this terminology.  To insist that we 
take our norms and desires to be accurate as opposed to authoritative guides to how the 
 84 
world should be is to smuggle in a moral realism that we do not need and that causes 
innumerable problems.  I am not here rejecting moral realism outright, but I want to 
ensure that my vocabulary does not implicitly endorse the position.  Similarly, as the 
practical analog of the epistemic notion of evidence of error that arises when there is 
some problem with one’s belief set, I will use the notion of cause of uncertainty to 
describe a situation in which a problem arises with one’s prospective set.  Cause of 
uncertainty threatens the authority of the various sources of, and constraints upon, 
prospective content.   
Prospectivism maintains that it is not in the first place general doubt that causes 
the problem about which we must deliberate, but rather a particular incompatibility 
among beliefs, plans, and norms that causes problematic uncertainty about which we 
must deliberate.  And while we deliberate, it is our reflective awareness of the beliefs and 
norms at issue, our ability to bring these mental states into focus, and in particular, our 
ability to articulate and grasp exactly which norms and beliefs are called into question by 
a particular development that contribute to our capacity to self-correct, i.e., to process and 
neutralize the cause of uncertainty.  Reflective awareness in this case is not the source of 
a problem; it is part of the solution. 
 Still, we might think Nagel’s important point stands independently of the question 
of how we initially become aware of the possibility of error.  What really matters, we 
might suspect, is that the threat of error, once introduced, is introduced irrevocably.  
Having learned your belief in Santa Claus was inaccurate, you have thereby been made 
aware that beliefs are, in general, the types of things that are susceptible to inaccuracy.  
Similarly, if you have ever consciously surrendered a norm because you came to 
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recognize it lacks authority, you have thereby been made aware that any of your norms 
may lack authority.   
The awareness of the possibility of error is the birthplace of skepticism.  Those 
who are profoundly bothered by the possibility of error set out to put it to rest, Descartes 
providing perhaps the most famous example.  It is important to highlight that such 
thinkers are not aiming to overcome particular evidence of error.  Rather, they want to 
eliminate the possibility of error altogether.  In the practical realm, achieving this task 
would involve ruling out any possibility that a given norm lacks authority.  Is this what 
deliberators are up to when they stop and ask themselves what they have reason to do? 
Are they checking to see whether the norms guiding their plans are backed by an 
indubitable source of normative authority?  For such deliberators, does the need for 
guidance always involve the need for immunity from uncertainty? 
Before answering this question, let us return for a moment to the prospective 
deliberator as a point of contrast.  Prospectivist deliberation begins not with an agent’s 
awareness of the possibility that her prospective content is flawed, but rather with her 
awareness that her prospective content is in fact flawed.  The hiker from §1.3.5 cannot 
plan both to keep her feet dry and to reach the campground by nightfall.  The pregnant 
teenager cannot plan both to obey the teachings of her church and to finish high school on 
schedule.  The economically struggling family cannot both pay their mortgage and pay 
for health insurance.  In these situations an agent becomes aware that something must 
give.  In the case of belief, an agent must somehow make the beliefs compatible by 
revising or surrendering one or all of her competing beliefs.  In the case of prospective 
content, an agent must somehow make her goals compatible by revising or surrendering 
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one or all of the goals (and perhaps the norms constraining those goals).  This is to say, 
prospective deliberation is spurred not by an agent’s awareness of the threat of error, but 
rather because the agent has direct cause of uncertainty. 
It is possible, of course, to turn a prospective deliberator into a practical skeptic.  
All you need to do is add to an agent’s prospective set the activated goal of being certain 
that all her beliefs are accurate and all her norms are binding.  But then we must ask what 
would satisfy this demand for certainty.  We might think that such an aim requires us to 
try, as Descartes did, to locate some indubitable foundation for all our beliefs and norms, 
to find a belief that must be accurate and a norm that must be authoritative.  But, realizing 
the futility of this pursuit—and I maintain that such a pursuit is indeed futile—the agent 
might instead do the most thorough scan she can for any cause for uncertainty, and 
finding none, be content that she is as certain as anyone in her situation can be. 
In light of these two possibilities, I argue the following:  If we are meant to 
understand Korsgaard’s or Nagel’s deliberator as engaged in the same pursuit as the first 
agent above, as looking to overcome practical skepticism once and for all, we 
philosophers should not concern ourselves with her problem, for two reasons.  First, it is 
unlikely that there are any actual agents who possess the goal of absolute eradication of 
the possibility of uncertainty.  This is an obviously false description of actual humans.  
Even Descartes trusted his belief that his pen existed enough to use the pen to write about 
whether he could trust that his pen existed.  Second, even if it is psychologically possible 
to adopt such an aim, and even if a handful of dedicated thinkers have adopted the aim, it 
is impossible to satisfy.  There is always a fanciful what-if waiting in the wings—a 
demon, the matrix, delusion-inducing drugs—raising the possibility that our 
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understanding of the world and ourselves is flawed.   Since the task of eliminating this 
possibility is impossible, we should rightly conclude that nothing we philosophers can 
come up with will satisfy this aim. 
 
3.3.4  Checking for uncertainty versus deliberating 
Thus, being charitable, we should assume that, insofar as a reflective agent is after 
some sort of reassurance, it is the latter type, the certain-as-I-can-be type.  And here we 
arrive at an important distinction.  The activity of practical reflection and practical 
deliberation are often treated synonymously.  But notice, the agent who, motivated by a 
desire for certainty, goes looking for cause of uncertainty is not yet deliberating.  Rather, 
she is checking whether she has anything to deliberate about, checking to make sure that 
she has not overlooked accessible cause of uncertainty. 
The habit of checking for accessible cause of uncertainty (henceforth, “checking 
for uncertainty”) is—unlike the aim of attaining absolute certainty—very common.  
Causes for uncertainty are sometimes easy to miss, even when they are staring us in the 
face.  And since the consequences of missing important cause of uncertainty can be dire, 
we develop habits of actively searching for them, and expect others to do the same.  We 
expect our students to recheck their grammar before they submit papers.  We expect our 
pilots to check that the instruments are properly functioning before take-off.  We expect 
the doctor to check he is amputating the correct limb before he begins his incision.  And 
we hold these agents responsible when their failure to engage in such checking results in 
catastrophe (or, in the less extreme case, results in an unreadable paper). 
Checking for uncertainty is thus an important and perhaps uniquely human form 
of reflective activity.  In the practical case, checking for uncertainty can sometimes itself 
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involve imagining alternatives to one’s current plan in an effort to make sure there is not 
some more attractive option.  It can also involve consciously attending to one’s normative 
beliefs to make sure that the current plan accords with those beliefs.  And it can involve 
imagining the current plan in greater detail to check for lurking incompatibilities.  But, 
importantly, unless any of these searches turns up an actual instance of conflict, an agent 
has nothing to deliberate about.  For, deliberation is what is required once the uncertainty 
is discovered.   
When the student realizes her paper is riddled with incomplete sentences, when 
the pilot realizes that his gauges are not functioning properly, when the doctor realizes 
that the leg he is about to amputate does not match the description on the chart—these are 
the scenarios that call for deliberation.  How should I revise my sentences?  How serious 
is the malfunctioning of these instruments, and what are my options now that I am aware 
they are not properly functioning?  Whose chart am I looking at, and why was it handed 
to me?  Thus, our reflective nature comes in two phases: the checking phase and the 
deliberating phase.  If the checking phase turns up no uncertainty, there is nothing for an 
agent to deliberate about.  
 
3.3.5  The power of reflection  
This distinction can help us shed light on what is misleading about Korsgaard’s 
understanding of the deliberator.  Korsgaard suggests that when an agent attends to her 
mental states, the attention itself has the effect of neutralizing the causal impact of those 
mental states.  Korsgaard characterizes this as the transformation of incentives—objects 
represented in such a way as to motivate us directly—into inclinations—proposals 
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offered up to reason as possible options.97  We can illustrate this idea with an analogy.  
The difference between an incentive and an inclination can be compared to the difference 
between a wind that moves a ship, and the same wind conceived by a skilled sailor as a 
possible source of movement of the ship.  The wind, possessed of its own direction and 
force, provides a suggestion or proposal to the sailor regarding where he might sail, but 
the sailor is in a position to decide whether to engage the wind or not.   
The story is similar with an agent who, say, recognizes in herself an inclination to 
run away in the face of some danger.  Korsgaard believes that the recognition and 
reflection upon this inclination itself suspends its direct casual efficacy, and transforms it 
into a proposal that the agent can take or leave.  She writes, “In the sense I am using the 
term here, an inclination just is the operation of a natural incentive upon you, as viewed 
through the reifying eye of self-consciousness.”98  Faced with the inclination to run away, 
the agent must decide whether to run away.   
As an initial response to this conception of deliberation, it is worth noting that in 
fact, often when we attend to our desires, it makes them more not less dominating.  
Thinking about the fact that one has the urge to laugh in church often makes the impulse 
to laugh stronger, not weaker.  Reflecting on one’s hunger or on a particularly appealing 
food item usually increases the demand for food.  This evidence seems contrary to the 
claim that attending to the incentives motivating us at any one point suspends their causal 
efficacy.  
In contrast, prospectivism does not take reflection upon an incentive to suspend 
that incentive’s direct causal efficacy any more than a sailor’s reflection on a wind 
                                                        
97 Korsgaard, Christine. 2009. (121-122) 
98 Ibid. (121-122) 
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suspends its causal efficacy.  Rather a problem with the prospective content related to the 
incentive is what disarms the incentive.  In other words, incentives interrupted by a 
particular conflict are brought to our attention not merely as inclinations that we can take 
or leave, but rather as problematic inclinations that, in their current state, cannot move us.  
However, if one overlooks the difference between checking for uncertainty and 
deliberating, and groups them both under the heading “reflecting,” it might be easy to 
mistakenly think that reflection itself has the power to suspend the efficacy of desire.  
Normal human adults often, as part of a useful habit, stop themselves to check for 
uncertainty.  And this process, which involves attending to the content of our beliefs and 
plans, even occasionally attending to the content as such, involves a momentary 
suspension of our confidence in our beliefs, plans, and norms, and hence an openness to 
uncertainty, i.e., to evidence that the norms and desires shaping our prospective content 
are not authoritative.  Korsgaard mistakenly attributes to agents suspended in such a 
search the need for reasons.  But in fact, the reflection is centered on locating cause of 
uncertainty.   We do not need uncertainty; we do not even in most instances want it.  
Quite the opposite, we are usually hoping we will not find any.  For any such uncertainty 
is inconvenient.  It requires us to deliberate.  It is only once we have found uncertainty 
that the need for reasons arises. 
 
3.3.6  Reflective hang-ups 
 In previous chapters, I have tended to describe those scenarios that lead to 
deliberation as scenarios in which uncertainty finds us.  If readers have sensed that this is 
an inadequate account of deliberation, it might well be because they think, rightly, that 
we do and ought to deliberate more often than just in those scenarios in which we 
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stumble upon incompatibilities in our prospective set.  Understanding that many of the 
causes of uncertainty that spur deliberation are discovered not by accident but because, as 
avid critical thinkers, we go looking for such incompatibilities, allows us to preserve 
prospectivism as a general theory of deliberation while accounting fully for the reflective 
activity of even the most thoughtful of agents. 
 To summarize, Korsgaard claims that agents, while reflecting, are looking for 
reasons to do things.  Nagel believes that they are hoping to quiet the threat of possible 
error.  But prospectivism maintains that when agents are actually deliberating, it is 
because they are dealing with some actual cause of uncertainty.   Korsgaard writes, “[The 
reflective mind] needs a reason.  Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot 
commit itself or go forward.”99  Prospectivism counters with a similar, but importantly 
different claim about the needs of the reflective self:  The reflective mind, when 
confronted with uncertainty, needs to process and neutralize this uncertainty.  Otherwise, 
it cannot commit itself or go forward.  
 These observations raise a number of questions.  How can an agent neutralize 
uncertainty?  Are some methods and instances of neutralizing uncertainty better than 
others, and if so, by what standards are they better?  And, meta-philosophically, is there a 

















  The Vindication of Values 
 
 
4.1  Framing the Authority Question 
 If you are about to take a bite of soup and a fly lands on your spoon, your 
prospective content becomes unsettled.  You have an aversion to consuming any food 
that has been touched by a fly, but you have a strong desire to eat.  The question is 
whether you should override the aversion and allow yourself to take a bite, or whether 
you should override your desire to eat instead.  This tension can be resolved by 
deliberating to discover a revised plan to fetch a new bowl of soup.  In doing this, you 
respect the authority of your aversion to fly-tainted food, while still allowing your hunger 
to shape a new plan, forsaking only the immediate desire for a particular bite of soup. 
 Of course, this is a fairly trivial example.  A much more weighty decision might 
arise in the life of a pregnant teenager who believes abortion is wrong but who is 
considering aborting her fetus before telling her community that she is pregnant.  Her 
general value judgment that abortion is wrong serves to prevent the teenager from 
accepting as her future any plan in which she has an abortion.  But carrying a child to 
term is incompatible with all her current plans, which are forged from various desires and 
value judgments (getting good grades in school, playing on the volleyball team, 
maintaining her social status and friends, protecting her family’s reputation, etc.).   
Here, the anti-abortion aversion is much different in nature than the anti-fly 
aversion.  It is imbedded in a large and stable identity, a network of norms that purport to 
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direct an agent toward a well-lived life, and further, direct an agent how to feel about 
herself upon fulfilling or failing to fulfill these norms.  Which is to say, parts of the 
agent’s identity—the honest daughter, the good Christian, the compassionate, life-
affirming citizen—are in conflict with other parts of her identity—the good team-
member, the talented student, the fun and carefree friend, the girl who lets nothing get in 
the way of her dreams.   
This is why our decisions are often not just about what to do, and what to value, 
but also about who to be.  When we knowingly override our aversions to pain or 
discomfort—when we make ourselves go to the dentist because it is the only way to fix 
our teeth, or we make ourselves eat the fly-tainted soup because it is the only food we 
have in the house—it is simply a matter of bringing ourselves to endure, temporarily, an 
uncomfortable experience.  But when we override the aversions and desires that stem 
from our value systems, we do not just agree to endure temporary discomfort; rather, we 
agree to revise our identities. 
It is important to note that although the weightier, value-laden decisions we make 
differ in significant ways from the more pedestrian fly-in-the-soup decisions, they are not 
different in kind.  For, at issue in any open-ended practical deliberation is the question of 
import.  Is it important to avoid eating the fly?  Is it important to satisfy my desire to eat?  
Is it important to avoid having an abortion?  Is it important to be a good Christian?  How 
important is it and in what sense is it important?   
In order for diagnostic reason to answer these questions, it must have access to a 
working theory of value—a theory that tells a deliberator what is important and why.  
Included in this is a working theory regarding which sources can be trusted as authorities 
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on the matter of import.  Our desires, our learned norms, our value judgments, pain and 
pleasure, the demands made by other people, the yelps of a suffering dog—all of these 
things direct our attention to objects, beings, and situations.  Even just the fact that other 
people are attending to something itself suggests that we should pay attention to it.  In 
this simple way we are continuously bombarded by demands for attention and specific, 
related action.  (These demands, when unreflectively guiding action, are what Korsgaard 
calls “incentives.”) 
One component of a working theory of value is a theory of which of these 
demands can be justifiably discounted or ignored.  The recovering smoker might discount 
his desire for a cigarette.  The sexist might discount the requests of women.  The factory 
farm owner might discount the cries of suffering animals.  Our theories of value often 
take the form of generalized policies regarding which of the various demands for 
attention and action need to be heeded and why.  These judgments are what I have been 
calling, for shorthand, judgments of import. 
Thus, the authority question is properly framed not just as uncertainty with regard 
to the authority of one given demand for attention and action, but rather as uncertainty 
about which components of a set of conflicting or vague demands should be granted 
authority as is, which should be granted authority in some revised form, and which 
should be ignored temporarily or altogether.  When we inquire as to the philosophical 
prospects of answering the authority question, then, we are inquiring whether philosophy 
has anything to say about this collection of questions.  Further, the authority question is 
always going to be found in the context of a conscious attempt to reevaluate in the face of 
uncertainty about the authority of one or more demands.  
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Another important point is that deliberative uncertainty is not caused by 
momentarily forgetting one’s value theory.  If that were the case, all an agent would need 
to do is recall to mind her theory of value, apply it, and move forward.  Deliberative 
uncertainty is caused by a shortcoming with the value theory itself.  As a result, in the 
face of such uncertainty, we cannot simply rely on the rules, norms, maxims, desires, 
identities, etc. that we previously took as authorities on the matter of what is important, 
for these entities are playing a direct role in causing our deliberative problem. 
 This observation reinforces the point made in the previous chapter that even the 
clearest analysis of a given action-guiding concept (e.g., rationality) will not be able to 
instruct us in our deliberative revisions so long as its authority is what is in question.  
Similarly, we cannot turn to any fixed set of rules, or any rigid identity that we have 
antecedently taken to be an authority on what is important as a means of solving our 
problem.  Even in the case in which we decide to trust a given person (like a parent, 
friend, or pastor) as an authority on a given problem we are facing, doing so requires us 
to extend our understanding of that person’s authority, to judge explicitly that they have 
authority on the specific matters in question.  Deliberation, I insist, calls upon us to 
change our value theory via extension, specification, or revision.    
 
4.2  The Authority of Experience 
Prospectivism allows us to make sense of the idea that developments in one’s life 
and one’s environment can cause problems for one’s normative theory.  Here, I will offer 
and defend an account of the conditions under which revisions to one’s normative theory 
can be vindicated, an account I will call the evidential account of normative authority. 
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Succinctly, the position is this:  An agent’s normative theory—the collection of 
her judgments of import—is vindicated if guiding her actions in light of the theory proves 
to be non-problematic.  Further, evidence of authority is accrued over time in relation to 
whether the normative theory proves non-problematic not only in a given instance but 
rather in a variety of environments and motivational circumstances.  
 
4.2.1  Cause of uncertainty versus grounds for uncertainty 
 One of the first skills a philosopher must learn is the ability to appreciate the 
distinction between belief and justified belief, i.e., between actually believing and having 
grounds for belief.  Those who seek to defend rational desire are committed to a similar 
idea, the distinction between actually desiring and having grounds for desire.  These 
distinctions, in turn, anchor our judgments that certain actual beliefs and desires are 
mistaken. 
 We might expect a parallel distinction to be made between actual uncertainty and 
grounds for uncertainty.  And this leads to an obvious objection to the evidential theory 
of normative authority.  If the evidential theory grounds the vindication of value 
adjustments in their capacity to resolve actual uncertainty, but agents are capable of being 
unwarrantedly certain or uncertain, then it seems the wrong norms will be vindicated on 
this picture.   
For example, the norm of enslaving my friends in my basement and forcing them 
to write articles for me would be vindicated so long as it causes me no uncertainty.  This 
seems, initially, as unattractive as the proposition that my desire to enslave my friends 
justifies my plan to do so.  It also might lead to the inverse counterintuitive consequence.  
Suppose I am such that the goal of basic hygiene causes me a great deal of normative 
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uncertainty:  I just cannot convince myself that bathing is worth the bother.  In the face of 
this uncertainty, I will be forced to revise my norms.  But, we may believe, since the 
uncertainty was ungrounded in the first place, so too the vindication of any revisions 
made to accommodate the uncertainty is similarly ungrounded. 
These are the types of scenarios that lead Arpaly and others to reject the idea that 
whether we can convince a given moral agent to accept a given value has no bearing on 
whether that value is authoritative.  Such a rejection is comforting for two reasons.  It 
forms a nice analog with our typical rejection of the idea that whether we can convince a 
given believer to accept a given belief has no bearing on whether that belief is accurate.  
It also allows us to dismiss without much hesitance the authority of the norms of others, 
when those norms seem suspect or unjustifiable.   If, for example, you are walking down 
the street and a stranger demands that you must publicly accept Jesus Christ as your lord 
and savior, one option available is to reject the stranger’s demand as unjustified.  He is 
certain about it, but this is only because he has failed to appreciate the abundance of 
actual evidence that would undermine his certainty.  In general, the proposal that freedom 
from uncertainty is equivalent to having justified values and actual uncertainty is 
equivalent to having unjustified values is unattractive.  If the evidential theory of 
normative authority commits us to this position, we ought to reject it. 
 In response to these worries, I nevertheless maintain that there is nothing more to 
a given value’s vindication than its ability to resolve, and be an on-going part of, 
problem-free value theory.  To defend this position, I will demonstrate the resources 
available for making the counterintuitive consequences seem less counterintuitive.  This 
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will involve two steps.  First, I will introduce a dispositional account of grounds for 
uncertainty, and second, I will endorse a pluralistic notion of normative communities. 
When I introduced the notion of cause of uncertainty in Chapter 3, I meant it 
literally.  An agent with cause for uncertainty has literally been caused to be uncertain.  
But how does such actual uncertainty relate to grounds for uncertainty?  I define grounds 
for uncertainty as follows:  If, holding everything else in your present condition fixed, 
your attending to (experiencing/noticing/discovering) information i will cause you 
uncertainty, then i is grounds for uncertainty, whether you attend to i or not.  For 
example, if you were to discover that all of the paint in your house has trace amounts of 
lead, this would cause you uncertainty about the safety of your house.  Thus, the 
existence of the lead is grounds for you to be uncertain about the safety of your house, 
even though you are not in fact uncertain about the safety of your house because you do 
not know about the lead.  The existence of unnoticed grounds for uncertainty is exactly 
why the habit of checking for uncertainty, discussed in §3.3.4, is useful.  
With this dispositional understanding of grounds for uncertainty, we can 
accommodate a great deal of the circumstances we are likely to judge cases of mistaken 
certainty and uncertainty.  But notice, these cases cause no problem for the evidential 
account of normative authority, because it is built into the theory that the authority of a 
given value adjustment resides not only in its ability to resolve problems currently, but in 
its ability to be part of an on-going problem-free value theory.  Thus, the vindication of a 
given value adjustment is relative not just to its capacity to resolve actual uncertainty, but 
also to its capacity to resolve, or at least be part of a solution to, potential uncertainty.  
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And, given the plethora of unnoticed, but available, information, there is a great deal of 
potential uncertainty lurking around every corner. 
However, the dispositional account of grounds for uncertainty will not explain 
away all cases that we might want to call cases of mistaken certainty and uncertainty.  
There are two ways in which an agent might fail to appreciate grounds for uncertainty.  
First, she might simply overlook, i.e., fail to attend to, available information that would 
cause her uncertainty if she attended to it, in which case uncertainty and deliberation will 
not be triggered.  Second, even when attending to grounds for uncertainty, an individual 
might be caused no uncertainty.  Call the first type of failure to appreciate grounds for 
uncertainty a case of overlooking and the second type of failure a case of 
unresponsiveness.100 
My approach to the second type of cases is to deny that they are in fact cases of 
mistaken certainty, and instead appeal to a response-relative definition of epistemic and 
normative communities.  To take a clear, though extreme example, the psychopath is not 
a member of our normative community precisely because the perception of another’s 
suffering causes him no pause.101  Insofar as the normative uncertainties he faces are 
dramatically different than the ones we face, we should not expect the value judgments 
he makes and tests in experience to be binding on us.  Of course, there is still a question 
                                                        
100 Nomy Arpaly recognizes a similar distinction, which she calls the distinction between 
“deficiency of perception” and “deficiency of motivation.” 2003. (83) She writes, “Many people 
have wondered if their spouses don’t see the dust on the floor or don’t care that it is there, and the 
diagnosis is hard because there is often a combination: a person who does not care about 
cleanliness tends to be less trained at spotting dust, and a person who is not good at spotting dust 
may find it hard to be motivated to learn to see it and add a new worry to his life.” (83) 
101 Of course, there is the chance that psychopaths simply do not perceive the blatant behavioral 
signs of suffering as signs of suffering.  The problem then would be that because there is no way 
for them to attend to the suffering of others, they have no access to the fact that another being is 
suffering, in which case we cannot judge whether their failure to respond is due to overlooking or 
unresponsiveness. 
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of how we should, practically speaking, deal with a psychopath, just as there is a question 
of how we should deal with a lion, a question that is not answered by characterizing his 
lack of responsiveness to evidence as differences rather than mistakes.   
 One key objection to this strategy might be the claim that it narrows one’s 
normative community much too far, or, worse, that it is “shockingly cultlike.”102  The 
worry here is that we will take the lesson of the psychopath too far.  Does this theory 
sanction us to simply excise from our normative community any individual who has an 
opinion different from our own?  
There are two positions from which this objection may be raised, and I will take 
them in turn.  The first is the position that, whatever normative theory we settle upon, we 
must take it as a constraint upon that theory that all adult humans are equal and reciprocal 
members of a shared normative community.  I see no reason beyond sheer dogmatism to 
insist that we treat this result as a constraint upon our normative theory.  It is a live 
question, I believe, whether and in virtue of what we humans are members of the same 
normative community. 
 However, there is a second, non-dogmatic position from which to resist the 
division of the normative community along lines of shared responsiveness.  The success 
of pluralistic communities like ours have demonstrated that in spite of vast differences in 
responsiveness, differences that sustain, presumably, our society’s widely varying 
metaphysical and ethical beliefs, humans are able to forge workable political and social 
communities, to articulate somewhat shared conceptions of the good, and to agree upon 
principles of justice.  This suggests that excising someone entirely from the normative 
                                                        
102 I thank Elizabeth Anderson for making this objection clear. 
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community because of a difference in responsiveness to a particular set of evidence is a 
dramatic overreaction. 
 With this I agree.  But nothing I have suggested so far endorses this picture of 
dramatic excision.  To make this clear, allow me to highlight two points.  First, because 
differences in opinion can result from either overlooking information or unresponsiveness 
to information, differences in opinion alone should never be treated as definitive evidence 
of the latter.  In fact, because of the high cost of subdividing the normative community, 
the presumption that differences in theory and opinion are predicated on differences in 
attending, as opposed to differences in responsiveness, is always warranted.  One should 
make sure that disagreeing parties are attending to all the same information (under the 
same description) before one writes a disagreement off as irreconcilable. 
 Second, there is no reason to assume that normative communities are mutually 
exclusive, all-or-nothing affairs.  The conditions that make us the type of beings that have 
problems do not guarantee that we share any specific problems.  And yet, as a matter of 
fact, we do share a great deal of our problems.  This is because we come from similar 
biological stock and we are tethered together in our physical, social, linguistic, and 
cultural environments.  These facts make it likely that we will have similar epistemic, 
evaluative, motivational, and phenomenological reactions to the world we encounter.  
These dispositions, which are the fodder for the problems we face, the problems we must 
figure out how to overcome via deliberation, define the boundaries of our normative 
communities. 
In spite of these similarities, there are also variations in our responses to the 
world.  Consider, for example, that alcoholics are well served by banding together to 
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devise strategies for overcoming their problematic addictions. The norms that serve that 
purpose—such as absolute abstention from alcohol—are not binding on non-alcoholics.  
So too, the normative strategies which are the fruitful products of problem-solving efforts 
of any particular sub-group of problem-havers are not binding on those who do not have 
those problems. 
And so, I propose, the degree to which a given individual values exercise, family, 
money, art, sex, prestige, power, adventure, and intellectual engagement rightly depends 
on what problems would be caused by giving up such values.  It is, I believe, 
unreasonable to expect that this measure will be the same for all humans in all situations.  
Thus, each person belongs to a variety of overlapping normative sub-communities, and 
each of these sub-communities will be bound by norms specific to the problems their 
members face.  But sub-communities are not cults.  An honest attempt to discover which 
sub-communities you belong to, and to understand the values you develop as relative to 
those communities, is neither cult-like nor shocking.  It is, rather, another way of 
describing the familiar human quest for belonging. 
Further, if there is one normative community to which all humans and only 
humans belong, it will be in virtue of the fact that we all share, or are disposed to share, 
the same substantive problem or problems, not in virtue of the fact that we are all 
problem-havers, nor, for that matter, in virtue of the fact that we are all reflective beings. 
In any case, whether or not there is a single normative community to which we all 
belong, there is certainly a vast amount of commonality among the problems we are 
disposed to face.  This contingent fact about our shared predicament, in conjunction with 
our capacity to understand and communicate about the commonality among our 
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problems, creates the possibility of a shared project of value assessment, as well as the 
possibility of collaboration and cooperation in revising and innovating new value 
structures.  We can learn from others what matters and why.  We can share solutions with 
others, and they can share their solutions with us.  
 The evidential theory gives us a framework for understanding how and why it is 
possible to challenge the legitimacy of a given value set, just as the evidential theory of 
science gives us a framework for understanding how and why it is possible to challenge 
the legitimacy of certain theoretical beliefs.  Namely, attention to new information can 
cause uncertainty about our values, and this uncertainty will make it impossible for us to 
continue without revising those values.   
But this framework does not itself deliver any verdicts as to which particular 
values have authority.  For this, we must turn to life itself, or, within philosophy, to 
applied ethics.  When it comes to our current plans, there is no shortage of unnoticed 
grounds for uncertainty.  Applied ethicists are like experimental scientists.  They advance 
the field of ethics by identifying and bringing to our attention the ways in which our 
current moral theories are insufficient, and they help formulate and articulate new 
principles and values to overcome these insufficiencies. 
 
4.2.2  A Note on normative discourse 
 During open-ended reasoning, diagnostic reason often leads us to discover that 
some, or many, of our activated goals are supported not just by unreflective desires or 
impulses, but by a history of problem-solving episodes.  In other words, many of our 
goals have been explicitly adopted in order to solve previous prospective problems.  Or, 
they have thrived in prospection because, though accidentally adopted, they nevertheless 
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harmonize our motivations effectively.  In such cases, deactivating these goals will not 
simply involve ignoring the demands of a persistent desire, but rather, will involve 
opening or re-opening the prospective problems they hold at bay.    
For example, accepting the ideal of democracy creates many problems for our 
society.  Holding elections and providing education to a population is expensive.  It is 
also harder to implement needed changes when everyone has a say in whether and how 
those changes are implemented.  These problems could be avoided if we simply 
abandoned the ideal of democracy.  The reason that we continue to champion democracy 
in the face of these challenges is not just that we want to have a democracy, nor that we 
find democracy inherently satisfying (though we might).  Rather, democracy is itself a 
solution to numerous other problems.  Hence, giving up on democracy would require not 
just frustrating a desire, but rather, reopening additional problems, many of which are 
worse than, say, figuring out how to fund an election.   
Values like this, values that play problem-solving and problem-preventing roles, 
provide important structural support to our prospective economies.  When someone 
challenges the authority of these norms, we have something to say in their defense.  This 
defense will involve many other values and beliefs, and an appeal to experience and 
predicted consequences.  All of these are the proper subjects of normative discourse.  Are 
these values as supportive as we take them to be?  Are there other values that would 
provide better support?  Is the support they currently provide predicated on any mistaken 
beliefs about the world?  And so forth. 
We can interpret moral discourse on topics like same-sex marriage, abortion, 
animal rights, euthanasia, prison reform, affirmative action, medical ethics, justice in 
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distribution, religious freedom, etc. as engaged in exactly this kind of questioning.  Part 
of what we might discover in the context of such discourse is that not everyone involved 
in the discourse is disposed to exactly the same types of problems as we are.  But, there is 
more similarity between us than difference, and so moral discourse can yield fruitful 
understandings of shared problems, and help us craft more robust and enduring solutions 









Deliberation and Responsibility 
 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that the prospectivist account of motivated behavior, 
in combination with a diagnostic conception of practical reason, provides an attractive 
answer to the question of whether, and in what regard, human choice and action is free.  
To avoid confusion, I want to be clear from the outset that I am not seeking to defend the 
existence of human free will as it has been traditionally defined, i.e. as categorical 
freedom of choice.  An agent possesses categorical freedom of choice only if, for any 
decision d that an agent has made, she could have chosen differently under exactly the 
same circumstances.  However, I hope to show that prospectivism’s conception of 
intelligent deliberation answers to most, if not all, of the same data and desires to which 
free will supposedly answers.  If I succeed, I will leave the reader with the following 
question:  Given that prospectivism’s understanding of intelligent deliberation is both 
compatible with our general scientific understanding of the world103 and capable of 
satisfying the same data and desires that categorical free will supposedly satisfies, why 
worry about whether we have the latter?   
I proceed in the following manner:  First, I investigate the reasons people are 
typically compelled to believe in categorical free will.  Second, I explain prospectivism’s 
conception of intelligent deliberation.  Third, I show that prospectivism’s notion of 
                                                        
103 This includes determinism for mid-sized objects, but allows for indeterminacies at the 
quantum level. 
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intelligent deliberation is compatible with determinism104 by testing the theory against a 
common incompatibilist attack.  In the process, I demonstrate why prospectivism’s brand 
of soft determinism is more promising than other versions on the table.  Finally, I explore 
the ways in which prospectivism’s conception of intelligent deliberation answers to the 
phenomenology and desires that typically lead people to believe in categorical free will.   
  
5.1  Reasons for Believing in Free Will 
There are three primary reasons that people are tempted to believe in free will.  
The first is a set of phenomenological, or introspective, data that requires explanation.  
The second is a strong desire, shared by many, for a particular type of agential control.  
And the third is the fear that, in surrendering the notion of free will, we would thereby be 
forced to surrender our practices of holding people morally responsible.  I will take these 
in turn. 
Consider the way it feels to be in the midst of a difficult choice.  Imagine, for 
instance, choosing between sending your child to a private school—where she will get a 
great education, but which also costs more than you can comfortably afford and involves 
supporting an elitism you are uncomfortable with—and sending her to a public school, 
where she will have far fewer educational resources, but which will cost very little and 
involve adhering to your fundamental belief that education should not be a matter of 
privilege.  Some would suggest that the outcome of your deliberation is a matter of the 
blind forces of physics, but of course, it does not feel that way to you.  You are aware of 
                                                        
104 For the purposes of this chapter, I will use the term determinism to denote the position that 
human minds are subject to causal laws just like everything else in the universe.  This use allows 
for the possibility that there may be some probabilistic or indeterministic physical laws at the 
quantum level. 
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all your relevant desires—your desire for your child’s happy and healthy future, your 
desire to be fiscally responsible, your desire not to be an elitist, etc.—and yet your full 
awareness of these desires, and even your initial attempts to weigh their respective 
values, is not enough to determine what you should or will do.  If it were, proceeding 
would be simple.  Instead, proceeding involves making an extraordinarily difficult 
choice.  It seems that the world, your body in particular, is waiting for instructions and 
that nothing but you, in particular your mind, is going to provide those instructions 
(especially not the laws of physics and some contingent facts about your environment).   
To be clear, there are four relevant phenomenological pieces of data here.  1) It 
seems to you that you, in particular your choice of a course of action, will be the 
proximate cause of your actions.  2) It seems to you that unless you actively engage in a 
certain type of mental activity, no choice will be made at all, or in other words, that your 
deliberation is inherently active rather than passive.  3) It seems to you that when you do 
eventually make a choice, you will be responsible for that choice, because right now, 
your decision is the only thing in the world that is going to determine the matter one way 
or the other.  4) It seems to you that you are in a position to freely decide among a variety 
of genuinely available options.  This includes the appearance that nothing—internal or 
external—is forcing you to choose one option over another. 
According to the traditional free will dialectic, the determinist105 will maintain 
that such phenomenological data is not veridical.  In fact, determinists are often eager to 
                                                        
105 Again, for the purposes of this chapter, I will use the term determinism to denote the position 
that human minds are not categorically free and that they are subject to causal laws just like 
everything else in the universe.  Along the same lines, I use the term determinist to denote a 
generic opponent of libertarianism, someone who believes that the activity of the human mind is 
governed by the same laws that govern physical events.  As such, a determinist need not believe 
 109 
point to numerous instances in which phenomenological data has led us astray (e.g. we 
thought the earth was flat because it seemed that way to us, but we were wrong) and 
simply insist that free will is just one more phenomenological illusion.  However, I am 
sympathetic with those who feel this dismissal is often too careless.  Yes, the 
phenomenological data sometimes leads us astray; but also, sometimes it does not.  And 
though the evidence for determinism is generally very strong, it is at its weakest when it 
comes to understanding the causal relationship between mental events and physical 
events.  In fact, no one has ever witnessed the generation of a choice, except from the 
first-person perspective.  And from that perspective the generation of the choice seems to 
involve a certain amount of freedom (at least in many instances).  Therefore, this data 
deserves closer attention.  What is the content of our phenomenological experience when 
we are deliberating and is it indeed incompatible with determinism? 
The second reason we may be tempted to believe in free will is a simple one: we 
want to be categorically free.  There is a large emotional payoff in adopting the belief 
that, as agents, we are free from the demands of the causal nexus, that we stand somehow 
apart from the universe’s molecular tide, and that we engage with the physical world only 
in accordance with our self-contained will.  In short, we like to believe we are self-
determined and in control of our actions.   
Of course, wanting a certain theory to be true does not constitute evidence of its 
truth.  However, our beliefs about our freedom do more than make us feel good, they also 
have tremendous pragmatic value.106   Thus, when presented with determinism, a theory 
                                                        
in strict determinism, but rather can allow for probabilistic or indeterministic laws at the quantum 
level. 
106 Something has pragmatic value to the degree that it helps us navigate our world and make 
sense of it and our reactions to it.  The more pragmatic value a belief has to us, the less we would 
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that has its own merits and epistemic support, the proper attitude is not the hasty 
abandonment of our current beliefs, but a cautious attempt to reconcile them with 
determinism.  The appropriate question in this case is:  Even if determinism is true, am I 
still warranted in retaining a belief that has enormous pragmatic value—am I warranted 
in regarding myself as self-determined and in control?  Perhaps it will turn out that the 
pragmatic value of belief in freedom can be realized by belief in some type of control 
short of categorical free will. 
This leads to the final reason for believing in categorical freedom of choice: the 
fear that in surrendering free will, we will have to give up the possibility of moral 
responsibility.  Some have suggested that if in fact human choice is not categorically free, 
then it is completely nonsensical, and perhaps cruel, to blame an agent for the unsavory 
things she has done.  Consider, if everything I am doing right now has been determined, 
necessitated, by forces beyond my control, it seems intuitively unjust to hold me 
responsible for these actions, or at least as unjust as it would be to hold someone 
responsible for falling down because they have been physically thrown to the floor by an 
earthquake. 
Again, our commitment to the existence and importance of moral responsibility 
provides a pragmatic reason for belief in free will, and the determinist’s response is 
obvious:  Even if we currently hold people morally responsible for their actions, and even 
if we cannot imagine what it would be like to continue without these practices, these facts 
alone are not proof that blaming and praising people for their actions is not cruel or 
absurd.  In fact, it may be that asking who is morally responsible for the destruction of 
                                                        
know how to carry on without it.  A great deal of Dewey’s work in epistemology has centered 
around articulating this concept. 
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the World Trade Center in New York makes about as much sense as asking who is 
morally responsible for the tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of innocent 
civilians in the Indian Ocean two years later.  If both events followed inevitably from the 
blind forces of physics, the correct answer in both cases is no one. 
And yet even the determinist must admit that there is an intuitive difference 
between the two cases.  The latter invokes only a feeling of sorrow and the hope that we 
may be able to prevent, through technological and educational advances, such tragedy in 
the future.  The former evokes, in addition to these feelings, a sense of moral outrage.  It 
may be the case that the differences in our emotional and rhetorical responses to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the tsunami of December 26, 2004 do not 
track any actual metaphysical difference between the two events.  But surely we should 
not jump to this conclusion just because we think determinism is true.   
Sequences of events initiated by human minds are, and have always been, 
especially interesting to us, probably for a good evolutionary reason.  And even if it turns 
out that human deliberation is not categorically free, and hence does not initiate chains of 
events in the strictest sense of ‘initiate’, that hardly seems reason enough to stop taking a 
particular interest in the choices we humans make, the reasons we make them, and the 
events that follow from these choices.  Before we discard the possibility that humans may 
be morally responsible for their actions, we may want to reexamine exactly why it is 
important to us, and whether some other conception of human freedom might support our 
moral rhetoric and practices, or perhaps recommend even better practices. 
Before I go any further, I want to briefly note a few reasons for believing in 
categorical free will that I will not attempt to accommodate.  The first is the dominant 
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contemporary folk psychology of our culture.  It is commonplace for people to claim that 
humans have free will.  And this fact in itself provides a certain amount of support for 
believing in free will.  Secondly, there are theological reasons for believing in free will.  
For instance, free will may be the best defense against the problem of evil; free will may 
be a prerequisite for admittance into heaven; or free will may be an intrinsic feature of 
souls.  However, these are not my starting points, and I see no reason to make them so.  
Thus, while I hope to show that prospectivism’s notion of intelligent deliberation is 
compatible with our phenomenological data and many of our desires and practices, I 
cannot promise that his theory is compatible with all our deeply held beliefs.   
To summarize, I have offered three reasons people are typically compelled to 
believe in categorical freedom of choice: phenomenological data, the desire to be self-
determined, and the need to continue to regard ourselves and others as moral agents—as 
worthy of moral praise and deserving of moral blame.  All three need to be taken 
seriously.  What I hope to show soon is that prospectivism’s non-categorical notion of 
rational control is compatible with both determinism and our phenomenological data; that 
it satisfies our desires for self-determination; and that it is capable of supporting and 
making sense of our practices of deliberation, of attributing responsibility, of holding 
people accountable for their actions, and of morally praising and blaming others and 
ourselves. 
 
5.2  Intelligent Deliberation 
I would like to propose that an agent is free in a sense that answers to the above 
considerations if and when she employs her capacity for intelligent deliberation.  
Intelligent deliberation is deliberation that allows an agent’s understanding of the 
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problem that has necessitated her choice—an understanding that can be more or less 
accurate and more or less useful—to help her achieve that choice.  
   On this picture freedom does not involve the ability to initiate chains of events, 
but rather to reorganize and redirect chains of events in a manner that is meaningful and 
promising to the agent.  Freedom involves being so designed that thoughts about the 
future, in particular thoughts about the predicted consequences and expressive meanings 
of imagined actions as they relate to a given deliberative impasse, can serve as both 
stimuli and sources of significance.  Shortly, I will discuss whether intelligent 
deliberation is an adequate definition of freedom.  First, however, I want to establish that 
freedom defined in terms of intelligent deliberation is in fact compatible with 
determinism. 
 
5.3  Intelligent Deliberation and Determinism 
 Propsectivism’s account of freedom as intelligent deliberation faces potential 
challenges from two directions.  First, there are philosophers like A.J. Ayer and Walter 
Stace who agree that humans are free and that this freedom is compatible with 
determinism (a position known as soft determinism), but who offer rival accounts of what 
human freedom consists in.  Second, there are philosophers, such as Richard Taylor,107 
who argue that no type of freedom is compatible with determinism.  We can deal with 
both of these challenges at once by demonstrating that prospectivism can survive 
Taylor’s incompatibilist attack while Ayer and Stace cannot. 
                                                        
107 I have chosen to use Taylor as my particular incompatibilist foe, but incompatibilism has a 
wide canopy, including libertarians, who believe we have free will and determinism is false (for 
example C.A. Campbell, Peter van Inwagen, and Robert Kane), and hard determinists who 
believe that determinism is true and there is no meaningful sense of freedom that is compatible 
with determinism (such as B.F. Skinner). 
 114 
 In his article “Freedom and Determinism” Taylor offers the following thought 
experiment: 
…suppose that an ingenious physiologist can induce in me any volition he 
pleases, simply by pushing various buttons on an instrument…All the volitions 
that I have in that situation are, accordingly, precisely the ones he gives me.  By 
pushing one button, he evokes in me the volition to raise my hand; and my hand 
being unimpeded, rises in response to that volition…We can even suppose that 
the physiologist puts a rifle in my hands, aims it at some passer-by, and then, by 
pushing the proper button, evokes in me the volition to squeeze my finger against 
the trigger, where upon the passer-by falls dead…This is the description of a man 
who is acting in accordance with his inner volitions, a man whose body is 
unimpeded and unconstrained in its motions, these motions being the effects of 
those inner states.  It is hardly the description of a free and responsible agent.  It is 
the perfect description of a puppet.108 
 
The argument in this passage can be made explicit as follows:  
P1) An agent whose mental states are being manipulated by a physiologist in the 
manner described above is not free.  (True by strong intuition.) 
 
P2) The reason she is not free is because the mental states that compose her will 
are being determined entirely by forces beyond her control. (True by 
inference to the best explanation.)109 
 
P3) If determinism is true, then in all instances the mental states that compose an 
agent’s will are determined entirely by forces beyond her control, namely, 
the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe.  (True by 
definition of determinism.) 
 
P4) Determinism is true.  (True by supposition.) 
 
                                                        
108 Taylor, Richard. 1963/1999. (445) 
109 Taylor attempts to block an anticipated rival explanation of the agent’s lack of freedom with 
the following passage: “Whether a desire which causes my body to behave in a certain way is 
inflicted upon me by another person…or derived from hereditary factors, or indeed from anything 
at all, matters not the least” (445).  His point here is that it is not the fact that another person is 
controlling the agent that deprives the agent of freedom.  I tend to agree with this claim—it is 
hard to draw a principled distinction between being forced to do something by a person and being 
forced to do it by anything else.  Of course, there may be something extra-bad about being forced 
to do something by another person, just like it might feel worse to have your car stolen than to 
have it washed away in a flood.  Either way you lack the car because something removed it from 
your possession, but the fact that this something was another person might add insult to the 
injury.  
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C1) In all instances, the mental states that compose an agent’s will are determined 
by forces beyond her control. 
 
C2) In all instances an agent is not free. 
 
To defeat this argument, a soft determinist must disprove one of the first three premises.  
The most promising way to do this—or at least, the one that is most often tried—is to 
offer an account of freedom that makes the second premise false.  What the soft 
determinist is looking for is an alternative explanation for why the agent who is being 
controlled by the physiologist is not free: in particular, an explanation that does not hold 
true of persons in general. 
 In his article “The Problem of Free Will” Stace defines human freedom as 
follows: 
…it is obvious that all those actions of men which we should ordinarily attribute 
to the exercise of their free will, or of which we should say that they freely chose 
to do them, are in fact actions which have been caused by their own desires, 
wishes, thoughts, emotions, impulses, or other psychological states.110 
 
Stace is correct that if human freedom is defined as such, it is compatible with 
determinism.  His alternative to Taylor’s second premise would be this: 
P2S) The reason the agent is not free is because the mental states that compose 
her will are not her own. 
 
This response, however, begs the question:  Under which circumstances are an agent’s 
mental states legitimately her own?  In the face of Taylor’s challenge, Stace must justify 
the assertion that mental states entirely determined by ingenious physiologists are not an 
agent’s own mental states, while still maintaining that mental states entirely determined 
by the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are the agent’s own.  This 
                                                        
110 Stace, Walter. 1952/1999. (417) 
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may not be an impossible task for Stace to execute, but as the dialectic stands, the ball is 
in his court.  
 A second attempt at a formulation of soft determinism can be found in the article, 
“Freedom and Necessity” by A.J. Ayer.  Ayer articulates his understanding of freedom in 
the following passage: 
[To say I am free] is to say, first, that I should have acted otherwise if I had so 
chosen; secondly, that my action was voluntary in the sense in which the actions, 
say, of the kleptomaniac are not; and thirdly, that nobody compelled me to choose 
as I did.111 
 
The third criterion of Ayer’s definition of freedom (that nobody, that is, no other person, 
is determining an agent’s choices) seems, at least at first glance, to give him an easy 
refutation of second premise of Taylor’s attack.  Ayer’s alternative to Taylor’s second 
premise would look like this: 
P2A) The reason the agent is not free is because the mental states that compose 
her will, and hence her choices, are being determined by somebody other 
than herself. 
 
And yet, this again begs the question against Taylor.  To see how, we need to step back 
and look more closely at the method Ayer uses to arrive at his conclusion. 
 Ayer begins from two observations: that freedom is usually defined in contrast to 
constraint, and that causal determination is not necessarily equivalent to constraint.  
Therefore, it follows that freedom does not necessarily require lack of causal 
determination.  Another way of putting his point is this: compatibilism is possible if 
freedom is defined, as it is and should be, in terms of lack of constraint.  Next Ayer poses 
the apt question: “In what circumstances can I legitimately be said to be constrained?”112 
The supposition is that if the answer to this question involves a more limited set of 
                                                        
111 Ayer, A.J. 1969/1999. (412) 
112 Ibid. (411) 
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circumstances than the answer to the question “In what circumstances can I legitimately 
be said to be causally determined?” then Ayer has proven his case. 
 The question-begging aspect of Ayer’s approach is how he proceeds to define 
constraint, namely, by establishing a list of circumstances that intuitively involve 
constraint.  For example, he writes, “an obvious instance is the case in which I am 
compelled by another person to do what he wants.”113  In a similar manner, he cites 
hypnosis, habits of obedience, physical constraint, psychological duress, and neurosis as 
obvious cases of constraint.  There are two points to be made against Ayer here.  First, 
“legitimate” and “obvious” are not synonyms.  So to answer the question of which cases 
are legitimately described as involving constraint by investigating which cases obviously 
involve constraint seems misguided.  Second, while Ayer creates an intuitive list of 
circumstances that involve constraint, he does nothing to justify his omissions from this 
list, most importantly, his omission of causal determination as a form of constraint. 
 Remember, it is exactly the fear that if determinism is true, all our actions are in 
some legitimate sense constrained (by physical law and prior conditions) that began the 
free will debate in the first place.  Thus, if Ayer hopes to defuse this fear, he has to do 
more than claim that the laws of physics are not what we normally think of when we 
think of things that constrain.  He has to give us some positive reason not to think of them 
as constraints.   
To return to our starting point, Taylor can block Ayer’s response by demanding 
an answer to the question: Why does being determined to act in a certain way by another 
person count as being constrained, while being determined to act in a certain way by laws 
                                                        
113 Ibid. (411) 
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of physics does not count as being constrained?  If Ayer cannot answer this question, he 
has not made any headway against Taylor. 
 Intelligent deliberation fares better against Taylor than Ayer and Stace do.  
Prospectivism begins from the Deweyan starting point that an agent’s habits, desires, 
ambitions, aversions, and goals are substantially influenced by her social environment.  
Everyday, the behavior of the people in our lives, from marketers to our closest friends, 
affect what we believe and what we desire.  Taylor’s ingenious physiologist represents 
just an extreme, and particularly invasive, case of something that happens all the time.  
Because the notion of intelligent deliberation is built against a backdrop of such external 
forces of influence, we may expect it to be better equipped to accommodate Taylor-style 
objections than rivaling soft determinist theories. 
 In the face of Taylor’s challenge, prospectivism’s conception of freedom needs a 
two-pronged approach.  For, depending on the nuances of how the physiologist in 
Taylor’s thought experiment manipulates the agent’s mind, prospectivism will charge 
either that Taylor’s second premise is false, i.e. that the agent is unfree not because her 
actions are being determined by forces outside her control but for some other reason, or 
that Taylor’s first premise is false, i.e., that the agent is in fact free, despite our initial 
intuitions on the matter.  I’ll start with the rejection of the second premise. 
The agent in Taylor’s thought experiment appears to be incapable of intelligent 
deliberation.  In fact, the way the agent’s behavior is described, it sounds as if the 
physiologist has managed to turn her into a child-like agent, someone who unreflectively 
acts on impulse.  Prospectivism accepts that children possess a great deal less freedom 
than “normal” adults precisely because they cannot deliberate intelligently.  In order to 
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deliberate intelligently, an agent must have both the capacity to be made uncertain, and 
the capacity to resolve this uncertainty by way of her own reflective diagnostic reason. 
Those who act entirely on impulse are such that, because they never have the opportunity 
to employ diagnostic reason in the face of uncertainty, never intelligently deliberate.  
Thus, prospectivism can replace Taylor’s second premise  
P2) The reason an agent is not free is because the mental states that compose her 
will are being determined entirely by forces beyond her control.  
 
with something like this: 
P2D) The reason the agent is not free is because the physiologist has deprived her 
of the capacity to deliberate intelligently. 
 
Because this condition—the lack of the capacity to deliberate intelligently—is not 
universal to all agents even if determinism is true, such a move blocks the deduction to 
the conclusion that all agents are not free. 
 In response to these moves, Taylor might claim that I have missed his point.  If a 
physiologist actually had complete control over an agent’s mental states, he would not 
need to turn the agent into an impulsive agent in order evoke in her the desired intentions.  
Rather, he could simply set up an agent’s mentalscape so that it simulated, perfectly, the 
mentalscape of someone who would in fact intelligently choose to do the physiologist’s 
bidding.  Suppose, for example, the physiologist wanted the agent to surrender her 
diamond ring.  Could he not, by manipulating the agent’s mind, make her intelligently 
choose to do so?  The answer to this question is less than straightforward. 
 First, assuming prospectivism entails that delusion is a restriction on freedom114, 
the physiologist cannot make the agent intelligently choose to give up her ring simply by 
                                                        
114 An agent who is drastically misinformed about the world, and specifically about the 
consequences of his actions, cannot deliberate intelligently.  Coordinating our habits with our 
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manipulating her beliefs, for example, by making her believe her ring actually belongs to 
the physiologist.  So again, if this is how the physiologist is manipulating the agent’s 
mentalscape, then the second premise of Taylor’s argument is false.  But assume instead 
that the physiologist overhauls the agent’s entire character, including all of her 
background proclivities, impulses, and desires.  Suppose the physiologist designs the 
agent’s mind so that whenever she is confronted with the opportunity to aid scientists, she 
derives meaning and satisfaction from deciding to do so.  Under these circumstances, 
when the agent correctly recognizes the physiologist is a scientist, and correctly 
recognizes that giving the physiologist her ring will aid him, and correctly recognizes that 
if she gives the physiologist the ring, she will still have plenty of money to meet her 
needs and desires, her decision to hand over her ring seems to fit the description of 
intelligent choice.  (It seems analogous at least to what prospectivism would consider a 
free choice to donate money to a charity, or to give money to your children, etc.). 
 This brings us to the second prong of prospectivism’s defense.  Prospectivism’s 
understanding of freedom as the exercise of intelligent deliberation commits it to the 
conclusion that, in this final permutation of the thought experiment, the agent is free.  
This clashes with our initial intuition on the matter, the point at which we nodded our 
heads in agreement with Taylor’s first premise: an agent whose mental states are being 
manipulated by a physiologist in the manner described above is clearly not free.  
Prospectivism’s best move in this position is to claim that our intuitions are wrong, and to 
attempt to explain them away.  We can do so as follows.   
                                                        
environments requires that our habits respond to our actual environments.  Any habits that clash 
with the actual environment will, if our minds are properly functioning, be quickly revised.  Thus, 
a requirement for veridicality of belief is built into prospectivism. 
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 First, it is important to point out that the thought experiment, as it was originally 
conveyed, gave the impression that the agent had been almost literally turned into a 
puppet.  The physiologist seemed to be giving direct orders to the agent’s motor-cortex 
(in the form of “volitions”), thus cutting the agent’s deliberative apparatus out of the 
loop.  When we whole-heartedly agreed that such an agent lacks freedom, it is not clear 
that our intuitions stemmed from our belief that the agent’s volitions were determined by 
forces beyond her control.  It is equally plausible that our intuitions stemmed instead 
from our belief that her volitions were not formed via the proper deliberative process, or 
in other words, from our sense that the agent was not given the opportunity to reflect 
intelligently on the impulses and habits that were moving her to act.  Once the thought 
experiment is redescribed to include the fact that the volition motivating the agent to act 
was the result of a conscious, desire-harmonizing session of deliberation carried out in 
the mind of the agent, it seems that our intuitions that she lacks freedom become a lot less 
overwhelming. 
 Furthermore, to the extent that these intuitions still manifest themselves, we can 
explain them away in terms of a confusion between violation of and restriction upon 
freedom.  In other words, our misleading intuitions stem from our acknowledgement that 
the agent has been violated, that she has been forcibly changed in a way that, had she 
been asked, she would not have accepted.  We are certain the agent is a victim; we are 
repulsed that the physiologist is so blatantly using her as a mere means to his ends.  We 
believe strongly that the agent as she was prior to manipulation would not now approve 
of her decision to hand her ring over to the physiologist.  This, in turn, leads to the sense 
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that she is choosing to do so against her will, and this is the point at which our intuitions 
about her lack of freedom kick in.   
But we are wrong that she is choosing against her will.  Tragic and unfair as it 
might be, the agent has a new will now.  And if we can keep this fact in mind, our 
intuitions that her choice is not free can be defused.  Thus, prospectivism’s final response 
to Taylor can be summarized as follows:  By manipulating an agent’s mental states, 
either the physiologist deprives an agent of freedom by limiting her capacity for 
intelligent deliberation, or the physiologist does not restrict the agent’s freedom at all, but 
rather creates a new problem for the agent, which the agent then intelligently resolves.115  
Either way, the argument for incompatibilism fails. 
Before I move on, I want to consider one more way that the physiologist could 
possibly “force” an agent to “freely decide” to hand over her ring:  He could ditch his 
fancy technology, leaving the agent’s current mentalscape untouched, and instead grab a 
gun and threaten to kill her unless she surrenders the ring.  If the agent decides to hand 
over her ring to avoid death, has she acted freely?  The standard intuition in reaction to 
this question is “no.”  And certainly for legal purposes we want to say that the robber 
forced her to give him her ring.   
Is it a problem, then, that prospectivism commits us to the position that in such 
circumstances, as long as the agent has openly considered all her available options under 
their various descriptions and in light of their various consequences, she has chosen 
freely?  This question points to an underdeveloped portion the of prospectivist picture:  In 
some cases an agent’s options can, objectively speaking, be so limited that any choice she 
                                                        
115 Of course, an accurate understanding of her problem would include the fact that it was caused 
by the manipulation of her mental states by the physiologist.  This might be alone sufficient to 
make an exception in this case to her desire to help scientists. 
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makes is going to involve ignoring or suppressing a value that she takes to be 
authoratative.  (For a poignant example, think of Sophie’s choice.) 
Stace is happy to relegate these cases to a gray zone of ‘borderline cases’, to claim 
that in some instances it is simply not clear whether we are free.116  But prospectivism 
can offer a more sophisticated response.  In particular, the prospectivist can distinguish 
between two distinct types of freedom.   The first, deliberative freedom, is measured in 
accordance with the degree to which an agent exercises an intelligent response to the 
objective contours of a deliberative impasse, whatever those contours happen to be.  The 
second, freedom of opportunity, can be measured in accordance with the resources 
available to the agent during her impasse. 117   
To make the difference between these two types of freedom clear, consider the 
following case.  Suppose there are two agents, one in a room with three doors and one in 
a room with two doors.  Further, assume the both have to pick a door to pass through, and 
both agents can pass through only one door at a time. (Imagine that the agents know 
something about where the doors lead, etc.)  Given their respective deliberative impasses, 
the agents could be equally open and creative when rehearsing in imagination their 
respective options, and equally thorough when weighing these options.  If they are so 
equal, then the agents share the same degree of deliberative freedom.  But there is also a 
sense in which the agent in the room with three doors has more to work with than the 
                                                        
116 In discussing an armed robbery case, Stace writes: “Aristotle…admitted that there are what he 
called ‘mixed’ or borderline cases in which it is difficult to know whether we ought to call the 
acts free or compelled.  In the case under discussion, though no actual force was used, the gun at 
your forehead so nearly approximated to actual force that we tend to say the case was one of 
compulsion.  It is a borderline case.” (Stace, Walter. 1952/1999. (417)) 
117 I have intentionally avoided relying on Locke’s distinction between free will and freedom of 
action here to avoid some of the problems that come with it.  However, I believe his distinction 
and the one I am introducing here are motivated by the same intuitions and theoretical goals. 
 124 
agent in the room with two doors.  When the agent in the three-door room imagines 
various courses of action, there are three different general descriptions these actions fall 
under, corresponding to three general sets of consequences she has to choose among; the 
other agent has only two.  Hence, the three-door agent has a greater freedom of 
opportunity than the agent in the room with two doors has.   
 The important point is that there are two ways to restrict an agent’s freedom.  One 
is to impair her capacity for effective intelligent deliberation, thus restricting her 
deliberative freedom.   The second is to manipulate the objective circumstances of her 
deliberative impasse so that she has very few resources to work with, thus restricting her 
freedom of opportunity.  In the case of the armed robbery, our intuition that the agent’s 
choice to surrender her ring is not free can thus be explained in terms of her lack of 
freedom of opportunity.  Under such circumstances, all the options available to her entail 
only two possible salient consequences: the loss of her ring or the loss of her life.   Her 
failure to generate in imagination any possible courses of action that might lead to 
different, more appealing, circumstances is not due to a failure of imagination or 
intelligence, but rather, to facts about the environment external to her deliberative 
processes, facts which are the subject matter of her diagnostic deliberative processes.  
Both deliberative freedom and freedom of opportunity are important to 
prospectivism.  To increase an agent’s freedom of opportunity is to increase the potential 
range of her deliberative freedom (in the same sense that giving a talented painter 
additional colors to work with can increase the range of what she can produce, without 
directly affecting her abilities as a painter).  Second, and perhaps most importantly, both 
types of freedom are compatible with determinism.  Freedom of opportunity is measured 
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in terms of the available outcomes118 to an agent during a deliberative impasse, and 
deliberative freedom is measured in terms of how intelligently an agent can conceive of 
the contours of her impasse in order to overcome her impasse, which depends on the 
talents of her diagnostic reason.119  The truth of determinism diminishes neither of these 
freedoms. 
At this juncture, it seems that prospectivism can undo Taylor’s incompatibilist 
argument, and in the process prove that prospectivism’s version of freedom as the 
exercise of intelligent deliberation is superior to the soft determinism offered by Ayer and 
Stace.  However, there is one last charge that incompatibilists (and perhaps compatibilists 
as well) can make against prospectivism, a claim that might be phrased as such: 
“Prospectivism, in attempting to maintain that freedom is compatible with determinism, 
has twisted the meaning of the word ‘freedom’ to such a degree that it no longer captures 
what we care about, say, when we desire for ourselves to be free, and that it can no longer 
do the work we believe freedom can and should do to justify or moral practices and 
explain our phenomenological experience.”   
Thus, I now turn back to the question I began the chapter with—why is freedom 
important to us?  In the following section I hope to establish that deliberative freedom, in 
                                                        
118 An avid incompatibilist might try to challenge the notion that any outcomes are actually 
‘available’ to an agent except for those that she is determined to pursue by the laws of physics.  
But if this is the case, an agent in the room with two doors has precisely as many options 
available for exiting the room as an agent in a room with one door—namely, one.  Settling upon a 
definition of availability that made this claim true would involve drastically overhauling, 
abandoning even, all of our modal concepts. 
119 Again, an avid incompatibilist might object: “But if that’s your definition of freedom then 
possessing freedom is a matter of mere chance.”  The response to this objection is yes and no.  
Yes, like possessing beauty, or being born into a large fortune, or being born human, possessing 
the capacity for intelligent deliberation is to some extent a matter of luck.  However, if an agent 
happens by chance to come to care about possessing the capacity for intelligent deliberation (i.e. 
if she happens to come to care about being free), then she can do something about it, at least to 
the extent allowed by her physiology, because her desire for freedom can then figure into her 
choices. 
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combination with adequate freedom of opportunity, is exactly the type of freedom that we 
do and should care about. 
 
5.4  Is Intelligent Deliberation Enough for Us? 
According to the picture I have been defending here, an agent is free if 1) she has 
the capacity to deliberate intelligently, 2) she exercises that capacity in such a way as to 
effectively direct action, and 3) she is in a situation that affords a certain minimum 
amount of freedom of opportunity.  We have seen that such freedom is compatible with 
determinism, but this theory needs a defense against those who would claim it does not 
constitute real freedom, or at least not any type of freedom we are inclined to care about.  
To execute this defense, I return to the question I began the chapter with: why are we 
typically compelled to believe in categorical freedom of choice?120 
The first reason is that it seems to us while we are deliberating that we are free.  
In particular, I outlined four phenomenological pieces of data that support the appearance 
of freedom:  1) An agent’s choice appears to her to be the proximate cause of her action.  
2) An agent feels that unless she actively engages in a certain sort of activity, no decision 
will be made.  3) An agent is aware that she will be responsible for the choice she makes, 
because it seems to her that the outcome of her deliberative process is the only thing that 
will determine what she will do next.  4) An agent feels, at least in most instances of 
deliberation, that she is in a position to choose among a variety of genuinely available 
                                                        
120 I am assuming for the sake of argument that categorical freedom of choice is the most robust 
and appealing sense of freedom on the market, and so if intelligent deliberation can offer 
everything that categorical freedom of choice can, intelligent deliberation has nothing more to 
prove.  However, it is worth noting, as many others have, that categorical freedom of choice 
might itself be an incoherent notion, in which case, so the much better for intelligent deliberation. 
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options, and that there are no facts, internal or external, forcing her to choose one option 
over another.   
All four of these pieces of introspective data are not only compatible with, but 
also predicted by prospectivism’s theory of deliberation.  Imagine the phenomenology of 
an agent behaving in accordance with prospectivism.  To begin with, the majority of her 
life will not be spent deliberating.  In some instances, however, the environment will 
prevent her from doing what comes naturally, or she will find that she is naturally 
inclined to behave in two or more conflicting manners.  When this happens, she will be 
thrown into a state of disruption, and in order to return to a state of natural activity, she 
will need to imagine, or envision, various possible courses of action.  In other words, 
because the need for deliberation was generated by a conflict between her impulses and 
habits, the only true resolution121 to the conflict will be the result of her own mental work 
(this explains 3 above).  It will feel to her that this process requires effort, because it 
requires her not to simply react in a habitual way to familiar stimuli and impulses, but 
rather to exert attention to the project of envisioning novel ways of acting (this explains 2 
above).   
To achieve this imaginative task she will rely on her habits of problem solving to 
identify and assess salient features of the impasse, and her understanding and observation 
of past sequences of events to predict what consequences would result from taking one 
course of action or another.  Eventually, one of these imagined courses of action will 
satisfy, in virtue of its representational content, the conditions for settled prospection.  
                                                        
121 If an agent is deliberating about whether to go to a movie or to a play and she receives word 
that the play has been cancelled, the conflict disappears, but is not truly resolved.  Consider: if 
Palestine and Israel and all the people therein were to suddenly disappear, there would no longer 
be a conflict between Israel and Palestine, but it would be strange to say the conflict had been 
resolved as opposed to simply removed. 
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From the first-person perspective, the event of this object of thought satisfying these 
conditions and resolving the deliberative impasse will be experienced as decision, and 
will be followed by the motion of her body in accordance with that decision.  In this way, 
her choice (i.e. her settling upon an imagined course of action) will appear to her as the 
proximate cause of her action (explaining 1 above).122  
Whether prospectivism is compatible with the fourth consideration above requires 
closer examination.  As for the appearance of the lack of internal constraints upon 
freedom, there are two potential points of conflict with prospectivism.  The first would 
arise if this introspective observation of freedom amounts to appearing to have control 
over the generation of her thoughts, and the second would arise if this introspective 
observation amounts to appearing to have control over her motivational reaction to her 
thoughts.  
 Imagine an agent who is trying to decide what to do in reaction to the news that a 
class she was planning to take has been cancelled.  Suppose she decides to look through 
the course catalog and upon doing so, finds a different class, say, World Religions, that 
she is even more excited about taking and that will fulfill the same requirement.  Her 
deliberative quandary is over: she knows how to proceed.  But it is a fair question to ask: 
to what extent did she have control over her decision?  The emergence of the idea of 
taking World Religions was not in her control, rather it was sparked by a feature of the 
environment, namely some words on the page of a course catalog.  Similarly, the 
                                                        
122 This is, of course, a description of a successful deliberative agent.  Similar stories could be 
told about how it feels when efforts to settle on a choice are thwarted for one reason or another, or 
what it is like when an agent manages to proceed with action without reaching complete 
resolution. 
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excitement she felt in response to the idea of taking World Religions was not within her 
control, but rather dictated by motivational dispositions beyond her control.  
In this case, I agree with Dewey’s assessment of the amount of control we have 
over our thoughts—to a large extent, the thoughts that spring to our minds when we 
deliberate are not the product of our conscious choice.  He writes, 
Thoughts sprout and vegetate; ideas proliferate.  They come from deep 
unconscious sources…Some suggestion surges from the unknown.  Our active 
body of habits appropriates it.  The suggestion then becomes an assertion.  It no 
longer merely comes to us.  It is accepted and uttered by us.  We act upon it and 
thereby assume, by implication, its consequences.  The stuff of belief and 
proposition is not originated by us.123 
 
Our ideas are not by and large consciously and deliberately generated, but rather, 
consciously and deliberately appropriated from suggestions that “surge from the 
unknown.” (In principle, the “unknown” here might in fact be an ingenious physiologist.)  
If I am right about diagnostic reason, one of its chief gifts is that it directs our attention in 
a non-random fashion toward those propositions and possibilities that are promising.  But 
since diagnostic reason is called for precisely because our antecedent motivations have 
ceased to effectively guide behavior, we should expect the deliberator to feel as if no one 
antecedent motivational state will alone determine what she will do. 
Thus, in opposition to those who have claimed that the phenomenology of 
deliberation “certainly points”124 to categorical freedom of choice or free will, I maintain 
that nothing in my phenomenology suggests to me that I have categorical control over my 
thoughts or my imagination during deliberation.  Cases of addiction serve to highlight 
this fact, because they involve unwanted desires.  But notice, there is nothing about the 
act of accepting my desires that makes it appear to me that I manufactured those desires 
                                                        
123 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (314) 
124 Taylor, Richard. 1963/1999. (449) 
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out of an act of conscious will.  Wanted and unwanted desires do not appear to come 
from separate places.  For sure, I am glad to be constituted in such a manner that the 
thought of torturing children repulses me and the thought of helping others pleases me 
(i.e. I am glad to have the desire not to torture children and the desire to help others).  
Further, I am aware that, if given the choice, I would certainly choose to be so 
constituted.  But these facts do not imply that I have ever been given such a choice.  And 
in fact, when it comes to my phenomenological data, it seems to me that, for as long as I 
can remember, these happy facts about who I am have simply been reliably present.  I 
have not had to choose them, or to work consciously to maintain them at all.  Since the 
fourth piece of introspective data above does not itself imply categorical freedom of 
choice, then we need not conclude that prospectivism conflicts with the 
phenomenological data.   
As for the appearance of the lack of external constraint, this can be explained in 
terms of the agent’s awareness of the presence of ample freedom of opportunity, as 
defined in the previous section.  Normally, when we find ourselves in a situation of 
deliberative impasse, we also find ourselves in the presence of the resources sufficient to 
resolve that impasse.  Of course, on occasion, we are faced with resources insufficient for 
the task of meeting the activation conditions without forcibly ignoring certain values or 
desires, and when we are, we experience this as being forced to act against our wills.  
This explains the feeling of coercion that accompanies being robbed at gun point, and 
also the feeling of being forced that no doubt accompanies an agent’s decision to make a 
dangerous jump from a tall, burning building.  
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In short, I contend that the phenomenology associated with deliberation is 
relatively unspecific with regards to its metaphysical suggestions and therefore is capable 
of supporting numerous theories of agency and deliberation.  This fact allows many to 
confuse their beliefs about what freedom of choice involves with what is actually 
suggested by the phenomenological data associated with deliberative experience.  Any 
time a philosopher claims that it is the determinist’s dialectical responsibility to explain 
away our strong illusions of free will, ask that philosopher to specify what this illusion of 
free will amounts to and you will find that it amounts to nothing that is in fact 
incompatible with determinism.  
The second reason that we are tempted to believe in free will is our desire to be 
self-determined and in control.  Here again, we need to consider what exactly this desire 
amounts to.  I am glad to be a human because humans have lots of powers and 
capabilities that other things and creatures do not have.  One of the things I can do that a 
rock cannot is determine for myself where to go and what to do (this is often referred to 
as ‘freedom of action’).  One of the things that I can do that a dog cannot (if my intuitions 
about dogs’ mental lives are correct), is to decide what type of life I want to live and what 
type of individual I want to be.  Furthermore, I am glad to be free from serious addictions 
and compulsions, because one of the things I can do that an addict cannot is act in 
accordance with what I take to be the most reasonable or beneficial action, all things 
considered, rather than acting primarily in accordance with a desire which I do not want, 
or do not identify with, or do not consider important.  I claim that my abilities to do these 
things constitute my capacity for self-determination. 
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In this way, the degrees of difference between my capacity for self-determination 
and that of a rock, a dog, or an addict are directly equivalent to the degrees of difference 
between our respective capacities for intelligent deliberation.  There is much more to be 
said about exactly what is involved in these differences, i.e. about what is involved in 
being a person as opposed to some other type of creature, and many philosophers have 
offered theories of personhood that could be used to supplement prospectivism.125  But 
for now, I hope merely to demonstrate that while intelligent deliberation cannot satisfy an 
agent’s desire for categorical freedom, it can satisfy the desire to be self-determined in a 
way that rocks, dogs, and addicts are not.  And in fact, when I consider my own desires 
about my deliberative self, I must admit that I cannot quite understand why having 
categorical freedom would be any more appealing to someone than having deliberative 
freedom.  Hence, deliberative freedom is capable of supporting a limited, yet satisfactory, 
type of self-determination. 
Finally, we must ask whether prospectivism is enough to serve as a backbone to 
our understanding of moral blame and moral praise, and to justify our practices of 
holding people morally responsible for their actions.  Surely, if what we seek is to be 
warranted in believing that humans are, in an absolute and metaphysical sense, the “sole 
authors”126 of their own actions, then prospectivism will not suffice.  But if what we seek 
is something else, say to avoid concluding that, all along, we have been behaving in a 
nonsensical or cruel fashion, then prospectivism is satisfactory. 
                                                        
125 Particularly, I have in mind much of David Velleman’s work on agency, deliberation, and will, 
as well as some aspects of Harry Frankfurt’s work.   
126 ‘Sole authorship’ as a requirement for moral responsibility is C.A. Campbell’s concern in his 
essay, “Has the Self ‘Free Will’?” (Campbell, C.A. 1967/1999.) 
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The suspicion that moral responsibility cannot be justified in the absence of 
categorical freedom of choice stems from the belief that moral responsibility is 
incompatible with determinism.  The argument goes something like this: 
P1) An agent whose is pushed to the floor by an earthquake is not responsible, 
morally or otherwise, for her falling to the floor.  (True by strong intuition.) 
 
P2) The reason she is not responsible is because her behavior is determined 
entirely by forces beyond her control. (True by strong intuition.) 
 
P3) It is cruel and/or nonsensical to punish or blame an agent for her behavior if 
that behavior is determined by forces beyond her control.  (True by intuition 
and appeal to the case in P1.) 
 
P4) If determinism is true, then in all instances an agent’s behavior is determined 
entirely by forces beyond her control, namely, the laws of physics and the 
initial conditions of the universe.  (True by definition.) 
 
P5) Determinism is true.  (True by supposition.) 
 
C1) In all instances, an agent’s behavior is determined by forces beyond her 
control. 
 
C2) In all instances an agent is not responsible for her behavior. 
 
C3) In all instances it is cruel and/or nonsensical to punish or blame an agent. 
 
Philosophers who want to maintain both that determinism is true and that our moral 
practices are justified can attack this argument in different ways.  For instance, Harry 
Frankfurt argues against the second premise, insisting instead that an agent’s moral 
responsibility for her behavior has to do with whether she endorses (approves of or 
identifies with), on a second-order level, the desires and goals that move her to act.127 
   Prospectivism instead attacks the third premise, maintaining that we can make 
sense out of pronouncements of moral blame and praise even if an agent’s actions were 
determined entirely by the laws of physics, and that in fact, such pronouncements are 
                                                        
127 Frankfurt, Harry. 1988. See in particular, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” 
(11-25) 
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often acts of kindness.  To understand just the sense in which prospectivism thinks moral 
praise and blame are warranted, it helps to start with the following admonition from 
Dewey: 
To content ourselves with pronouncing judgments of merit and demerit without 
reference to the fact that our judgments are themselves facts which have 
consequences and that their value depends upon their consequences, is 
complacently to dodge the moral issue, perhaps even to indulge ourselves in 
pleasurable passion just as the person we condemn once indulged himself.  The 
moral problem is that of modifying the factors which now influence future results.  
To change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective 
conditions which enter into his habits.  Our own schemes of judgment, of 
assigning blame and praise, of awarding punishment and honor, are part of these 
conditions.128 
 
In essence, Dewey holds that acts of moral blame and praise derive their meaning in the 
same way any course of action derives its meaning—by our taking the course of action 
into consideration in light of all of its consequences.  For Dewey, a prerequisite for 
morality is the recognition that our reactions to others are themselves part of the social 
environment; they are among the many factors that shape human habits and contribute to 
our understanding of ourselves.   
Consider, if human minds were as intractable as thunderclouds, morally blaming 
an arsonist for starting a fire would make as much sense as morally blaming a lightning 
bolt for the same infraction.  But human minds are much more tractable than 
thunderclouds.  For us, the reception of positive or negative judgment from members of 
our community means something.  Morally praising or blaming an agent gives her a 
reason and an opportunity to reinvent her habits of deliberation to better harmonize with 
the environments she regularly encounters (or, alternatively, to alter her environment as 
she sees fit).   
                                                        
128 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (19) Emphasis his. 
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For Dewey, determinism does not strip our moral vocabulary of its meaning, nor 
does it require us to give up our social practices of praising those who act in accordance 
with our deepest moral principles and blaming those who fail to do so.   Rather, it 
implores us to embrace the fact that our moral attitudes and actions themselves become 
part of a social environment that, in turn, will provoke our impulses, influence our habits, 
and ultimately determine how we all behave.129  Dewey writes: 
We are disapproved, and this disapproval is not an inner state of mind but a most 
definite act.  Others say to us by their deeds “we do not care a fig whether you did 
this deliberately or not.  We intend that you shall deliberate before you do it 
again, and that if possible your deliberation shall prevent a repetition of this act 
we object to.”  The reference in blame and every unfavorable judgment is 
prospective, not retrospective.  Theories about responsibility may become 
confused, but in practice no one is stupid enough to try to change the past.  
Approbation and disapprobation are ways of influencing the formation of habits 
and aims; that is, of influencing future acts. 130 
 
This passage, taken with the other, expresses the denial of the third premise above.  It is 
not nonsensical to change our environment in a way that better conforms to our ideals.  
Therefore, if morally praising and blaming agents is a means to changing others in a way 
that better conforms to our ideals, then these practices are not nonsensical, even if the 
behavior of the person we are praising or blaming was determined by the laws of physics.   
However, this consequentialist approach to explaining the sense and significance 
of moral practices has significant drawbacks.  P.F. Strawson, in his article “Freedom and 
Resentment” offers an explanation for why some philosophers—he calls them the 
pessimists—refuse to accept this account.    He writes that when moral practices are 
justified in terms of behavior modification they are  
                                                        
129 Ayer seems to be in agreement with Dewey on this point when he writes “[Even if 
determinism is true it does not] entail that my actions make no difference to the future: for they 
are causes as well as effects; so that if they were different their consequences would be different 
also.” (413) 
130 Dewey, John. 1922/2002. (316) 
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…represented solely as instruments of policy, as methods of individual treatment 
and social control.  The pessimist recoils from this picture…He is apt to say, 
among much else, that the humanity of the offender himself is offended by this 
picture of his condemnation and punishment…[The picture] is painted in a style 
appropriate to a situation envisaged as wholly dominated by objectivity of 
attitude.131 
 
The general idea here is that treating an agent as merely a system-to-be-modified in 
accordance with our own wishes is equivalent to treating her as if she is not a member of 
the moral community.  But this behavior—treating members of the moral community as 
if they are proper objects of our control—is considered by most, including me, a moral 
offense.  And, if the explanation given to justify moral practices is itself morally 
offensive, it is inadequate.  Why should we care that our moral practices are reasonable 
and meaningful if they are also immoral?  Prospectivism’s idea of agents as intelligent 
deliberators can appease the pessimists. 
   Holding another agent responsible for her actions, on the prospectivist picture, is 
not a matter of controlling another agent, but rather, a matter of staking out the 
boundaries of one’s normative community.  In particular, the verbal or visual expression 
of praise and blame is a matter of communicating to the other that they have failed to take 
as authoritative the values that would qualify them as a full member of your normative 
community.   
   This can happen on both the trivial and more significant levels.  When one 
housemate blames another for failing to wash her dishes in a timely manner, she 
communicates the expectation that everybody in the house is to pull their own weight.  
She is, in essence, saying that, in order to be a full-fledged member of the house, her 
housemate must adopt and respect that value of a decent shared living space.  On a more 
                                                        
131 Strawson, P.F. 1962/1976. (206) 
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serious level, when one citizen accuses another of racism, she communicates her 
expectation that discriminatory attitudes have no place in her society. 
The imperatives we express via praise and blame are not, therefore, categorical.  
They are hypothetical, of the form: in order to be part of sub-community c, you must 
adopt values v.  Expressing such an imperative does not imply the disrespect of the agent 
toward whom it is aimed, nor an effort to manipulate that agent.  Rather, the blame is 
informational, informing the agent of stakes of which she may have been previously 
unaware, so that she can, if those stakes are important to her, figure them into her future 
deliberations.  Those who praise and blame us do not manipulate us.  Rather, they set us a 
problem, and thereby give us a choice: we can accept their value propositions as our own 
and remain in the community, we can reject both the community and the value 
propositions, or we can try through dialog to convince them that the value expectations 
they hold are unreasonable or inappropriate. 
Our attitudes and expressions of praise and blame thus perform a critical social 
function.  They are part of mapping the terrain of values against which future decisions 
must be made.  Dewey thus gets the essential point correct.  Blaming and praising are 
essentially forward-directed.  But they are not forward-directed in the sense that we are 
trying to manipulate others to our ends.  Rather, they express our expectation that another 
agent is capable of grasping the communal stakes of her decision.  This is quite the 
opposite of what the pessimist feared.  Such an expression is an expression of respect, not 
disrespect.  We are not attempting to manipulate agents to our ends.  We are attempting 
to inform them of our expectations.132 
                                                        
132 A similar story can be told about expressions of approval and disapproval.   
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Thus we can make sense of our moral practices, and be assured that they are not 
cruel and disrespectful, so long as they effectively embody the aim of informing others of 
the communal stakes of their decisions.  Notice, condemning someone for falling down in 
an earthquake does not fit this description, and this is what makes punishing someone for 
such behavior nonsensical and cruel.  But punishing people for stealing; holding them 
morally responsible for breaking promises; praising them for sharing their good fortunes 
with others; blaming them for failing to react more quickly in a disaster—all of these 
moral practices do fit the description.  These practices are justified and moral. 
If praise and blame, and approval and disapproval, are expressions of our own 
value expectations (i.e., our expectations regarding what will be valued by members of 
our moral community), then such behavior plays an important reciprocal educational 
function.  When we blame an individual for an action and demand reparations, we not 
only put at risk their membership in our moral community, but ours in theirs.  Since the 
cost of disintegrating one’s moral community is high, trying to jointly reconcile value 
discrepancies is, by default, the preferable strategy.  This will involve, first, diagnosing 
the various problems that have led us to accept the values we have come to accept and 
behave in the ways we have come to behave, and second, searching for a shared 
understanding that will allow us to avoid the positing of irreconcilable value differences.  
In this way, the practice of holding others morally responsible leads inevitably to a public 
mapping of the normative territory we all share.  This is why the practice is justifiable, 
even in a deterministic world.  Not only can prospectivism’s conception of intelligent 
deliberation give us what we might have once wanted from categorical freedom of 
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